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 5 
Introduction 
Sexism is defined as „individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, and 
organizational, institutional, and cultural practices that either reflect negative 
assessments of individuals based upon their gender or support unequal status of 
women and men“ (Swim & Hyers, 2007, p.2) and is mostly directed against women. 
In many ways it can be argued that sexism is not particularly prevalent and that 
complete gender equality is on the cusp of being achieved at least in industrialized 
countries (e.g., Jackson, 1998). Starting with the cultural, political and social 
movements of the 1960s and 70s, gender relations in Europe and North America 
seem to have shifted from considerable gender inequality to emerging egalitarianism. 
Egalitarian values have become more and more important (e.g., Helmreich, Spence, 
& Gibson, 1982; Twenge, 1997; Wells & Twenge, 2005) and laws were changed in 
terms of gender equity.  
However, these egalitarian norms did not result in real gender equality (for a 
review see Rudman & Glick, in press). Sexism and discrimination against women are 
still widespread all over the world (Glick et al., 2000; Swim, Becker, Pruitt, & Lee, in 
press). This can be seen on the societal level, for instance, regarding the ongoing 
gender-specific division of labor (Cornelißen, 2005; U.S. Department of Labor, 2006) 
as well as in everyday discrimination. Regarding the labor market, men, as compared 
to women, earn more money (e.g., Ostroff & Atwater, 2003; Cornelißen, 2005; 
European Commission, 2006a; U.S. Department of Labor, 2006), have more 
authority (e.g., McGuire & Reskin, 1993), receive more promotions (e.g., Brass, 
1984) and are overrepresented in decision-making positions (European Commission, 
2006b).  
Regarding everyday life, women report to experience about one to two sexist 
incidents per week (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001). These refer to 
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traditional gender stereotypes (e.g., expectations about women’s and men’s 
behaviors, and expressions of traditional gender stereotypes) and unwanted sexual 
attention (e.g., staring at body parts or unwanted sexual touching). Sexual or bodily 
objectification can also be experienced through media portrayals of women 
(Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997), for instance through the use of female bodies in 
advertisement to sell everything from toothbrushes to cars (Benokraitis & Feagin, 
1995). Furthermore, violence against women continues to be widespread in intimate 
relationships (e.g., Carlson, Worden, VanRyn, & Bachman, 2003; Cornelißen, 2005). 
A final example of common sexism is sexist language. Language teaches and 
reinforces gender role expectations and helps to maintain gender inequality (Swim, 
Mallet, & Stangor, 2004), for instance by using the generic masculine (Stahlberg & 
Sczesny, 2001), by interrupting women in conversations (Brooks, 1982), or by 
demonstrating inadequate behaviors when a woman is talking, e.g., by engaging in 
side conversations, checking the time, leaving the room to make phone calls, or 
turning away from the speaker (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Tannen, 1990). 
This evidence let scholars to conclude that sexism continues to reproduce 
gender inequality and to protect male privilege by a new language and new 
strategies (e.g., Benokraitis & Feagin, 1986; Glick et al., 2000; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, 
& Ferguson, 2001). Thus, open endorsement of sexist beliefs is not in line with social 
norms any longer, which is why it changed into covert and subtle manifestations of 
sexism (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Swim & Cohen, 1997). 
In response to these societal changes from blatant to subtle sexism, 
researchers developed new concepts to mirror contemporary forms of sexism. The 
most important developments during the past 15 years have been the concepts of 
Modern Sexism/Neosexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995; Tougas, Brown, 
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Beaton, & Joly, 1995) and the concept of Ambivalent Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), 
which will be outlined below. 
Interestingly, although belonging to the target group of gender discrimination, 
a substantial share of women reinforces subtle sexism (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). 
The present research has aimed at explaining individual differences in women’s 
endorsement of sexist beliefs and engagement in collective action on the one hand 
and has investigated ways of reducing endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs on the 
other. 
Throughout the research I refer to the newly developed concepts of subtle 
sexism. Therefore, before focusing on the role of women in the proliferation of gender 
inequality, the seminal concepts of contemporary sexism will have to be reviewed. 
1. Measures of Contemporary Sexism 
First, I review the concepts of Modern and Neosexism and afterwards focus on 
the concept of Ambivalent Sexism (ambivalence toward women and ambivalence 
toward men). 
1.1. Modern Sexism and Neosexism 
The concepts of Modern Sexism (Swim et al., 1995) and Neosexism (Tougas 
et al., 1995) have been developed independent from one another in order to assess 
“hidden” prejudice against women. Both concepts derive from research that was 
done on modern and symbolic racism (McConahay, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981, 
Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, Sears, 1988). 
Modern Sexism manifests itself in a denial of discrimination against women, 
resentment of complaints about sexism and resentment against special favors for 
women (e.g., affirmative actions; Swim et al., 1995). Neosexism is defined as 
“manifestation of a conflict between egalitarian values and residual negative feelings 
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toward women” (p. 843, Tougas et al., 1995) and is perceived as a socially 
acceptable way of expressing prejudice. Both of these beliefs represent resistance to 
efforts made in the direction of addressing the problem of sexism and imply an 
inclination to maintaining current gender relations: If there is no discrimination, then 
special efforts and policies directed at changing the gender system are unnecessary 
and complaints about sexism are overreactions which can be worth ignored. 
Critics could argue that in an absolutely egalitarian society, denial of gender 
discrimination is not indicative of sexism. Likewise, Swim et al. (1995) argued that it 
is an indispensable assumption of the concept of Modern Sexism, at least at the level 
of its operationalization, that sexism still exists. However, inasmuch as our society is 
far from being egalitarian, such objections are not indicated in present societies (e.g., 
Cornelißen, 2005; U.S. Department of Labor, 2006). Research has demonstrated 
divergent and convergent validity of both scales. Modern and Neosexism are distinct 
from endorsement of traditional gender roles and stereotypes (Swim et al., 1995; 
Swim & Cohen, 1997; Tougas et al., 1995), but correlate with several similar 
characteristics, such as lesser likelihood of judging particular incidents as sexual 
harassment (Swim & Cohen, 1997), overestimation of the number of women in 
masculine domains (Swim et al., 1995), negative attitudes toward Affirmative Action 
(Tougas et al., 1995), religious service attendance (Frieze et al., 2003), negative 
evaluations of feminists and feminism (Campbell, Schellenberg, & Senn, 1997), and 
greater use of sexist language (Cralley & Ruscher, 2005; Swim et al., 2004; for a 
review see Swim & Hyers, 2007). 
In spite of several similarities between Modern and Neosexism, there are 
some distinctions between the two measures. Researchers have argued that Modern 
and Neosexism scales appeared to measure different facets of the same construct 
(Campbell et al., 1997; Parks & Roberton, 2004): Both scales assess the three 
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dimensions of Modern Sexism as outlined by Swim et al. (1995): 1) denial of 
continued discrimination, 2) resentment of complaints about sexism and 3) 
resentment of special favors to women. Yet, the Modern Sexism scale primarily 
measures perceptions of discrimination whereas the Neosexism scale focuses 
mostly on the second and third subcomponent. An empirical test supported that both 
scales have different emphases. Swim, Becker, and DeCoster (2007) found that 
Modern and Neosexism items load on two different factors, indicating one factor with 
items assessing perceptions of the prevalence of sexism (which are mostly from the 
Modern Sexism scale) and a second factor with items measuring lack of support for 
efforts toward improvement of women’s status and a few items that could be 
considered as relatively blatant sexist beliefs (e.g., “It is difficult to work for a female 
boss”; which are mostly from the Neosexism scale). 
1.2. Ambivalent Sexism 
1.2.1 Ambivalence toward Women 
Glick and Fiske (1996) started their research with the question how women 
can be oppressed and loved at the same time. They referred to the concept of 
structural power (control over economic, legal and political institutions) and dyadic 
power (power that stems from dependencies in relationships, Guttentag & Secord, 
1983) and took into account that sexism emerges within the context of patriarchal 
structures which also include interdependencies between women and men 
developing in heterosexual relationships (Jackman, 1994). The interplay of structural 
and dyadic power elicits ambivalent sexist attitudes, which are composed of hostile 
and benevolent sexist beliefs. 
Hostile Sexism is clearly negative and fits Allport’s (1954) antipathy model of 
prejudice, but it is also counterbalanced by a subjectively benevolent view of women. 
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This benevolence is a result of men’s dependence on women for sexual reproduction 
and fulfilling domestic roles, hence lending women power in intimate relationships 
(Guttentag & Secord, 1983). 
Patriarchy, gender differentiation and sexual reproduction create both hostile 
and benevolent sexist beliefs: Hostile Sexism addresses dominative paternalism (i.e., 
the belief that men ought to have more power than women, which is accompanied by 
the corresponding fear that women seek to gain power by getting control over men), 
competitive gender differentiation (the belief that women are inferior to men on 
competence related dimensions, e.g., that in conditions of fair competition women 
were unable to win high-status roles) and hostile heterosexuality (the belief that the 
sexuality of women is dangerous for men, that women are “sexual teases” or “femme 
fatales” who seek control over men in their relationships). In sum, hostile sexists 
perceive women as seeking control over men, be it through sexuality or though 
feminist ideology. 
Hostile sexist beliefs are tempered by their benevolent counterparts: 
Benevolent Sexism includes protective paternalism (the belief that women should be 
protected and taken care of by men), complementary gender differentiation (the 
belief that women are the “better” sex, and have special qualities that few men 
possess, but only in ways suiting lower status and conventional gender roles, such 
as “other-profitable” traits (Peeter & Czapinski, 1990), in contrast to “self-profitable” 
traits which include the competence dimension which high-status groups excel on), 
and heterosexual intimacy (the belief that heterosexual romantic relationships are 
essential for true happiness in life and that women fulfill men’s romantic needs).  
Individuals scoring high on Hostile and Benevolent Sexism are the ambivalent 
sexists. They seem to reconcile their hostile and benevolent attitudes by classifying 
women into good (e.g., housewives) and bad subtypes (e.g., career women).  
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The Problem of Benevolent Sexism 
Benevolent Sexism seems subjectively positive, characterizes women as 
wonderful, pure creatures and may flatter women, but reinforces patriarchy by 
portraying women as childlike, incompetent, needing men to protect them and 
therefore as best suited for low status roles. Only those women who behave in line 
with sexist prescriptions for maintaining traditional gender role behavior are 
“rewarded” with affection, those who challenge men’s power (e.g., feminists, career 
women) and those who are perceived as using their sexual allure to gain power over 
men (e.g., temptresses) are punished with hostility (Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner & 
Zhu, 1997).  
Benevolent Sexism can also undermine the aspirations of women toward 
autonomy and socioeconomic progress. Benevolent Sexism is negatively associated 
with values of self-direction (e.g., freedom, independence, curiousness, choosing 
own goals, cf. Feather, 2004). It has been shown that women’s implicit (but not 
explicit) idealization of men as chivalric rescuers (e.g., Prince Charming), negatively 
predicts their interest in personal power (Rudman & Heppen, 2003). Further, women 
who endorse benevolent sexist beliefs assigned more importance to the 
characteristic “good earning potential” when choosing a mate, which presumably 
reflects a desire for a male provider (Johannesen-Schmidt & Eagly, 2003). Instead, 
women who endorse benevolent sexist beliefs conform to current beauty ideals and 
practices, as seen, e.g., in the use of cosmetics (Forbes, Collinsworth, Jobe, Braun, 
& Wise, 2007; Forbes, Jung, & Haas, 2006; Franzio, 2001) and in body 
dissatisfaction (Forbes et al., 2005). Taken together, benevolent sexist ideology 
increases women’s tolerance for acts of discrimination and promotes women’s 
individual advancement by pairing themselves with a powerful man who functions like 
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a social and economic elevator for women. Thus, many women do not perceive 
benevolence as discriminatory for their own lives and do not realize the harm it 
causes for women as a category. As a consequence, Benevolent Sexism deflates 
collective resistance of women against it by offering them a way of coming to terms 
with a sexist system individually without having to challenge the structure of the 
system as a whole (e.g., Wright, 2001; Ellemers, 2001). Therefore, whereas Hostile 
Sexism is likely to elicit women’s rebellion, Benevolent Sexism often obtains 
acquiescence and therefore works effectively and invisibly to promote gender 
inequality. 
In sum, the positive nature of benevolent sexist beliefs (e.g., chivalrous offers 
of help to “damsels in distress”) is particularly problematic since it may benefit 
individual women on a micro level, but is harmful for women in general on a macro 
level by representing an effective tool of oppression which exemplifies the ways in 
which women can be co-opted. 
 
The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory 
In order to measure Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, Glick and Fiske (1996) 
developed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI). Confirmatory factor analyses of 
the ASI with samples in the United States suggest that sexism encompasses 
separable hostile and benevolent components, which are moderately correlated. 
Although Glick and Fiske (1996) have suggested three subcomponents both for the 
hostile and for the benevolent scale, subfactors were only confirmed for the 
Benevolent Sexism scale. This factor structure was also found in 16 of 19 different 
countries from all over the world (Glick et al., 2000). Correlations between Hostile 
and Benevolent Sexism were higher for women (average r = .37) than for men 
(average r = .23). Furthermore they were higher in low sexist nations than in high 
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sexist nations and higher in low sexist individuals than in high sexist individuals. On a 
societal level, Hostile and Benevolent Sexism are strongly correlated (r = .89), 
supporting the argument that Benevolent and Hostile Sexism form complementary 
ideologies, like the stick and the carrot, motivating the acceptance of the system as a 
whole (Jackman, 1994). 
Variation in national Hostile and Benevolent Sexism scores are associated 
with a variation in gender inequality across nations: Men’s Hostile Sexism related 
significantly and men’s Benevolent Sexism related marginally significantly to United 
Nations indices of gender inequality (as measured with the Gender-related 
Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Measure), indicating that higher 
gender inequality is accompanied with men’s Hostile and Benevolent Sexism (Glick 
et al., 2000). 
Consistent with an antipathy characterization of most measures of sexist 
beliefs, Hostile Sexism was moderately to strongly correlated with measures of 
blatant sexism such as the Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS, Spence & 
Helmreich, 1972), the Rape Myth Acceptance scale (Burt, 1980), and also with the 
Modern and the Neosexism scale (Masser & Abrams, 1999). In contrast, Benevolent 
Sexism was only weakly correlated with these measures. These correlations even 
vanished, once the relation with Hostile Sexism was controlled for. Instead, 
Benevolent Sexism, but not Hostile Sexism, correlated with a measure of 
paternalistic chivalry (Viki, Abrams, & Hutchison, 2003). Moreover, Hostile and 
Benevolent Sexism predicted opposing valences in attitudes toward women: Hostile 
Sexism predicted negative and Benevolent Sexism positive attitudes toward women 
(Eckes, 2002; Glick et al., 1997; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Sibley & Wilson, 2004).  
Ambivalent sexists produced the highest degree of polarization in their 
judgments of subtypes of women (career woman vs. housewife) as well as men 
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(manager vs. softy; Eckes, 2001). Glick et al. (2000) interpreted these results as 
supporting the notion that Hostile Sexism and Benevolent Sexism generally target 
different types of women. 
Other researchers also found supporting evidence for the predicted validity of 
both scales: Benevolent Sexism is positively related to traditional values (Feather, 
2004). Individuals high on Benevolent Sexism positively evaluate those women who 
conform to traditional gender roles (Glick et al., 1997) and negatively evaluate those 
who violate traditional role expectations (Viki & Abrams, 2002; Viki, Massey, & 
Masser, 2005). For instance, benevolent sexists have more favorable impressions of 
the breastfeeding woman than those with low scores on the Benevolent Sexism scale 
(Forbes, Adams-Curtis, Hamm, & White, 2003). In contrast, Hostile Sexism is 
positively related to power values (Feather, 2004) and to negative evaluations of 
women who pose a threat to men’s status in the workplace (Masser & Abrams, 
2004). Consistent with these findings, Abrams, Viki, Masser, and Bohner (2003) 
found, that Hostile Sexism, but not Benevolent Sexism is associated with 
acquaintance-rape proclivity, whereas Benevolent, but not Hostile Sexism is 
correlated with blaming the acquaintance-rape victim for having behaved in 
inappropriate ways (see also Viki, Chiroro, & Abrams, 2006; Yamawaki, 2007).  
Social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, &Malle, 1994) and 
right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) are well established predictors of 
Ambivalent Sexism. Social dominance orientation is defined as the degree to which 
people favor group-based inequality and hierarchically structured relationships 
among social groups in society. 
Social dominance orientation causes negative attitudes toward competitive 
groups and is therefore a well established predictor of Hostile Sexism. Contrary, 
right-wing authoritarianism causes negative attitudes toward groups threatening 
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security, control and order and is hence more closely related to Benevolent Sexism 
(e.g., Christopher & Mull, 2006; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007; Whitley, 1999). 
Moreover, Benevolent Sexism can be predicted by catholic religiosity (e.g., Glick, 
Lameiras, Castro, 2002), while Hostile Sexism can be predicted by a protestant work 
ethic (Christopher & Mull, 2006). 
1.2.2 Ambivalence toward Men 
Although it is not central for the present work, it is worth noting that members 
of lower status groups are also affected by power and status differences and are 
likely to both resent and admire the powerful (Glick & Fiske, 1999). To catch 
women’s attitudes toward men, Glick and Fiske (1999) developed the concept of 
benevolent and hostile attitudes toward men and measured it with the “Ambivalence 
Toward Men Inventory” (AMI). Similarly to the ASI, the structure of the AMI is 
composed of a benevolent and a hostile superordinate factor, each of them having 
three subfactors related to paternalism, gender differentiation, and heterosexual 
relations.  
Hostility against men is characterized by resentment of paternalism (women 
resent the power and higher status associated with men), compensatory gender 
differentiation (women differentiate themselves positively from men by attributing 
negative stereotypes to men, e.g., being arrogant or being whining when they are 
sick) and heterosexual hostility (resentment of male sexual aggressiveness and of 
the threat of sexual violence). In contrast, benevolence toward men is composed of 
maternalism (belief that men are weak and need protection and nurturing, e.g., that a 
woman must take care of her man at home because he is incapable of doing so 
himself), complementary gender differentiation (admiration of men for their higher 
status) and heterosexual attraction (belief that the most important thing for happiness 
in life is a romantic relationship with a man). Altogether, hostility and benevolence 
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toward men reflect and support gender inequality by characterizing men as being 
designed for dominance. 
The hypothesized structure of the AMI was confirmed not only in the United 
States (Glick & Fiske, 1999), but also in 16 geographically and culturally diverse 
nations (Glick et al., 2004). Hostile and benevolent beliefs toward men were 
moderately positively related to each other and to Hostile and Benevolent Sexism (as 
measured by the ASI). Women, as compared to men, scored persistently higher on 
hostility toward men and lower on benevolence toward men. Therefore, some women 
simultaneously hold beliefs which actively support and justify male dominance at the 
same time that they resent the consequences of this dominance. 
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2. Women’s Role in Maintenance of Gender Hegemony: 
Doing Gender 
2.1 Prevalence of Doing Gender 
According to the “doing gender” perspective (West & Zimmerman, 1987), 
gender per se and therefore all gender differences are socially constructed and 
constituted by interaction. “Doing gender means creating differences between girls 
and boys and women and men, differences that are not natural, essential, or 
biological” (West & Zimmerman, 1987, p.24).  
Thus, women and men have internalized gender stereotypes and gender-
specific behavior: Men are “doing” more dominance and women are “doing” more 
deference, which reinforces and legitimizes hierarchical arrangements. For instance, 
women are taken less seriously than men because they express themselves in less 
powerful ways: Women speak more tentatively than men, use more tag questions 
(“It’s a nice day, isn’t it?”), unfinished sentences, disclaimers (“I could be wrong, 
but…”) and hedges (“hum, ah”). They ask more questions than they make 
statements and rather “support” than guide conversations (e.g., Carli, 1990; Lakoff, 
1975; Reid, Keerie, & Palomares, 2003). When men are talking, many women 
respond with smile, attentive listening and nodding (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). 
Furthermore, many women have internalized different self-silencing beliefs, 
which are composed of relationship maintenance and self presentation beliefs (Jack 
& Dill, 1992; Swim, Eysell, Quinlivan, & Ferguson, 2007). These represent the 
tendency to restrain one’s own thoughts and feelings in relationships in order to 
preserve harmony and to put other’s needs before one’s own. Therefore, they derive 
from gender related beliefs about appropriate behavior for women. These beliefs are 
related to self-silencing to sexism (Swim, Eysell et al., 2007). 
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Generally speaking, although women belong to the target group of gender 
discrimination, many of them typically agree with sexist beliefs: In a recent 
representative survey of the German adult population (Heitmeyer, 2007), 29.2% of 
the female respondents disagreed (“rather disagree” or “fully disagree” on a four-
point rating scale) with the (recoded) modern sexist statement that discrimination is a 
problem in Germany. And 31.2% of female respondents demand (“rather agree” or 
“fully agree”) that women should concentrate on their roles as wives and mothers, 
hence approving an item measuring traditional sexism. However, women’s 
endorsement of sexist beliefs is not only confined to Germany. Glick et al. (2000) 
have analyzed people’s benevolent and hostile sexist attitudes in 19 different 
countries all over the world. In all countries, men scored higher on Hostile Sexism 
than women, but this gender gap was smaller for Benevolent Sexism in four 
countries, non-significant in nine countries and even reversed in four countries. In 
these four countries, where women had significantly higher scores on Benevolent 
Sexism than men, men had the highest Hostile Sexism scores, as compared to the 
other 15 countries. This suggests that women in these countries may feel a 
particularly high level of threat due to men’s endorsement of hostile sexist beliefs 
and, in turn, endorse benevolent sexist beliefs because it implies the need for 
protection from this threat (Glick et al., 2000; Fischer, 2006). Altogether, these results 
imply that belonging to the target group of discrimination does not automatically 
protect from endorsement and active maintenance of the current gender hegemony 
(see e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994). This phenomenon is not only observable for women, 
but for disadvantaged individuals and groups in general: Almost all societies involve 
social inequality and unequal distributions of resources and power, some individuals 
and groups are socially devalued, materially disadvantaged and have a lower status 
compared to other individuals and groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). However, there 
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is typically little protest by members of these groups against social inequality. Thus, it 
seems as if disadvantaged individuals tolerate their situation and feel reluctant to 
challenge the system that oppresses them (Major & Schmader, 2001; Wright, 2001). 
Surprisingly, despite being discriminated against, disadvantaged individuals report, in 
comparison to members of socially advantaged groups, equal or greater levels of 
personal and collective self-esteem (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989). 
The present research therefore is an attempt to understand this paradoxical 
reaction of members of disadvantaged groups, exemplified by women as one of the 
disadvantaged groups. More specifically, the present research focuses on 
explanations for the phenomenon that many women endorse sexist beliefs and 
legitimize gender inequality, whereas others do not. Based on these considerations, 
possibilities to reduce endorsement of sexist beliefs are derived and empirically 
tested. 
2.2. Reasons for Women’s Endorsement of Sexist Beliefs 
In the following, different possible explanation for endorsement of sexist 
beliefs will be delivered. These are legitimizing ideologies, individual advantages of 
sexism and lack of awareness of the prevalence and harm of sexism. Based on this 
review, the major shortcomings of previous research on explanation of women’s 
endorsement of sexist beliefs are pointed out and the connection to the present 
research is presented. 
Legitimizing ideologies work not only for women but for all disadvantaged 
groups. Therefore, I start with a broad focus on disadvantaged groups in general to 
underline the universal mechanism by which long-term social inequality is upheld. I 
then regard the disadvantaged group of women in depth.  
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2.2.1 Legitimizing Ideologies 
The classic position established by the most influential conflict model (Marx & 
Engels, 1888/1959) posits that force, violence and hostility are primary features of 
expropriate regimes to control subordinates. Such regimes engender resentment and 
resistance among disadvantaged groups, which inevitably leads to intergroup conflict 
and to attempts to subvert the legitimate rule (Marx & Engels, 1888/1959).  
However, a scan through history impressively shows that most expropriate or 
oppressive social relations have survived for centuries without any evidence of 
political resistance (Jackman, 1994, 2005). Such stable social relations point to the 
assumption that there is more than just openly practiced violence and dominance at 
play securing the maintenance of expropriative or oppressive relationships. 
Therefore, other theorists have postulated that pure power is impotent and instead 
groups use more subtle means of managing oppressive relations and thereby win the 
voluntary acceptance (Machiavelli, 1517/1940) and consent of the vast majority of 
the population (Gramsci, 1971). Theoretical advances made in classic conflict theory 
have suggested that dominant groups achieve legitimacy1 by using ideological 
means to induce a “false consciousness” among subordinates (Gramsci, 1971; Marx 
& Engels, 1846/1970). Marx and Engels argued that the primary function of ideology 
is to legitimize ideas and actions that might otherwise be objectionable. Dominant 
ideologies mask the real interests of the privileged groups and serve to rationalize, 
legitimize and justify social and economic forms of inequality. Therefore, ideologies 
are a prerequisite of the stability of any social order. Within society, legitimizing 
ideologies are held consensually and get their power through this collective 
                                                 
1I use a broad definition of legitimacy adopted from Zelditch (2001). For Zelditch, “something is 
legitimate if it is in accordance with the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by 
a group” (p. 33). 
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endorsement (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Gramsci, 1971; Kluegel & 
Smith, 1986; Major, 1994; Marx & Engels, 1846/1970; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  
Legitimizing ideologies are, for instance, system justification (Jost & Banaji, 
1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980), belief in 
meritocracy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and in a protestant work ethic (Mirels & 
Garrett, 1971). Sidanius and Pratto (1999) distinguish between hierarchy-enhancing 
“legitimizing myths”, which justify and support group-based social inequality from 
hierarchy-attenuating “legitimizing myths”, which support social equality. 
System justification theory has integrated several concepts and was 
developed to explain societal groups’ agreement with social stereotypes as well as 
with the prevalence of outgroup favoritism among members of disadvantaged 
groups. System justification means that people are motivated to not only positively 
evaluate their own self and the groups they belong to (see Social Identity Theory, 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Social Dominance Theory, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), but also 
the superordinate societal system. Based on the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980), 
Jost and colleagues argue that people want to believe that social outcomes and 
arrangements are fair, legitimate and deserved. Believing otherwise would imply that 
people might be treated unfairly, are not able to cause (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), and 
control their own outcomes (Langer, 1977) and that the world is not a predictable 
place (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). Individuals avoid these beliefs, 
because perceptions of undeserved suffering raise discomfort (Lerner, 1980; van den 
Bos & Lind, 2002; see also theory of cognitive dissonance, Festinger, 1957).  
Therefore, by legitimizing social distributions, system justification reduces 
anxiety, guilt, dissonance and uncertainty both for those who are advantaged and for 
those who are disadvantaged (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Moreover, it justifies inaction 
of subordinates against social injustice (Taylor & Dube, 1986), because those who 
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are most disadvantaged have the most to explain, to justify and to rationalize (Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). However, for members of privileged groups, 
motives of ego, group and system justification are consistent and complementary, 
whereas for members of disadvantaged groups they are often in conflict. As a 
consequence, members of disadvantaged groups show a tendency to justify existing 
status hierarchies, even when those hierarchies are to the disadvantage of them or 
their own group.  
Assumptions of system justification as well as the belief in a just world have 
been empirically supported. Jost and colleagues found that the belief that every 
group in society possesses some advantages as well as some disadvantages, thus 
perceiving discrimination as being balanced, increased system justification. For 
example, women’s system justification scores were increased by the complementary 
representation of gender stereotypes of women as communal and men as agentic or 
of Benevolent and Hostile Sexism (Jost & Kay, 2005). Belief in a just world is 
associated with derogating innocent victims (see Furnham & Procter, 1989), 
acceptance of inequalities in society (e.g., Smith, 1985) and justification of personal 
deprivation (Hafer & Olson, 1989).  
Endorsement of legitimizing ideologies has also implications for self-esteem. 
On the one hand, appraisals of illegitimacy which pertain to specific situations of 
prejudice can buffer self-esteem: Researchers have demonstrated that attributing 
negative outcomes to discrimination is an effective strategy to protect personal self-
esteem when prejudice appears to be blatant and unambiguously sexist (Crocker & 
Major, 1989; Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003). On the other hand, the 
development of chronic perceptions of discrimination can have negative 
psychological consequences, because it can threaten important beliefs that sustain 
one’s sense of self-worth and the perception that one is valued by others (Major & 
INTRODUCTION 
 23
Schmader, 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 1997). Therefore, blaming poor outcomes to 
discrimination in contexts where prejudice cues are weak or nonexistent, is not a 
protection but rather a threat to self-esteem (Brown & Siegel, 1988; Major et al., 
2003). This is consistent with the finding that the belief in personal control and the 
belief in a just world are positively associated with self-esteem and well-being (Taylor 
& Brown, 1988). Thus, one reason why individuals deny personal experiences with 
discrimination might be that it buffers their self-esteem.  
An effective strategy to legitimize the gender system, to reduce chances of 
real change in power relations and to keep women in their “place” is tokenism.  
Tokenism is defined as restricted intergroup context where only a few 
members of the disadvantaged groups gain access to advantaged positions, while 
the vast majority of the group remains in a disadvantaged position (Kanter, 1977; 
Wright & Taylor, 1999). Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998) commented that while 
“women and minorities have made inroads into the power elite, the overwhelming 
majority at the top continues to be white, wealthy, Christian and male.” 
Considering successful tokens, Wright (2001) answered the interesting 
question, as to whether those tokens support their disadvantaged group. He 
manipulated the opportunity of social mobility in a higher status group and analyzed 
responses from three perspectives: the perspective of the disadvantaged, of the 
advantaged and of the successful tokens who gained access to the higher status 
group. He contrasted responses to tokenism with responses to completely closed 
and completely open contexts in terms of social mobility. Wright (2001) found that 
successful tokens do not support their disadvantaged group, but in contrast, are 
sufficient to undermine the interest of collective action of members of disadvantaged 
groups who are denied access to higher status groups. This is consistent with 
findings of Ellemers (for an overview see Ellemers, 2001) that individual upward 
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mobility of women can help to perpetuate existing differences between women and 
men. Ellemers found that women who have been successful in male-dominated 
organizations (she labeled those women as “queen bees”) hold stereotypical images 
of other women: Compared to male faculty members, female faculty members rated 
female Ph.D. students as significantly less committed to the organization and to their 
career than the male students (Ellemers, van den Heuvel, de Gilder, Maass, & 
Bonvini, 2004). She argued that the unwillingness to support the disadvantaged may 
result from their rapid shift in identification from the low to the high status group. 
Moreover, Wright found that under conditions of tokenism, the disadvantaged 
themselves are also unwilling to support collective action on behalf of their group. 
Therefore, tokenism can serve as an effective tool by which dominants can maintain 
their position of power. 
2.2.2 Possible Advantages of Sexism 
As mentioned above, women who conform to traditional gender roles are 
rewarded with benevolence, whereas those who disconfirm to these roles are 
punished with hostility. Therefore, the former can individually profit from subtle 
sexism and hence do not perceive it as prejudicial. Especially chivalry refers to 
superficially courteous behavior that can be perceived as protective, paternalistic and 
positive (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). Some women may feel flattered by offers of 
protection, adoration and enjoy being part of “the better sex” (Glick & Fiske, 1999). 
They reinforce gender stereotypes to get affection and potential rewards from 
dominant group members. This is consistent with Jackman’s (1994) argument that 
long-term inequality is maintained by paternalistic systems that accompany 
expropriation with affection toward disadvantaged groups. An extreme form of 
paternalistic prejudice is slavery which is couched by the dominant group as 
benevolent (e.g., White man’s burden).  
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Jackman (1994) argued in her velvet-glove theory that members of dominant 
as well as of subordinate groups have self-interested reasons for avoiding hostility 
and conflict. From her point of view, the small share of resources subordinates 
receive from dominants provide a potent incentive for subordinates and a sufficient 
motivation to cooperate and comply. Thus, dominants provide subordinates to a 
sufficient degree with a stake in the system, thereby encouraging them to fulfill the 
dominants’ needs without social conflict. As mentioned above, pairing with a powerful 
man can serve a woman as a social and economic elevator. Therefore, women 
would have something to loose, at least short-term, if they started to challenge men’s 
social privileges.  
Besides the fear of losing rewards, self-stereotyping has the function of 
increasing personal and collective self-esteem. Many women can get self-esteem by 
favorably distinguishing themselves from men and by seeing themselves as superior 
in some – typically status irrelevant – areas, e.g., by being proud of superior 
domestic abilities, by attributing negative traits to men (e.g., arrogance) or by 
characterizing men as not being as capable as they might appear, when taking a 
“behind the scenes” point of view (e.g., men are like children, cf. Glick & Fiske, 
1999).  
Since conformity is rewarded and deviation punished, not confronting sexism 
can have the additional advantage to be accepted by a (male) group. For instance, 
women report to complicit in sexist humor, to be “one of the guys” (Benokraitis & 
Feagin, 1995). Further, many women want to avoid rejection and reprisal. Studies 
have shown that, in general, people constantly try to shape other people’s 
impressions of themselves. They desire to appear nice, and try to get others to like 
them. Complaining about discrimination can often produce undesirable 
consequences, such as creating the impression of incompetence, selfishness, or 
INTRODUCTION 
26 
being a whiner. Researchers have demonstrated, that the pressure to be polite 
(Swim & Hyers, 1999), and the fear to be labeled a feminist (Swim, Pearson, Chau, & 
Stangor, 2003) can inhibit women’s tendency to confront sexism. In addition, women 
(as well as men) can directly benefit from being sexist: In a study of Watkins et al. 
(2006) it has been found that women (as well as men) who endorse modern sexist 
beliefs rely on men’s (versus women’s) work-related advice and, in turn, obtain more 
promotions than their less modern sexist counterparts.  
The opposite effect, that is, experiences of individual disadvantages lead to a 
stronger rejection of sexist beliefs has also been shown: Tougas, Brown, Beaton and 
St.-Pierre (1999) found that women’s endorsement of neosexist beliefs is negatively 
related to social mobility attempts. When women perceived that barriers in a non-
traditional female field of work prevented their upward mobility, they felt collective 
relative deprivation, which in turn was associated with lesser endorsement of 
neosexist beliefs. 
2.2.3 Lacking Awareness of Gender Inequality and its Harm 
Subtle sexism is integrated into cultural and societal norms and therefore built 
into people’s everyday routines. As described above, many women get used to 
sexism and internalize it as customary and normal behavior (Benokraitis & Feagin, 
1995). In comparison to blatant sexism, subtle sexism is difficult to discover, because 
subtle forms of sexism do not match the mental prototype of sexist perpetrators. As a 
consequence, individuals are not aware of subtle manifestations of sexism or they do 
not perceive them as anything serious and harmful (Swim et al., 2003; Swim, Mallett, 
Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). Several researchers found empirical support for 
this phenomenon: Women were disinclined to recognize expressions of Modern 
Sexism as prejudicial (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a), and people endorsing benevolent 
sexist statements are less likely to be perceived as sexist than those endorsing 
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hostile sexist views (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b). Women prefer egalitarian men over 
benevolent men, but nevertheless evaluate a benevolent sexist men profile slightly 
positively (Kilianski & Rudman, 1998). The lacking awareness of manifestations of 
sexism in language was demonstrated by Swim et al. (2004). They showed that 
Modern Sexism is associated with the use and non-detection of sexist language. 
People improved their ability to detect sexist language when it was defined for them. 
Moreover, modern sexist beliefs are associated with a lack of awareness of the 
extent to which the work force is segregated along gender lines and people who 
endorse these beliefs overestimate the percentage of women in male-dominated jobs 
(Swim et al., 1995). In addition, beliefs about the prevalence of discrimination are the 
central element of modern sexist beliefs, thus it is assumable that people may 
endorse Modern Sexism because they do not perceive discrimination in their 
personal lives and are not aware of the prevalence of sexism in society. 
In contrast, people may be likely to think that benevolent sexist men’s 
statements are less sexist than those of hostile sexist men, because the positive 
nature of the former hides the harm they can cause (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a; 
Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Swim et al., 2005). Therefore, people may endorse 
benevolent sexist beliefs because they do not perceive benevolence as 
discriminatory in their personal lives and are not aware that these beliefs can 
promote harm especially for women as a category. 
Hence, it is likely that informing people about the prevalence, respectively 
harm of sexism can reduce modern sexist, respectively benevolent sexist beliefs. 
These assumptions have not yet been tested and become central in the second part 
of the present dissertation. 
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3. Present Research 
The present dissertation is based on two manuscripts. In Manuscript #1, the 
Gender Identity Model was developed to predict individual differences in women’s 
endorsement of sexist beliefs and engagement in collective action. In Manuscript #2 
the impact of heightened sensitivity for the prevalence of sexism and its harm on the 
reduction of benevolent, modern and neosexist beliefs was analyzed. 
3.1 Predictors of Women’s Endorsement of Sexist Beliefs: 
Shortcomings in Research 
As described above, several correlates and predictors of sexism have been 
identified. These predictors are primarily relatively stable personality traits and 
attitudes (e.g., authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, religiosity, protestant 
work ethic). Yet, researchers analyzed predictors of endorsement of sexist beliefs for 
women and men at the same time. They did not focus on women’s endorsement of 
sexist beliefs in particular. Therefore, the contradiction between being a member of 
the target group of gender discrimination and simultaneously reinforcing sexist beliefs 
is still insufficiently considered (for an exception see, Cameron & Lalonde, 2001). 
However, the objective group membership (e.g., being a woman) is accompanied by 
a more or less subjective sense of belonging to that certain group (i.e., strength of 
social identification with women as a group, Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore, it 
should be taken into account that the endorsement of sexist beliefs might depend on 
the strength of women’s gender identification. It is likely that women who are strongly 
identified as compared to those who are low identified with their gender in-group are 
more sensitive to gender-related information and motivated to evaluate their gender 
in-group favorably to maintain positive self esteem. Equally, negative evaluations of 
women in general should be more self-relevant for highly identified women than for 
low identified women. Therefore, highly identified women should reject sexist beliefs 
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stronger than low identified women, since negative evaluations are self-relevant and 
harmful to them. Research on support for feminism is in line with this argument 
(Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000; Harquail, 2007). 
However, a further important distinction which needs to be made is the one 
between the strength of identification and identity content (cf. Condor, 1984): Women 
who are highly identified can associate either more progressive or more traditional 
values with the gender category. These different in-group connections result in 
different perceived group norms and as a consequence in different ways of thinking 
and acting. It is likely that women who associate traditional values with women as a 
group as compared to those with progressive associations adhere more strongly to 
sexist beliefs, because they understand differences in social behavior between 
women and men as genetically determined and value traditional relations between 
women and men. 
Identity content is specified for instance, by the concept of gender roles 
derived from Social Role Theory (SRT; Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Wood, 1999). Gender 
roles cover a broad range of associations women and men connect with their gender 
category and determine prototypical in-group norms. According to SRT, gender 
differences in social behavior are based on contrasting social roles of women and 
men (Eagly & Wood, 1999). In most Western societies, women are more likely 
responsible for home and family, while men are more often employed outside their 
home (e.g., U.S. Department of Labor, 2006). Both women and men adapt their 
social behavior to fulfil role requirements and therefore tend to act in ways that are 
appropriate for their roles. As a consequence, gender-specific role expectations 
become internalized as part of individuals’ self-concepts and personalities (Feingold, 
1994; Wood, Christensen, Hebl, & Rothberger, 1997). On an individual level, 
however, not all society members do accommodate to traditional gender roles in the 
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same way. As a result of the feminist movement of the 1970’s, many individuals 
disconfirm with traditional gender role expectations such as career women, female 
leaders, feminists, house husbands or homosexual couples (Jagose, 2001). For this 
reason, we expect that women have internalized different gender roles. Whereas 
some women internalize a traditional gender role, others prefer a more “progressive” 
or “modern” gender role. Therefore, the connection between strength of gender 
identification and endorsement of sexist beliefs is not straightforward, but depends on 
identity content. This is the starting point of the first part of the present dissertation. 
Built on the distinction between strength of gender identification and content of 
gender identity in explaining individual differences in women’s endorsement of sexist 
beliefs, we developed the Gender Identity Model. Combining these two orthogonal 
dimensions results in four general types of gender identity: traditional identifiers, 
progressive identifiers, traditional non-identifiers, and progressive non-identifiers (for 
a comparable model see Condor, 1984). 
In Manuscript #1, it was tested whether differences in women’s endorsement 
of benevolent, hostile and modern sexist beliefs can be explained with this model. In 
order to not only consider differences in attitudes toward sexism but also differences 
in actual behavior, we also focused on participation in collective political actions 
aiming to improve women’s social status in society (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 
1990). We predicted that women with a traditional gender role orientation adhere 
more strongly to sexist attitudes and reject collective action more strongly than 
women with a progressive gender role orientation, on condition that they are highly 
identified with their gender category. We did not predict these effects for low 
identified women. 
To test this hypothesis, we started with a correlational study and analyzed the 
data with moderated regression analyses. In two following experiments, we 
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examined the causal relation between different gender identities and endorsement of 
sexist beliefs as well as participation in collective action by manipulating the salience 
of gender role preference. We analyzed the interaction effect of the gender role 
manipulation and strength of gender identification on endorsement of sexist beliefs 
and intention to engage in collective action. 
3.2 Antidotes - Reduction of Sexist Beliefs 
As a consequence of advancing knowledge about predictors to explain 
endorsement of sexist beliefs, ways are focused to reduce endorsement of these 
beliefs. Reduction of ethnic prejudice is well explored (e.g., Oskamp, 2000; Pettigrew 
& Tropp, 2006; Stephan & Vogt, 2004). However, although sexism is prevalent and 
widespread all over the world and has negative consequences for women at least on 
a macro level, there exists almost no research on the reduction of sexist beliefs. 
Therefore, the second part of the present dissertation addresses this shortcoming 
and expands previous research on predictors of subtle sexism by investigating 
options to reduce endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs. 
Considering the reasons for endorsement of sexist beliefs as listed above, 
individuals adopt ideological belief systems partly because of the psychological 
needs and motives they satisfy (like the reduction of guilt, uncertainty and cognitive 
dissonance; Jost et al., 2003). Moreover, endorsement of such ideologies can help to 
secure self-esteem. For women who conform to Benevolent and Modern Sexism, 
possible individual advantages which can result are, for example, being rewarded 
with benevolence and affection, or being flattered by offers of protection (Benokraitis 
& Feagin, 1995). Taken together, it appears difficult to change legitimizing ideologies 
as well as to simply withhold women their individual advantages of sexism because 
they serve different motivational functions (see e.g., Jost et al., 2003).  
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Therefore, instead of trying to change motivational factors, we focused on 
cognitive causes of endorsement of sexist beliefs, such as a lack of awareness of 
prevailing sexism and of the harm experienced by the targets of discrimination. 
Results of Swim et al. (2004) suggest that people use sexist language because they 
do not define it as sexist. Equally, denial of discrimination might implicate that people 
do not define various types of sexism as sexist. Therefore, a lack of awareness of 
prevailing sexism might be responsible for endorsement of modern sexist beliefs. It is 
likely that information about the prevalence of sexism changes endorsement of 
modern sexist beliefs, because perception of gender discrimination is the core 
element of the Modern Sexism scale. Due to conceptual overlaps between Modern 
and Neosexism, changes in Neosexism are also likely.  
In contrast, it was posited that Benevolent Sexism appears to be positive on 
the first glance and that many women do not realize the harm it can cause, e.g., by 
characterizing women as childlike and best suited for conventional gender roles. 
Therefore, a lack of awareness of the harm experienced by the targets of 
discrimination might cause endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs.  
Consequently, in the second part of the present research it was investigated 
whether a heightened awareness of the prevalence of sexism can reduce modern 
and neosexist beliefs and whether a heightened awareness of harm experienced by 
the targets of sexism can reduce benevolent sexist beliefs. We tested these 
assumptions with three experiments. 
In the first experiment we tested whether a heightened sensitivity toward 
sexism in people’s everyday life can change endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs. To 
heighten the awareness for sexism, participants were asked to write in a daily diary. 
They were either instructed to pay attention to sexism or they were instructed to 
focus on stress in their lives and to complete several sexism scales afterwards. We 
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analyzed the data by comparing the sexism scores of people who completed the 
sexism diary with those who completed the stress diary. 
Next, we tested in a second experiment, whether information about the 
prevalence of sexism reduces endorsement of modern and neosexist beliefs, 
whereas information about the harm and negative consequences of seemingly 
positive behaviors like paternalism reduces endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs. 
For this purpose, we created three different information texts, a) about the 
prevalence of sexism, b) about the harm caused by sexism and c) about stress in 
students’ lives (control condition). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
three text conditions. Again, data was analyzed by comparing the three groups in 
their endorsement of benevolent, modern and neosexist beliefs. 
Whereas the first two experiments were conducted with American students, 
the third experiment aimed to replicate and extend findings of Experiment 2 in a 
European context. 
In all three experiments, we analyzed the role of gender identification in the 
process of changing sexist beliefs separately for women and for men. We predicted 
that women who are highly identified with their gender in-group would be influenced 
more strongly by information about sexism. Therefore, we assumed that for highly 
identified women the prejudice-reducing effect would be stronger than for low 
identified women. 
In contrast, men highly identified with their gender in-group are likely to 
perceive such information as a threat to their gender identity and react with 
reactance. Thus, we assumed that information about the prevalence and the harm of 
subtle sexism reduces endorsement of sexist beliefs more strongly in low identified 
than in highly identified men.  
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We also aimed at testing the interplay of the strength of gender identification 
and identity content (i.e., the gender role preference) on changing women’s 
endorsement of sexist beliefs. We expected that the prejudice reducing effects would 
be stronger for traditional identifiers than for progressive identifiers, because 
progressive identifiers might be less prejudiced anyway. 
To control for changes in legitimizing ideologies we also included a measure of 
system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994). We tested in each of the three experiments 
whether a heightened sensitivity for the prevalence of sexism results not only in 
changes concerning modern sexist beliefs but also in a stronger rejection of system 
justification beliefs. Plus, we investigated whether this relation would be mediated by 
changes in modern sexist beliefs. 
In sum, the present dissertation is composed of two manuscripts and aims at 
explaining the role of different gender identities in explaining women’s endorsement 
of sexist beliefs and based on this, it explores possibilities to reduce the acceptance 
of subtle sexist beliefs. Whereas the first part of the dissertation explicitly focuses on 
women, the second part includes research on both women and men, because 
reduction of sexist beliefs is meaningful not only for women but also for men. 
Manuscript #1 (Becker & Wagner, 2007) was meant to investigate the explanatory 
impact of the Gender Identity Model on endorsement of benevolent, hostile and 
modern sexist beliefs as well as of participation in collective action. In Manuscript #2 
(Becker & Swim, 2007), we investigated whether endorsement of modern and 
neosexist beliefs can be reduced via heightened sensitivity toward the prevalence of 
sexism and whether endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs can be reduced via 
heightened sensitivity to the harm experienced by the targets of gender 
discrimination.  
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The present dissertation ends with a conclusion including a brief summary and 
discussion of both manuscripts’ results, as well as suggestions for future research 
and a final outlook. 
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Abstract 
To explain differences in women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs, we introduce 
the Gender Identity Model. Based on Social Identity Theory and Social Role Theory, 
we combine strength of gender identification and identity content and propose that 
different types of gender identity can be distinguished, which are predicted to relate 
to different levels of women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs and engagement in 
collective action. Results of a correlational study and two experiments support the 
assumptions of the model: Women reject Benevolent, Hostile and Modern Sexism 
and participate in collective action in particular when they are highly identified with 
the category women and have, at the same time, internalized progressive identity 
contents. In contrast, gender role preference has weaker or no effects on sexist 
beliefs and collective action when women are low identified with their gender in-
group. 
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Although women belong to the target group of gender discrimination it does 
not automatically protect them from endorsement and active maintenance of the 
unequal gender status quo (see e.g., Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Jost & Banaji, 
1994). Research shows that not only men but also women endorse sexist beliefs, 
namely Benevolent, Hostile and Modern Sexism (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a, 
2005b; Glick et al., 2000; Jackman, 1994; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Swim, Mallett, 
Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). Benevolent Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) takes the 
form of seemingly positive but in fact condescending beliefs about women. 
Benevolent Sexism includes protective paternalism (e.g., the belief that women 
should be protected and cared for by men), complementary gender differentiation 
(e.g., the belief that women have – typically domestic – qualities that few men 
possess), and heterosexual intimacy (e.g., the belief that heterosexual romantic 
relationships are essential for true happiness in life and that women fulfill men’s 
romantic needs). The counter part to Benevolent Sexism is Hostile Sexism. Hostile 
Sexism is clearly negative and fits Allport’s (1954) classic definition of prejudice as 
“an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (p. 9). Hostile sexists 
perceive women as seeking control over men, be it through sexuality or through 
feminist ideology. Modern Sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995) is 
characterized by doubts about the current prevalence of sexism, unfavourable 
attitudes toward people who complain about sexism and rejection of support for 
programs and legislation designed to reduce gender inequality.  
Endorsement of sexist beliefs can take different forms, which range from 
blatant expressions of sexism like endorsement of old-fashioned and hostile sexist 
beliefs to subtle forms like denial of continuing gender discrimination and paternalism 
(Swim, Mallett, Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). Research has shown that blatant 
forms of sexism are increasingly less accepted, whereas subtle forms of sexism 
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receive a markedly stronger support (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a, 2005b; Swim 
et al., 2005).Yet there is also variation between women in their tendency to reject 
sexism: Whereas a substantial part of women endorse sexist beliefs and deny or 
legitimate gender inequality, others reject every manifestation of sexism and engage 
in collective action to change unequal gender relations (e.g., Foster & Matheson, 
1998; Liss, Crawford, & Popp, 2004). To explain differences in endorsement of sexist 
beliefs among women, we introduce the Gender Identity Model. Based on Social 
Identity Theory (SIT; e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Social Role Theory (SRT, e.g., 
Eagly & Wood, 1999), we argue that, firstly, different types of gender identity can be 
distinguished and, secondly, that these types explain for different levels of women’s 
endorsement of sexist beliefs. 
In order to not only consider differences in attitudes toward sexism but also 
differences in actual behavior, in the present paper we focus on differences in 
endorsement of sexist beliefs as well as on participation in collective political actions 
aiming to improve women’s social status in society (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 
1990). 
 
Women’s Endorsement of Sexist Beliefs: The Role of Strength of Gender 
Identification 
 
To explain endorsement of sexist beliefs, previous research has focused 
primarily on interindividual differences in relatively stable personality variables. For 
instance, it has been shown that right wing authoritarianism, social dominance 
orientation (e.g., Christopher & Mull, 2006; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 
2004; Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson 2006), adherence to a protestant work ethic 
(Christopher & Mull, 2006) and religiosity (e.g., Glick, Lameiras, Castro, 2002; Frieze 
et al., 2003) are predictors of the endorsement of sexist beliefs. However, most of 
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this research did not consider women as proponents of sexist attitudes and therefore 
ignored the contradiction between individual endorsement of sexist beliefs on the one 
hand and actually belonging to the target group of discrimination on the other hand.  
We argue that it is central to consider interindividual differences in the 
importance of belonging to the category women to understand women’s 
endorsement of sexist beliefs. According to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), it is 
necessary to differentiate between the objective category membership and the 
subjective sense of belonging to that category. That is, all women are part of the 
group of women, but not all women have the same subjective feeling towards 
belonging to this group: They vary in how strongly they identify themselves with their 
gender category. Social identification derives from the subjective importance of the 
group to the self (e.g., Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) and from “the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63; for a recent approach 
see Cameron, 2004). Therefore, according to SIT, women’s interest in issues which 
concern the social category of women, as well as women’s sensitivity to the 
evaluations and treatment of women should increase as a function of women’s 
identification with their gender in-group. Deduced from SIT, it is reasonable to 
assume that highly identified women reject sexist views because, especially for them, 
negative evaluations of their gender group are self-relevant and therefore harmful. 
Indeed, among those women who identify strongly with their female in-group, 
researchers report stronger support for feminist demands (Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 
2000) and a stronger engagement to advocacy on behalf of the female in-group 
(Harquail, 2007). 
However, strength of identification is not consistently related to in-group bias 
(Brown & Zagefka, 2005). For instance, Hinkle and Brown (1990) found in their 
review that the overall correlation between identification and in-group-bias was close 
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to zero. Therefore, although a positive relation between identification with the group 
of women and rejection of sexist beliefs seems straightforward, the consideration of 
the strength of women’s gender identification is not enough to understand women’s 
endorsement of sexist beliefs. We argue for an important qualification. 
 
The Role of Identity Content 
Identification per se motivates to act on behalf of one’s in-group. The direction 
of group behavior is, however, contingent on in-group norms (Turner, 1991). Thus, 
thinking and acting of in-group members depend on what they perceive as the 
prototypical in-group norm. For instance, Pehrson, Brown & Zagefka (2007) pointed 
out, that social identity processes should not be treated as independent from identity 
content. They delivered evidence showing that the relation between national 
identification and prejudice was moderated by identity content. We argue in a similar 
way that the relation between gender identification and endorsement of sexist beliefs 
is moderated by identity content. Women can associate progressive values with their 
gender in-group (i.e., women are independent, make own careers, interfere in 
politics, share household tasks and child care equally with men, reject traditional 
gender-related values) or traditional values and norms of femininity (i.e., women stay 
at home, do the household, take care of the children, valuing gender-specific 
behaviors and treatment of women, support the gender-specific division of labor). 
These different in-group attributes result in different perceived group norms and as a 
consequence in different ways of thinking and acting. Thus, as Pehrson et al. (2007) 
suggested, beside the strength of identification, it is important to take identity content 
into account. Whereas strength of identification energizes the behavior, identity 
content directs this behavior. 
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In previous research on the endorsement of sexist beliefs the distinction 
between strength of identification and identity content was almost neglected by either 
focusing solely on one of both constructs, or mixing them together in a single 
indicator (e.g., Foster, 1999). For instance, research on feminist identity (e.g., 
Downing & Rush, 1985; O’Neill, Egan, Owen, & Murry, 1993) confounds strength of 
identification and identity content, by ignoring that a woman might be identified with 
her gender group without favoring feminist attitudes. 
To the best of our knowledge, only Cameron and Lalonde (2001) and Condor 
(1984) considered strength of gender identification, and identity content, separately. 
However, both approaches did not analyze the interplay of strength of identification 
and identity content in explaining women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs.  
We propose that gender role preference (derived from Social Role Theory, 
Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Wood, 1999) is the most important source of identity content. 
We expect that women have internalized different gender roles. Whereas some 
women internalize a traditional gender role, others prefer a more “progressive” or 
“modern” gender role. Moreover, depending on the strength of identification, women 
tend to apply their internalized gender role to the whole gender category which is the 
core assumption of the Gender Identity Model. 
 
The Gender Identity Model 
The Gender Identity Model (GIM) explicitly differentiates between strength of 
identification and content of identity (preference for a traditional vs. progressive 
gender role) which pose, at the same time, the core dimensions of the model. 
Theoretically, four types of gender identity can be separated (see Figure 1): 
traditional identifiers, progressive identifiers, traditional non-identifiers, and 
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progressive non-identifiers. Since Condor’s (1984) conceptualization served as a 
model for the GIM we will retain her terminology. 
Highly identified women do not only set their own behavior in relation to the 
gender role, but also the behavior of other in-group members (i.e., other women). 
When gender identification comes into play, women project their view about what is 
right and wrong for women (i.e., their internalized gender role) to the whole category 
and therefore demand role-conform thinking and behavior from other women, too. 
For low identified women, gender role is more neutral and less of a reference point 
for the evaluation of their own and other women’s behavior.  
Therefore, within the GIM, strength of identification captures the motivation of 
a woman to act on behalf of her gender in-group, whereas gender role preference 
specifies the prototypical in-group position and thus the direction of behavior. 
Progressive identifiers are highly identified and prefer a progressive gender role. 
They reject traditional definitions of femininity regarding these attributes as artificial 
and serving to maintain women’s subordination. Condor (1984) assumed that 
progressively identified women want to redefine their gender in their own terms. 
These women perceive their gender group to be of lower societal status than the 
male gender group and claim for changes in status relations. Therefore, feminists as 
a female subtype would fit into the category of progressively identified women. 
Women who are highly identified and prefer a traditional gender role for their 
personal lives are the traditional identifiers. For them, being a woman is important 
and moreover, they prefer to stay at home instead of pursuing a career, take care of 
the family and value traditional relations between women and men. Therefore, they 
associate traditional contents with women as a social category. Condor (1984) found 
that traditional women do not perceive their gender to be of lower status in 
comparison to men. In contrast, they regard women as positively distinct from men. 
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Hence, they are motivated to justify the current gender system (Jost & Banaji, 1994). 
Traditional identifiers do not challenge “their place” in society. With their attitudes and 
behaviors, traditional identifiers support the gender status quo and thus contribute to 
the maintenance of the unequal social order. We assume that the subtype of 
housewives and anti-feminists would fit into this category of the traditional identifiers. 
An analog distinction can be made for low or non-identifiers: Women for whom 
being a woman is not essential, but who internalized a progressive gender role are 
the progressively non-identified women. According to Condor (1984), they regard 
themselves as different from other women and accept masculine but not feminine 
characteristics as self-applicable. Since masculine traits were associated with 
achievement and academic success, progressively non-identified women were most 
highly represented among professional women and students in Condor’s (1984) 
sample. They also could be queen bees (Ellemers, van den Heuvel, de Gilder, 
Maass, & Bonvini, 2004) and disidentify with their gender in order to identify with 
male-dominated professions and use men rather than women as their reference 
group. Therefore, it is possible that these women view other women, who are not of 
high achievement, as less worthy. 
The traditional non-identifiers evaluate being a woman as not self-relevant and 
simultaneously adopt a traditional gender role. Condor (1984) reported that these 
women support the gender status quo, but rate themselves neither as ‘not 
particularly’ feminine, nor as ‘not particularly’ masculine. Condor argued that these 
women might identify more with their husband than with other members of their own 
gender in-group (see de Beauvoir, 1949). It is assumable that these women are 
housewives for whom being a woman does not play a role.  
The GIM allows for formulating specific hypotheses about the extent of 
endorsement of sexist beliefs depending on different types of identity. We 
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hypothesize that women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs and participation in 
collective action to change the current gender system depends on the interplay 
between strength of identification and identity content (i.e., gender role preference). 
According to the GIM, women who are highly identified with their gender in-group 
should differ in their endorsement of sexist beliefs and participation in collective 
action depending on the identity content (i.e., their gender role preference). In 
contrast, for low identified women, identity content should not affect endorsement of 
sexist beliefs and engagement in collective action. Therefore, the relation between 
gender role preference on the one hand and endorsement of sexist beliefs and 
participation in collective action on the other should be moderated by women’s 
identification with their gender in-group: We expect that highly identified women who 
prefer a rather traditional gender role show a stronger endorsement of sexist beliefs 
and a stronger rejection of collective action as compared to highly identified women 
who have internalized a rather progressive gender role. We do not predict these 
effects for low identified women.  
To test the predictions derived from the GIM, we conducted a correlational 
survey (Study 1) and two experimental studies (Study 2 and Study 3). 
 
STUDY 1 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were a convenience sample of N = 250 non-student women, who 
participated voluntarily and were obtained via student assistants. They were between 
the ages of 20 and 65, with a mean of 42 years. 22% had a high school diploma and 
a further 31% a university degree. Three percent indicated that they were homo- or 
bisexuals.  
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Measures 
All items could be answered on a six point rating scale (1 = “disagree strongly” 
to 6 = “agree strongly”).  
Gender role preference was assessed with a newly developed scale 
measuring individual role preferences and actually lived gender roles. Most of the 
previous gender-related instruments captured either general gender-related attitudes 
(e.g., attitudes toward women, Spence & Helmreich, 1972; modern and ambivalent 
sexism) or they failed to hold sufficient construct validity like the Sex Role Behavior 
Scale (Orlofsky & O'Heron, 1987; McCreary, Rhodes, & Saucier, 2002). Thus, none 
of the existing scales were appropriate for our approach and we therefore developed 
and tested a new scale in a pretest. Items were phrased in a way that they measured 
individual approval and living of gender roles (e.g., “For me, it is important…” or “I 
am….”). Such phrases should implicate that women think about their own gender 
role, which is rather neutral and descriptive in comparison to general prescriptive 
statements, as for instance sexist beliefs, i.e., “For women, it is important…” or “We 
should be…” Partially adopting items from former scales, e.g., from the ALLBUS (a 
yearly representative German survey, see EA, 2002), we developed a pool of 33 
items for the pretest (e.g., “It is more important for me to support the career of my 
partner than to go ahead by myself”, “When I date a man, I would feel unpleasant if I 
had to pay”). The items covered different areas of women’s everyday life, such as, 
job (e.g., preference for a career, vs. household), politics (e.g., preference to engage 
in politics), dealing with children (e.g., preference for child care), partner relationship 
(e.g., preference for traditional treatment, like to be proposed to instead of proposing 
marriage oneself), social norms (e.g., preference for keeping maiden-name).  
A pretest sample of 70 non-student women (age range 20-68 years; mean age 
of 40 years) was recruited via friends and acquaintances. Respondents answered the 
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33 gender role items, and, in addition, the Benevolent, Hostile and Modern Sexism 
scales and eight gender role behavior items. The exploratory factor analysis for the 
gender role items yielded a one factor solution (eigen values: 5.34, 2.09, 2.07, 1.85, 
1.69, 1.39, 1.34, 1.16, .97, etc.). From the pool of 33 items those eight items that 
showed highest factor loadings and item-total correlations in reliability analysis were 
chosen to form a gender role preference measure (see appendix). High scores 
indicate preference for a traditional gender role, low scores indicate preference for a 
progressive gender role. In the pretest, the composite measure showed a sufficient 
internal consistency (α = .75).1 
Internal consistency for the gender role preference scale was α = .73 in Study 
1. The following scale descriptions are also based on the sample of Study 1. 
Identification. Identification with the gender in-group was measured with 4 
items developed by Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, & Williams (1986; “I identify 
with the group of women”), Cameron (2004; “I feel strong ties to other women”; 
“Overall, being a woman is an important part of my self-image”) and Haslam, Oakes, 
Reynolds, & Turner (1999; “Being a woman is important for me”). Internal 
consistency was satisfactory (α = .82).  
Sexism. Contemporary conceptualizations of sexist beliefs are the Benevolent 
Sexism, the Hostile Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and the Modern Sexism scale 
(Swim et al. 1995). To cover a broad range of contemporary sexist attitudes, we used 
all three scales as dependent variables. Benevolent and Hostile Sexism were 
                                                 
1 We used the pretest data (N = 70) to test the construct validity of the scale by comparing the gender 
role preference scale with Benevolent, Hostile and Modern Sexism measures in their ability to predict 
gender role behavior: Gender role behavior was measured by eight items comparing the participants’ 
and the reported partners’ behavior in different household tasks (e.g., doing laundry, dishes, taking 
care of sick family members, cleaning the flat, α = .78). A regression analysis with gender role 
behavior as the dependent variable and the gender role preference scale and Benevolent, Hostile and 
Modern Sexism as independent predictors showed that the gender role preference scale was the 
strongest predictor for gender role behavior (B = -.25, SE = .07, p < .01) in comparison to Benevolent 
(B = -.03, SE = .06, ns), Hostile (B = -.14, SE = .07, p < .10) and Modern Sexism (B = .16, SE = .07, p 
< .05). That is, higher preference for a traditional gender role relates to a stronger gender specific 
division of labor at home. 
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measured using items of the German translation of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory 
(Eckes & Six-Materna, 1999) and two self-developed items. Nine items measured 
Benevolent Sexism (BS, α = .82; e.g., “Women should be cherished and protected by 
men”), and five items Hostile Sexism (HS, α = .76; e.g., “When women lose to men in 
a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against”). 
Modern Sexism (MS) was measured with nine items (e.g., “Discrimination against 
women is no longer a problem in Germany”) chosen from a German version of the 
Modern Sexism Scale (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1998) and one additional self-
developed item. Internal consistency of the scale was sufficient (α = .84). Items of 
BS, HS and MS were given in a mixed order.  
Collective action. We included items measuring women’s engagement in 
actions directed at improving the conditions of the entire group of women (CA; 
Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). The five-item scale (α = .83), for instance, 
assessed the item “I have signed a petition advocating women’s issues (e.g., 
affirmative action)” or “I participated in protests regarding women’s issues” (items 
were chosen from Foster & Matheson, 1995). 
We imputed all missing values using the expectation maximization algorithm 
(Little & Rubin, 1987). Missing values did not exceed 3% in any of the variables. 
 
Results 
Descriptives and intercorrelations of all measures are provided in Table 1.  
Preliminary analyses 
To test whether the measures of gender role preference, BS, HS and MS can 
be separated, we computed Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using Mplus 4.2 
(Muthén & Muthén, 2006) and compared a model with four correlated latent factors 
(all construct indicators form separate but correlated latent factors) with a model with 
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only one latent factor (all construct indicators load on one latent factor). We used 
parcels as indicators (three parcels for BS, MS and gender role preference, and two 
parcels for HS) in order to reduce the number of parameters (cf. Little, Cunningham, 
Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). Results of the CFA (robust maximum likelihood 
estimates) clearly showed that the four correlated factors model (χ2 (55) = 49.17, p = 
.11; comparative fit index (CFI) = .99; root-mean-square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) = .03, standardized-root-mean-square-residual (SRMR) = .03) represents 
the data significantly better (∆χ2corrected (11) = 45.63, p < .001; Satorra & Bentler, 
2001) than the one factor model (χ2 (44) = 465.26, p < .001; CFI = .56; RMSEA = .20; 
SRMR = .12). Moreover, a further CFA upheld the proposition that gender 
identification and gender role preference should be regarded as separate dimensions 
(r = .08, see Table 1): Model comparison revealed a comparable model fit of a two 
uncorrelated factors model (χ2 (13) = 37.22, p < .001; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .09; 
SRMR = .06) and the correlated two factors model (χ2 (14) = 37.70, p < .001; CFI = 
.95; RMSEA = .08; SRMR = .06; ∆χ2corrected (1) = .36, ns) showing that gender 
identification and gender role preference are almost orthogonal. Comparing the two 
uncorrelated factors model with the one factor model (χ2 (14) = 201.37, p < .01; CFI = 
.57; RMSEA = .231; SRMR = .15) using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
showed that the uncorrelated two factors model (BIC = 5515.52) was better than the 
one factor model (BIC = 5685.57). 
Test of GIM predictions 
To test our main hypothesis, we conducted four separate hierarchical 
moderated regression analyses in order to be able to keep gender identification as a 
continuous measure (c.f. Aiken & West, 1991). BS, HS, MS and CA were dependent 
variables. Predictor variables in all regression analyses were centered, as 
recommended by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003). In a first step, we entered 
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gender identification and gender role preference in the regression and received 
significant regression models for all four dependent variables (results are provided in 
Table 2). Gender role preference and identification were significant predictors for all 
three sexism measures and CA. A higher preference for a progressive gender role (B 
= .40, SE = .07 p < .01 for BS; B = .16, SE = .06, p < .05 for HS; B = .27 SE = .06, p 
< .01 for MS and B = -.17, SE = .07, p < .05 for CA) and a higher gender 
identification (B = -.12, SE = .05 p < .05 for BS; B = -.11, SE = .05, p < .05 for HS; B 
= -.12 SE = .05, p < .05 for MS and B = .34, SE = .06, p < .01 for CA) are related to 
lower scores on BS, HS, MS and higher scores on participation in CA. 
Including the interaction term in the second step resulted in a significant 
improvement of each of the four regression models and significant interactions (B = 
.12, SE = .06 p < .05 for BS; B = .23, SE = .05, p < .001 for HS; B = .11 SE = .05, p < 
.05 for MS and B = -.15, SE = .06, p < .05 for CA). 
Figure 2 (a-d) shows simple slopes of the regressions of each of the three 
sexism scales and CA on gender role preference for highly identified (one SD above 
the mean) and low identified respondents (one SD below the mean). In accordance 
with our predictions, simple slopes were positive and significant for respondents who 
are highly identified with their gender for each of the three sexism scales (B = .53, SE 
= .08, p < .001 for BS; B = .40, SE = .08, p < .001 for HS and B = .38, SE = .08, p < 
.001 for MS) and negative for CA (B = -.35, SE = .08, p < .001). This implies that 
progressive identifiers reject sexist statements and engage in CA more than 
traditional identifiers. The simple slope for low identified women is positive and 
significant for BS (B = .27, SE = .08, p < .01, but weaker than the simple slope for 
high identifiers), and not significant for HS, MS and CA (B = .09, SE = .08, ns; B = 
.15, SE = .08, ns; B = .00, SE = .08, ns, respectively). That is, for low identifiers, 
DOING GENDER DIFFERENTLY 
66 
there is no difference between women with different gender role preferences in their 
endorsement of HS and MS and participation in CA. 
We also performed all four moderated regression analyses controlling for age 
and education in the first step, because young age and high education could be 
features of progressively identified women. Age had an impact on BS, HS, MS and 
CA (B = -.01, SE = .01, p < .05; B = -.01, SE = .01, p < .05; B = -.02, SE = .01, p < 
.001 and B = .03, SE = .01, p < .001, respectively). Older women showed a higher 
rejection of all forms of sexism and a stronger participation in CA. Education had an 
impact on HS (B = -.33, SE = .13, p < .05) which implies the higher the education, the 
higher the rejection of hostile sexist beliefs. The interaction effects on BS, HS, MS 
and CA (B = .12, SE = .06, p < .05; B = .18, SE = .06, p < .01; B = .09, SE = .05, p = 
.065; B = -.12, SE = .06, p = .058, respectively) remained at least marginally 
significant. 
 
Discussion 
Altogether, the results support the assumptions of the GIM. For each of the 
three forms of sexism, namely BS, HS, MS, and for the behavioral indicator CA, the 
interaction between strength of identification and content of identity was significant 
and in the expected direction. Consistent with predictions of the GIM, gender role 
preference has an impact on sexist beliefs and engagement in CA only when women 
are highly identified with their gender in-group: Highly identified women with rather 
traditional identity contents endorse every form of sexist beliefs stronger and reject to 
participate in related CA more than highly identified women who connect progressive 
values with their gender in-group. In contrast, for low identified women, identity 
content had less impact on women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs and their 
engagement in CA. Therefore, the results demonstrate the importance of 
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differentiating between strength of gender identification and content of gender identity 
for a better understanding of women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs.  
Results of Study 1 were correlational and hence the causal predictions 
proposed by the GIM cannot be tested critically. We proposed an influence from 
types of gender identity on sexism and CA. Nevertheless, the data would also fit to a 
model according to which sexist beliefs determine the type of gender identity. Study 2 
was designed to address this issue by experimentally manipulating the salience of 
the content of identity (i.e., gender role) and using identification with the gender in-
group as a quasi-experimental factor.  
 
STUDY 2 
Aim of the manipulation of the gender role was to increase the short-term 
cognitive accessibility of either a progressive or a traditional gender role. Although 
gender roles are internalized and thus relatively stable, research shows that it is 
possible to separate individuals from their social roles that regulate their behavior 
(e.g., Lightdale & Prentice, 1994). According to the GIM, we predict that women 
primed with a progressive gender role adhere less strongly to sexist attitudes and 
more strongly to CA than non-primed women, whereas women primed with a 
traditional gender role adhere more strongly to sexist attitudes and reject CA more 
strongly than non-primed women do. This should only be true for women highly 
identified with their gender.  
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Method 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via internet. Some participants got the link from 
thematic web pages (e.g., web pages of women’s magazines), others received the 
link via a snow balling system. Participants were debriefed 1 month later. Participants 
were 222 women, ages ranged from 16 to 66 years, with a mean of 26 years. 97% of 
the participants classified themselves as Germans, 3% as “other”. 57% of the 
participants were students, 75% had a high school diploma and 11% a university 
degree. Participants were randomly assigned to three experimental conditions 
(progressive gender role condition, N = 73; traditional gender role condition, N = 77; 
control condition, N = 72). 
Gender identification was measured before the experimental manipulation with 
the same four items as in Study 1 (α = .76) and served as quasi-experimental factor. 
To manipulate gender role salience, participants in the two experimental 
conditions read a short text about women’s gender roles to make either a progressive 
or a traditional gender role salient. Participants in the control condition received no 
text. The texts about the progressive gender role/ traditional gender role explained 
that the feminist movement seems to boom/ to decline in recent years, that women 
do not live/ do live in accordance to the classic female gender role (anymore) and 
that they do the same / more domestic work than men do. Moreover they are told that 
more and more women get self realization in the job domain/ family domain and have 
the same/ less interest in powerful positions in economy and politics as men have, 
and that many young women use typical feminine attributes (e.g., being nice) but 
also typical masculine attributes (e.g., being assertive)/ respectively typical feminine 
attributes to describe themselves.  
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Study Measures 
Two items were used as a manipulation check to assess whether participants 
processed the information in the short text correctly. They were asked to rate 
whether “For the majority of women, the maintenance of the classical role 
assignment is important” and whether “Most women feel comfortable with the 
traditional gender role”. Both items were highly correlated (r =.84), and composite to 
one measure. 
We used shortened measures of MS (4 items), BS (6 items), HS (2 items) and 
CA (5 items) as dependent variables, based on the scales used in Study 1 (see 
appendix). In order to have a measure which is sensitive for changes, items for CA 
were changed from measuring actual behavior into a measure to assess the intention 
to engage in CA, e.g., “I would participate in protests regarding women’s issues”. All 
items were answered on Likert scales from 1 = “disagree strongly” to 6 = “agree 
strongly”. Items were given in a mixed order. Internal consistency of the BS scale (α 
= .81), the MS scale (α = .77) and the CA scale (α = .83) were satisfactory. The two 
HS items (r = .58, p < .001) were highly correlated and thus averaged to form a 
single indicator of HS. 
 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the manipulation check as dependent 
variable and experimental condition as between subject-factor revealed a main 
effect, F(2,219) = 92.81, p < .001, η² = .46. Planned comparisons between the 
progressive condition versus the control condition and between the traditional 
condition versus the control condition support effectiveness of the manipulation. 
Participants in the progressive condition (M = 4.49, SD = .96) had significantly higher 
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scores on the manipulation check than participants in the control condition (M = 3.37, 
SD = 1.38; F(1,219) = 52.30, p < .001, η² = .19), whereas participants in the 
traditional condition (M = 2.05, SD = .88) had lower scores than participants in the 
control condition, F(1,219) = 39.98, p < .001, η² = .15. Gender identification did not 
interact with experimental conditions.  
Test of GIM predictions 
In Table 3 descriptives and intercorrelations of all measures are summarized. 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted four separate hierarchical moderated 
regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) using the three sexism scales and CA as 
dependent variables. The experimental factors were recoded into two dummy 
variables. For the first variable (progressive role), participants in the progressive 
priming condition were assigned a one, participants in the other two conditions were 
assigned a zero. In the second variable (traditional role), participants in the traditional 
priming condition were assigned a one, whereas all other participants were assigned 
a zero. In regression analyses, in the first step, the two dummy variables and 
identification were entered. When both dummy variables are simultaneously included 
in the analyses, the progressive role compares only the progressive versus the 
control group and the traditional role compares only the traditional versus control 
condition. In the second step, the two interaction terms (progressive role x 
identification; traditional role x identification) were entered. The models predicting all 
four dependent measures are displayed in Table 4. 
Entering the two dummy variables and gender identification in the first step 
resulted in significant effects of the progressive role on BS and HS (B = -.37, SE = 
.19, p < .05; B = -.54, SE = .21, p < .05, respectively). Entering the interaction terms 
in the second step into the regression equation resulted in a significant improvement 
in each of the regression models except for MS. As expected, the interaction term 
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progressive role x identification was negative and significant for BS and HS and 
positive and significant for CA (B = -.40, SE = .17, p < .05; B = -.48, SE = .20, p < .05 
and B = .46, SE = .18, p < .05, respectively). The interaction term traditional role x 
identification was positive for all sexism variables, however, significant and negative 
only for CA (B = -.61, SE = .18, p < .01). Therefore, none of the sexism scales were 
influenced by this interaction. 
As predicted, simple slope analyses for high identifiers in the progressive 
gender role condition revealed significant negative slopes for BS and HS (B = -.73, 
SE = .26, p <.01; B = -.98, SE = .29, p <.01; respectively) and a significant positive 
slope for CA (B = .69, SE = .28, p <.01), whereas slopes for the low identifiers were 
not significant for BS, HS, CA (B = .08, SE = .26, ns; B = -.03, SE = .29, ns and B = -
.22, SE = .28, ns, respectively). Therefore, only for high identifiers, but not for low 
identifiers, scores on BS and HS were significantly lower and for CA significantly 
higher when a progressive gender role was made salient. Also and accordant to our 
assumptions, in the traditional gender role condition we found a significantly negative 
slope for CA (B = -.96, SE = .28, p <.01). In contrast, for low identifiers the 
manipulation had no impact on CA (B = .28, SE = .28, ns; see Figure 3). Therefore, a 
salient traditional gender role leads only to a decreased intention to engage in CA 
when women are highly identified with their gender in-group. Contrary to our 
hypotheses, a salient traditional gender role did not affect women’s endorsement of 
sexist beliefs. 
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Discussion 
As proposed by the GIM, highly identified women showed a stronger rejection 
of BS and HS and an increased intention to engage in CA when a progressive 
gender role was salient. In contrast, when a traditional gender role was salient, highly 
identified women were less willing to participate in CA. Also accordant with the GIM, 
the priming manipulation had no influence on the endorsement of sexist beliefs and 
the interest in CA among low identified women.  
However, evidence for the GIM was not unequivocal. Against our 
expectations, the traditional gender role manipulation had no significant effect on 
endorsement of BS and HS in highly identified women. In addition, endorsement of 
MS was neither affected by the progressive nor by the traditional role priming in 
highly identified women. One reason for the lack of effect of the traditional gender 
role manipulation among high identifiers on endorsement of sexist beliefs might be 
that - especially in a highly educated sample - it is considerably easier to make a 
progressive gender role salient than a traditional gender role: Priming of a traditional 
gender role can elicit reactance effects, especially among progressive women (which 
are probably overrepresented in more highly educated samples). However, we found 
an effect of the traditional gender role priming for high identifiers on CA: This 
dependent variable aims at improving the status of the entire group. When 
participants are told that most other women feel comfortable with their traditional 
gender role, they might have been less motivated to act against the majority of their 
in-group (i.e., act against sexism), but might focus on individual strategies to improve 
their own status instead (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).  
The lack of effects for endorsement of MS might also be due to the 
manipulation: The text about the progressive gender role claimed, for instance, that 
most women prefer progressive gender roles and men do 50% of the domestic work. 
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Such claims can lead to the idea that gender equality has already been realized in 
Germany. Beliefs about the prevalence of gender equality are the core element of the 
MS scale, hence it is not surprising that this kind of manipulation did not affect 
women’s MS scores.  
To overcome the described limitations, we conducted a further experimental 
study using a new gender role priming. We considered two points. First, in order to 
avoid reactance against the manipulation, we chose a more subtle manipulation for 
the traditional gender role priming. Second, in order to increase the likelihood to 
influence modern sexist beliefs, we tried to avoid that the priming of the progressive 
role could lead to the assumption that gender equality has been realized in Germany. 
 
STUDY 3 
Method 
Procedure 
Study 3 was again an online-experiment. Design and procedure did not differ 
from Study 2. We only changed the manipulation and did not retest effects for CA, 
because the predictions of the GIM were fully supported for CA in Study 2. 
Participants were 106 women, ages ranged from 16 to 61 years, with a mean of 27 
years. 98% of the participants classified themselves as Germans, 2% as “other”. 
About half of the participants were students, 63% had a high school diploma and 
17% a university degree. 
Manipulation 
In order to induce a deeper elaboration of the content of the manipulation and 
therefore have a more effective priming, we asked participants to actively think about 
a progressive, respectively about a traditional gender role (instead of passively 
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reading a text as in Study 2). In a brief instruction, participants of the two 
experimental conditions were told that women and men have different social roles 
and that this role assignment has advantages and disadvantages for women. In the 
traditional gender role condition, participants were asked to focus only on advantages 
and to neglect the disadvantages of being a woman. In order to help focussing on the 
advantages, participants received eight examples of possible advantages of the 
traditional role assignment for women like having lower career pressure, a better 
possibility to build up a close relationship with children or to be financially secured by 
men. To avoid reactance, participants had the opportunity to disagree with the 
examples by asking them to rate these items on a six point rating scale ranging from 
“disagree strongly” to “agree strongly”. In contrast, in the progressive gender role 
condition, participants were asked to think about the disadvantages of the traditional 
gender role assignment for women. They got eight items indicating several possible 
disadvantages like the financial dependency of women on men, the amplification of 
gender inequality or not being taken seriously by men, and were also asked to rate 
these items. With this kind of manipulation, we avoided that participants might get the 
idea that gender equality has been realized. In the control condition, participants 
conducted no such rating and started directly with the manipulation check. 
Study Measures 
Manipulation Check. To check for the effectiveness of the gender role 
manipulation, all participants were asked to estimate whether the different social 
roles for women and men rather have advantages or disadvantages for women. The 
seven-point scale was ranging from (1) “exclusively disadvantages”, to (4) “neither 
disadvantages nor advantages” to (7) “exclusively advantages”. 
Gender identification and the sexism items were the same as in Study 2. Items 
were given in a mixed order. Internal consistency of the identification scale (α = .76), 
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BS scale (α = .79) and the MS scale (α = .78) were satisfactory. The two HS items 
were highly correlated (r = .68, p < .001). 
 
Results 
Descriptives and intercorrelations of all measures are provided in Table 5. To 
test the hypotheses, we used the same procedure and the same dummy coding as in 
Study 2.  
Manipulation Check 
We first checked whether women in the three conditions differed in their 
evaluation of the existence of different gender roles. As expected, women in the 
progressive condition had significantly higher scores than women in the control and 
in the traditional role condition (B = -.83, SE = .27, p <.01). Similarly, women in the 
traditional role condition had lower scores than women in the control condition and in 
the progressive condition (M = 3.22, SE = 1.02; M = 3.65, SE = 1.10; M = 4.81, SE = 
1.80, respectively B = -.55, SE = .27, p <.05). Both effects were moderated by gender 
identification: The effect for the traditional (B = -.68, SE = .26, p <.05) and the 
progressive role condition (B = 1.07, SE = .43, p <.01) were strongest for women 
highly identified with their gender in-group (F (5,100) = 17.07, p < .01). That is, 
especially highly identified women in the progressive role condition rated that the role 
assignment has disadvantages for women, whereas especially highly identified 
women in the traditional gender role condition responded that the traditional role 
assignment has advantages for women.  
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Test of GIM predictions 
Consistent with the hypotheses, the progressive role priming decreased 
endorsement of BS, HS and MS (B = -.74, SE = .27, p <.01; B = -.79, SE = .29, p 
<.05; B = -.52, SE = .23, p <.05, respectively). Neither the traditional role priming nor 
identification had an effect on endorsement of sexist beliefs (results are provided in 
Table 6). 
Entering the interaction terms progressive role x identification and traditional 
role x identification resulted in a significant improvement in each of the three 
regression models. As expected, both interaction terms were significant for all three 
dependent variables: The interaction term for the progressive role x identification was 
negative and significant (all ps < .05) for BS, HS and MS (B = -.55, SE = .24; B = -
.54, SE = .26; B = -.49, SE = .21, respectively), whereas the interaction between the 
traditional role and identification was positive and significant (all ps < .05) for BS, HS 
and MS (B = .50, SE = .25; B = .58, SE = .27; B = .43, SE = .21, respectively). 
Therefore, the impact of both types of gender role priming depended on women's 
identification with their gender-in-group.  
In accordance with our predictions, simple slope analyses for BS, HS and MS 
yielded significant negative slopes for highly identified women in the progressive role 
condition (B = -1.15, SE = .33, p <.001; B = -1.08, SE =.35, p <.01 and B = -.89, SE = 
.28, p <.01, respectively), whereas slopes for low identified women were not 
significant for each of the three sexism measures (B = -.05, SE = .33, ns; B = -.01, 
SE =.35, ns and B = .09, SE = .28, ns, respectively). Thus, a salient progressive 
gender role leads to greater rejection of BS, HS and MS, only for women who are 
highly identified with their gender in-group (see Figure 4a-c).  
Also supporting our predictions, simple slopes for BS, HS and MS revealed a 
significant slope for highly identified women in the traditional role condition (B = .81, 
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SE = .37, p <.01; B = .88, SE = .40, p <.01 and B = .67, SE = .32, p <.01, 
respectively). In contrast, for low identified women the manipulation had no impact on 
BS, HS and MS (B = -.14, SE = .37, ns; B = -.01, SE = .40, ns; and B = -.01, SE = 
.32, ns, respectively). Therefore, a salient traditional gender role leads to a higher 
endorsement BS, HS and MS, again, only when women are highly identified with 
their gender in-group. For low identified women, the manipulation did not influence 
their endorsement of different forms of sexism (see Figure 4a-c). 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3 replicated and extended the findings of Study 2. Highly 
identified women showed not only a stronger rejection of BS, HS, but also of MS, 
when a progressive gender role had been made salient. Therefore, we achieved to 
improve the manipulation successfully in the way that it also affected endorsement of 
MS. Moreover, in accordance with the predictions of the GIM, highly identified 
women showed a higher endorsement of BS, HS and MS when a traditional gender 
role had been made salient, whereas the priming did not influence endorsement of 
sexist beliefs in low identified women. This finding offers evidence that the priming of 
the traditional gender role was more subtle and did not elicit reactance in women. 
The causal assumption of the GIM was fully supported: Increased or 
decreased endorsement of sexist beliefs was due to the salient type of gender role in 
highly identified women. 
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General Discussion 
The Gender Identity Model was developed to explain different levels of 
endorsement of sexist beliefs among women. Based on SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
and SRT (Eagly & Wood, 1999), we separated different forms of gender identity by 
distinguishing the strength of identification from the content of identity. We 
hypothesized that among women who are highly identified with their gender in-group 
endorsement of sexist beliefs and sympathy for CA depends on the gender role 
preference: Whereas progressive identifiers were expected to reject sexist beliefs 
and engage in CA, traditional identifiers were assumed to endorse sexist beliefs and 
to reject CA. For low identified women, we did not expect this effect. 
Three studies supported these propositions and provided empirical evidence 
for the GIM. In Study 1, we demonstrated that highly identified women who prefer a 
more traditional gender role showed a stronger endorsement of BS, HS and MS and 
a stronger rejection of CA compared to those highly identified women who prefer a 
more progressive gender role. For low identified women gender role preference had 
almost no influence on the endorsement of sexist beliefs and CA. In Study 2, we 
found partial experimental causal evidence for the predictions of the GIM for BS and 
HS and full experimental causal evidence for the prediction concerning CA: A primed 
progressive gender role resulted in stronger rejection of BS and HS and a stronger 
engagement in CA when women were highly identified, whereas a primed traditional 
gender role resulted in stronger rejection of CA, again, only for highly identified 
women. Based on a critical review of our manipulation used in Study 2, we improved 
the priming of gender roles and tested the new manipulation in a further experimental 
study. Results of Study 3 fully supported the predictions of the GIM. Only for highly 
identified women, a primed progressive gender role led to rejection of BS, HS and 
MS and the intention to engage in CA, whereas a primed traditional gender role led 
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to a stronger endorsement of all three types of sexist beliefs and a stronger rejection 
of CA. For low identifiers, manipulation had, as expected, no effect. Taken together, 
the GIM enables to explain why some women support the gender status quo, 
although they are members of the target group of gender discrimination and why 
others reject the unequal gender system. Moreover, identification motivates to think 
and act on behalf of the in-group, whereas identity content directs thinking and 
behavior. It is a strength of the present research, that the GIM was not only validated 
for attitudinal variables (sexist beliefs) but also for actual behavior (CA in Study 1) 
and behavioral intentions (intention to engage in CA, Study 2). Overall, the GIM 
closes an important gap in previous research by offering a theory-driven and 
parsimonious way to consider both the strength of identification and the content of 
identity and to distinguish different types of gender identity.  
Our results have important implications for social interventions (see also 
Becker & Swim, 2007). In terms of changing sexist attitudes, heightening solely 
women’s identification with their gender in-group is not sufficient and might be even 
contraindicated: Without considering identity content, simply increasing gender 
identification could result in a higher acceptance of sexist beliefs. In contrast, we 
would recommend to heighten women’s identification with their gender in-group and 
to change identity content simultaneously: The probability for rejection of sexist 
beliefs is increased when identification is heightened and the content of identity is 
associated with progressive values (e.g., when the traditional gender-specific way of 
living is reflected and changed to a “gender equal” life style).  
We presented both correlational as well as experimental support for the main 
prediction derived from the GIM. However, in the last two studies we manipulated 
salience of a traditional vs. a progressive gender role, but not gender identification. 
Our results are therefore not unequivocal with regard to the causal status of gender 
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identification. Thus, we encourage future research to manipulate, in addition to 
identity content, levels of identification with the gender category.  
A further limitation of the present research might be our operationalization of 
identity content through gender role preference. Although the behavioral indicator CA 
was only weakly correlated to gender role preference, measures of sexism were 
moderately correlated and have therefore something in common. However, results of 
a confirmatory factor analysis supported the expectation that the gender role 
preference scale was separable from the three sexism scales. Moreover, we 
predicted that the correlation between gender role preference and sexist beliefs 
depends on the strength of identification. Additionally, identity content represents 
what individuals associate with their gender in-group, hence it might be difficult to find 
any operationalization which is not related to sexism. Therefore, it might be easier for 
future research to test predictions of the GIM for other behavioral indicators than just 
collective action. For instance, it is assumable that the different types of gender 
identity differ in the likelihood of confronting sexist incidents in everyday life (Stangor 
et al., 2003).  
In conclusion, we presented and provided first evidence for the GIM. We 
therefore extended previous research on gender identity and offer a parsimonious 
model to explain different levels of endorsement of sexist beliefs among women. In 
addition, the GIM has important implications for social interventions aiming to reduce 
endorsement of sexist beliefs. Both strength of identification and content of gender 
identity have to be considered. 
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Table 1 
Descriptives and intercorrelations for the relevant measures of Study 1 (N = 250; 1 = 
“disagree strongly”, 6 = “agree strongly”) 
 M SD 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Benevolent Sexism (BS) 3.64 1.07 .43(**) .42(**) -.18(*) .37(**) -.15(*) 
2 Hostile Sexism (HS) 2.90 .97 - .31(**) -.29(**) .19(**) -.13(*) 
3 Modern Sexism (MS) 2.85 .90  - -.40(**) .30(**) -.18(**)
4 Collective action (CA) 2.85 .90   - -.19(**) .36(**) 
5 Gender role 2.31 .92    - -.08 
6 Identification 3.87 1.19     - 
NOTE * p < .05, ** p < .01, two-tailed. 
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Table 2 
Beta-coefficients of the four regression analyses on Benevolent, Hostile, Modern Sexism and Collective action, Study 1 
 Benevolent Sexism (BS) Hostile Sexism (HS) Modern Sexism (MS) Collective action (CA) 
 B (SE)  B (SE)  B (SE)  B (SE)  
Step 1     
Gender role .40** (.07) .16* (.06) .27** (.06) -.17* (.07)
Identification -.12* (.05) 
 
F (2,247) = 22.24** 
R2adj =.15 -.11* (.05) 
 
F (2,247) = 6.46** 
R2adj =.04 -.12** (.05) 
 
F (2,247) = 15.86** 
R2adj =.11 .34** 
(.06) 
 
F (2,247) = 15.86** 
R2adj =.11 
Step 2         
Identification x 
Gender role 
.12* (.06) F∆ (3, 246) = 4.67*  
R2adj = .16 
.23** (.05) F∆ (3, 246) = 
17.44**  
R2adj = .10 
.11* (.05) F∆ (3, 246) = 
.4.57* 
R2adj = .12 
-.15* (.06) F∆ (3, 246) = 
.4.57* R2adj = .12 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, two-tailed.  
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Table 3 
Descriptives and intercorrelations for the relevant measures of Study 2 (N = 222; 1 = 
“disagree strongly”, 6 = “agree strongly”) 
 M SD 2 3 4 5 
1 Benevolent Sexism (BS) 3.69 1.11 .49(**) .25(**) -.15(*) -.02 
2 Hostile Sexism (HS) 3.36 1.28 - .28 (**) -.18(**) -.09 
3 Modern Sexism (MS) 3.15 1.02  - .01 -.07 
4 Collective action (CA) 3.55 1.28   - .12 
5 Identification 4.26 1.05    - 
NOTE. ** p < .01, two-tailed. 
DOING GENDER DIFFERENTLY 
92 
Table 4 
Beta-coefficients of the four regression analyses on Benevolent, Hostile, Modern Sexism and Collective action, Study 2 
 Benevolent Sexism (BS) Hostile Sexism (HS) Modern Sexism (MS) Collective action (CA) 
 B (SE)  B (SE)  B (SE)  B (SE)  
Step 1         
Progressive 
role 
(Dummy 1) 
-.37* (.19) 
F (3,218) = 2.35(*) 
R2adj.=.02 
-.54* (.21) 
F (3,218) = 3.74* 
R2adj.=.04 
.06 (.17) 
F (3,218) = .35 
R2adj.= -.01 
.33 (.21) 
F (3,218) = 5.42* 
R2adj.=.06 
Traditional role 
(Dummy 2) 
.09 (.18)  .01 (.21)  .03 (.17)  -.39(*) (.21)  
Identification -.01 (.07)  -.09 (.08)  -.07 (.07)  .14(*) (.08)  
Step 2         
Identification x 
progressive 
role 
-.40* (.17) 
F∆ (2,216) = 5.02** 
R2adj.= .05 
 
-.48* (.20) 
F∆ (2,216) = 4.53* 
R2adj.= .07 
 
-.26 (.16) 
F∆ (2,216) = 
1.45 
R2adj.= -.01 
 
.46* (.18) 
F∆ (2,216) = 15.77** 
R2adj.= .17 
 
Identification x 
traditional role 
.15 (.17)  .10 (.19)  .02 (.16)  -.61** (.18)  
NOTE. (*)p < .10, * p < .05,** p < .01 two-tailed. 
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Table 5 
Descriptives and intercorrelations for the relevant measures of Study 3 (N = 106; 1 = 
“disagree strongly”, 6 = “agree strongly”) 
 M SD 2 3 4 
1 Benevolent Sexism (BS) 3.63 1.19 .57(**) .47(**) -.04 
2 Hostile Sexism (HS) 3.44 1.29 - .40 (**) -.01 
3 Modern Sexism (MS) 3.17 1.01  - -.14 
4 Identification 4.48 1.04   - 
NOTE. ** p < .01, two-tailed. 
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Table 6 
Beta-coefficients of the four regression analyses on Benevolent, Hostile, and Modern Sexism, Study 3 
 Benevolent Sexism (BS) Hostile Sexism (HS) Modern Sexism (MS) 
 B (SE)  B (SE)  B (SE)  
Step 1       
Progressive role 
(Dummy 1) 
-.74** (.27) 
F (3,102) = 4.91** 
R2adj.=.10 
-.69* (.29) 
F (3,102) = 5.4** 
R2adj.=.11 
-.52* (.23) 
F (3,102) = 4.32** 
R2adj.=.09 
Traditional role 
(Dummy 2) 
.26 (.27)  .47 (.29)  .22 (.23)  
Identification .04 (.11)  .09 (.12)  -.08 (.09)  
Step 2       
Identification x  
progressive role 
-.55* (.24) 
F∆ (2,100) = 8.88** 
R2adj.= .22 
 
-.54* (.26) 
F∆ (2,100) = 8.68** 
R2adj.= .23 
 
-.49* (.21) 
F∆ (2,100) = 9.38** 
R2adj.= .22 
 
Identification x  
traditional role 
.50* (.25)  .58* (.27)  .43* (.21)  
NOTE. (*)p < .10, * p < .05, two-tailed. 
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Figure 1. Gender Identity Model (see also Condor, 1984) 
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Figure 2a-d. Simple slopes of Benevolent Sexism (BS), Hostile Sexism (HS), Modern Sexism (MS), 
and collective action (CA) as a function of identification and gender role preference in Study 1. 
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Modern Sexism Collective action 
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Figure 3. Simple slopes of collective action(CA) as a function of identification and salient gender role 
preference in Study 2. 
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Figure 4a-c. Simple slopes of Benevolent Sexism (BS), Hostile Sexism (HS), and Modern Sexism 
(MS) as a function of identification and salient gender role preference in Study 3. 
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APPENDIX 
Items measuring gender role preference  
1. I prefer to stay at home instead of getting ahead. 
2. I would feel foolish keeping my maiden-name after marriage. 
3. I would go to work even though I do not have to for financial reasons. (-) 
4. I would not interfere in politics since it is a men’s business. 
5. If possible, I would not work as long as my kids go to school.  
6. When I date a man, I feel unpleasant if I had to pay. 
7. It is more important for me to support the career of my partner than to get ahead 
by myself. 
8. I would not propose marriage to a man since it is a men’s business. 
Note: (-) items were recoded. The German Scale can be obtained by the first author. 
 
Items measuring Benevolent Sexism, Study 1  
1. No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person 
unless he has the love of a woman.* 
2. Women should be cherished and protected by men.* 
3. It is more appropriate that a man helps a woman to put a coat on than the other 
way around.* 
4. It is important that men are chivalrous towards women, for instance by holding the 
door open for a woman.* 
5. Men are incomplete without women.* 
6. Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility.* 
7. People are not truly happy in life without being romantically involved with a 
member of the other sex. 
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8. Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and 
good taste. 
9. Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.* 
Note: In Study 2 and Study 3 only items with an asterisk were used. 
 
Items measuring Hostile Sexism, Study 1 
1. Most women interpret innocent remarks of acts as being sexist. 
2. Women exaggerate problems they have at work. 
3. Many women get a kick out of teasing men by seeming sexually available and 
then refusing male advances. 
4. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor 
them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality”.* 
5. When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about 
being discriminated against.* 
Note: In Study 2 and Study 3 only items with an asterisk were used. 
 
Items measuring Modern Sexism, Study 1 
1. I consider the present employment system to be unfair to women. (-) 
2. Discrimination against women is still a problem in Germany. (-)* 
3. Us probably getting a female chancellor is a clear sign for women in Germany of 
not being discriminated against any longer. 
4. Women often miss out on good jobs due to sexual discrimination. 
5. Society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities 
for achievement.* 
6. I consider the present employment system to be fair to women.* 
7. It is often to see women treated in a sexist manner on television. (-) 
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8. In Western countries, gender equality has been realized a long time ago.* 
9. Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in Germany. 
Note: In Study 2 and Study 3 only items with an asterisk were used, (-) items were recoded. 
 
Items measuring collective action, Study 1, Study 2 
1. I make a conscious attempt to use non-sexist language. 
2. I have signed a petition advocating women’s issues (e.g., affirmative action). 
3. I participated in protests regarding women’s issues. 
4. I have gone out of my way to collect information on women’s issues. 
5. I got together with others in order to do something against the discrimination of 
women. 
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Abstract 
Three experiments tested the hypothesis that endorsement of subtle sexist 
beliefs can be reduced via heightening people’s sensitivity towards its prevalence 
and harm. In the first experiment (N = 120) using a daily diary-method, we 
demonstrated that attending to sexism in everyday life leads to rejection of modern, 
neo-, and benevolent sexist beliefs in women. In the second experiment (N = 240), 
we showed that a heightened sensitivity towards the prevalence of sexism resulted in 
rejection of modern sexist beliefs, whereas a heightened sensitivity towards harm 
experienced by the targets of discrimination resulted in rejection of benevolent sexist 
beliefs. Findings of the third experiment (N = 189) demonstrated that the prejudice 
reducing effects of the information were consistently stronger for women who are 
more identified and men who are less identified with their gender in-group. Across all 
studies, we found that rejection of sexist beliefs generalized to rejection of system 
justification beliefs. Results point to reasons why individuals endorse subtle sexist 
beliefs. 
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Although gender relations have become more egalitarian since the feminist 
movement (e.g., Twenge, 1997; Mason, Czajka, & Arber, 1976; Spence & Hahn, 
1997; Thornton, Alwin, & Camburn, 1983; for a discussion see Rudman & Glick, in 
press), sexism and discrimination against women are still widespread all over the 
world (e.g., Glick, Fiske, Mladinic, Saiz, Abrams, Masser et al., 2000; Swim, Becker, 
Pruitt, & Lee, in press). For instance, researchers have documented the continued 
presence of endorsement of sexist beliefs by examining more subtle indicators of 
sexist beliefs, which are accepted by significant proportions of men and women (e.g., 
Glick et al. 2000; Swim, Mallett, Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). Endorsement of 
sexist beliefs is harmful to women, yet the negative consequences caused by subtle 
sexism are widely unrealized (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Jackman, 1994). Despite 
these consequences and perhaps at least in part because of the unrecognized harm, 
women and men do not label certain types of sexism as sexism (e.g., Baretto & 
Ellemers, 2005a, 2005b; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Swim et al., 2005). Thus, lack of 
recognition of several types of sexism and presumably endorsement of sexist beliefs 
is at least partly due to a lack of information about sexism (e.g., Swim, Mallet, & 
Stangor, 2004).  
The present research aims to reduce endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs via 
heightening people’s sensitivity towards the prevalence of sexist behaviors and their 
harm. Relative to research on reduction of endorsement of racist beliefs (e.g., 
Oskamp, 2000; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Stephan & Vogt, 2004), little is known 
about reduction of endorsement of sexist beliefs. Additionally, knowing what types of 
information reduce endorsement of these beliefs points to reasons why women and 
men endorse the beliefs. 
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Subtle Sexist Beliefs 
Subtle sexist beliefs include modern sexist (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995), 
neosexist (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995) and benevolent sexist beliefs (Glick 
& Fiske, 1996). Modern Sexism and Neosexism are indicated by denial of 
discrimination against women, antagonism towards women’s demands and 
resentment against special favors for women (e.g., affirmative actions). These beliefs 
are considered sexist because they can lead to the maintenance of the status quo. 
For instance, the belief that gender discrimination is a thing of the past, which 
represents the core element of Modern Sexism, implicates non-support for actions to 
change the gender system. Lack of support for change would result in women 
remaining in lower status. Support for these assumptions comes from data showing 
that believing that sexism is not prevalent is associated with endorsing gender 
system justification beliefs (Swim, Becker, & DeCoster, 2007). Benevolent Sexism is 
one component of Ambivalent Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and consists of 
endorsement of complementary gender differentiation, heterosexual intimacy and 
paternalism. Benevolent Sexism encompasses protective, affectionate but 
patronizing beliefs about women who conform to their expected roles. Endorsement 
of these beliefs is associated with stronger gender inequality in a country (as 
measured with United Nations indices, Glick et al., 2000). Supporting the argument 
that these beliefs are subtle, women and men are less likely to identify endorsement 
of modern and benevolent sexist beliefs as sexist than they are to identify 
endorsement of traditional gender roles, Hostile Sexism, and gender stereotypes as 
sexist (Swim et al., 2005). 
 Endorsement of modern sexist, neosexist and benevolent sexist beliefs by 
men and women has been demonstrated cross-culturally (Glick et al., 2000; Swim et 
al., in press). Although women and men often differ in their support of gender 
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inequality with men having higher scores in measures of sexism, evidence indicates 
that a significant number of women also endorse subtle sexist beliefs (e.g., Baretto & 
Ellemers, 2005b; Glick et al., 2000; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Tougas, Brown, 
Beaton, & St-Pierre, 1999), sometimes even more than men (Glick et al., 2000).  
 
Prevalence of Subtle Sexism 
In many regards it can be argued that sexism is not particular prevalent in 
industrialized countries. For instance, relative to many non-western countries, United 
Nations data on gender equality indicates that there is much greater equality in 
countries such as the United States and many European countries (Swim et al., in 
press). Yet, despite this relative equality, other data indicate that sexist behaviors are 
still prevalent in these countries, but the behaviors are subtle. 
Subtle sexist behaviors refer to unequal and harmful treatment of women that 
is typically less visible than blatant sexist behaviors (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; 
Swim & Cohen, 1997). Reports about experiences with sexism reveal the prevalence 
of subtle sexist behaviors. Subtle sexist behaviors can come in the form of everyday 
sexism (Klonoff & Landrine, 1995; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001), sexual 
and gender harassment (Fitzgerald et al., 1988), and incivility in the work force (e.g., 
Sandy & Cortina, 2005). Qualitative data reveals several other forms of subtle sexist 
behaviors such as paternalism and tokenism (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). The 
existence of subtle sexist behavior is also supported by laboratory research, for 
instance, on paternalism (Rudman & Heppen, 2003; Vescio, Gervais, Snyder, & 
Hoover, 2005), tokenism (Ellemers, 2001; Wright, 2001), and backlash (Rudman, 
1998; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 2001).  
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Harm from Subtle Sexism 
There is ample evidence that being a target of sexist behaviors is associated 
with reduced well-being and lower self-esteem among women (see Berg, 2006; 
Kaiser, Major, & McCoy, 2004; Landrine, Klonoff, Gibbs, & Manning, 1995; Major et 
al., 2002; McCoy & Major, 2003; Moradi & Risco, 2006; Moradi & Subich, 2004; 
Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 2002). Other research demonstrates 
that endorsement of modern and benevolent sexist beliefs by women and men is 
harmful to women. 
Modern sexist beliefs can be harmful because they serve to maintaining the 
status quo and blame women rather than sexism for inequality. Endorsement of 
modern sexist beliefs is associated with being less likely to acknowledge sexism as a 
source of gender segregation in the workforce and with higher ratings of biological 
differences as a likely reason for job segregation (Swim et al., 1995). Moreover, 
when people think that gender equality has been achieved, they claim that lack in 
career success of women can be primarily a result of their inability and lacking effort 
compared to men (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a). This implies that women bear the 
blame for their low status. This is harmful for women, because it portrays them as 
being inferior and less ambitious compared to men.  
Benevolent sexist beliefs can be harmful to women because Benevolent 
Sexism legitimates and maintains inequality by valuing traditional feminine attributes 
in women and offering the promise of protection that is enacted only when women 
behave in line with sexist prescriptions for maintaining traditional gender role 
behavior. Hostile Sexism comes into play when women violate prescriptive roles. For 
instance, Benevolent Sexism is associated with favorable feelings toward women in a 
traditional role (homemakers), whereas Hostile Sexism is associated with 
unfavorable evaluations of women in a non-traditional role (career women; Glick, 
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Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997). In a direct test of the implication of 
endorsement of benevolent and hostile sexist beliefs for maintaining the status quo, 
Jost and Kay (2005) found that the conjoint activation of benevolent and hostile 
sexist beliefs increased endorsement of gender system justification in women. 
Moreover, Jackman (1994) argued that benevolent prejudice can be more effective at 
maintaining oppression of women as a group than hostile prejudice because of the 
resistance that the former causes. Thus, “sweet benevolence” pacifies women’s 
resistance against discrimination and increases their satisfaction with the status quo. 
Benevolent Sexism can also hurt women in other ways. It can create lack of 
sympathy for those who have been raped by an acquaintance. For instance, 
Benevolent Sexism is associated with blaming women for having behaved 
inappropriately in this situation (Abrams, Viki, Masser, & Bohner, 2003). Benevolent 
Sexism can also have negative consequences when women internalize sexist 
ideology: They have been socialized to be passive, modest, and dependent and 
might feel incompetent in several male dominated areas. This can result in the belief 
that they need male help and protection (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). Consistent 
with this argument, women’s implicit romantic idealization of men as chivalric 
rescuers (e.g., “Prince Charming”) negatively predicted their interest in projected 
income, education goal, interest in high-status jobs and group leadership appeal 
(Rudman & Heppen, 2003). Moreover, women’s endorsement of Benevolent Sexism 
is associated with valuing “good earning potential” as an important characteristic in a 
mate (Johannesen-Schmidt & Eagly, 2003), probably reflecting a desire for a male 
provider. 
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Why do People Endorse Subtle Sexism? 
Many people may get used to several manifestations of sexism in their 
everyday lives, because sexism is integrated into cultural and societal norms and 
individuals have internalized it as customary and normal behavior (Benokraitis & 
Feagin, 1995). For instance, individuals are unlikely to detect sexist language unless 
it is explicitly defined for them (Swim et al., 2004). Further, many do not consider 
expressions of subtle sexism as offensive (e.g., Baretto & Ellemers, 2005a, 2005b; 
Jackman, 1994, 2005; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998). Blatant sexism is more likely to be 
perceived as sexist than Modern or Benevolent Sexism suggesting that the latter will 
not be noticed when it occurs and the harm it can cause may not be realized (Barreto 
& Ellemers, 2005a, 2005b; Kilianski and Rudman, 1998; Swim et al., 2005). Related 
to lack of awareness of sexism is “gender apathy”, which can also explain 
endorsement of sexist beliefs. Forman (2004) developed the concept of racial apathy 
and defined it as „indifference toward societal racial and ethnic inequality and lack of 
engagement with race-related social issues“ (Forman, 2004, p.44). Applying this 
construct to gender discrimination, gender apathy would be a) “not knowing” about 
gender inequality, b) ignorance about the persistent nature of gender inequality as a 
strategic evasion of responsibility, c) an indifference about and avoidance of gender 
issues generally or a lack of interest and care in addressing such inequalities. Thus, 
we propose that lack of attention to or awareness of sexism in individuals’ everyday 
lives is a reason why individuals endorse subtle sexist beliefs.  
We also propose that lack of awareness of the prevalence of sexism helps 
specifically explain endorsement of modern sexist beliefs and possibly neosexist 
beliefs given the conceptual overlaps in the two constructs. Most of the items in the 
Modern Sexism scale measure beliefs about the prevalence of sexism (Swim, 
Becker, & DeCoster, 2007). Plus, modern sexist beliefs are associated with a lack of 
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awareness of the extent to which the work force is gender segregated and 
furthermore demonstrate a lack of understanding how this affects women’s 
occupational, economic, political and social status negatively (Swim et al., 1995). For 
instance, higher scores on the Modern Sexism scale are associated with greater 
overestimations of the percentage of women in several male-dominated jobs. The 
connection between modern sexist beliefs and lack of awareness of sexism is also 
illustrated by associations between endorsement of modern sexist beliefs and being 
less likely to detect sexist language (Swim et al., 2004).  
Similarly, endorsement of modern sexist beliefs can be explained as an 
expression of system justification. Jost and Banaji (1994) have argued that 
individuals are motivated to maintain the perception that the world is just and 
individuals get what they deserve. Therefore, individuals show the tendency to justify 
existing status hierarchies, even if those hierarchies disadvantage their own group. 
Eagly and Mladinic (1994) have shown that women are described with more positive 
adjectives than men. Based on this finding, Jost and Kay (2005) argue that as long 
as people believe that every group in society possesses some advantages as well as 
some disadvantages, the system as a whole is regarded as fair, balanced, and 
legitimate. Thus, women may see positive aspects of their own gender role and 
negative aspects of the male gender role which can result in the overall impression 
that both women and men are discriminated against in some way. If discrimination is 
perceived to be balanced, then individuals may deny that sexism is a particular 
problem for women, a central tenet of modern sexist beliefs.  
While we anticipate that awareness of the prevalence of sexism is particularly 
tied to endorsement of modern sexist beliefs, we propose that awareness of the harm 
associated with sexism is particularly tied to endorsement of benevolent sexist 
beliefs. When considering endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs, it is important to 
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take into account that an individual women might profit from Benevolent Sexism. For 
example, women may feel flattered by offers of protection and positive attributions or 
may enjoy being cherished by men. Further, women gain personal and collective 
self-esteem by seeing themselves as superior on status irrelevant dimensions, such 
as taking pride in their superior domestic abilities (Glick & Fiske, 1999). Women may 
be particularly likely to endorse benevolent sexist beliefs in contexts where they feel 
most vulnerable. For example, the countries where women are more likely to endorse 
Benevolent Sexism are those where men tend to be most likely to endorse Hostile 
Sexism (Glick et al., 2000). The argument given for women's endorsement of 
Benevolent Sexism in these countries is that it reflects the benefits it gives them 
through protection from men's hostility (e.g., Glick, Sakalli-Ugurlu, Ferreira, & Souza, 
2002; Fischer, 2006). These types of benefits may make women less attuned to the 
costs associated with them. Moya, Glick, Expósito, De Lemus, and Hart (in press) 
have also demonstrated that women are more likely to accept Benevolent Sexism 
from intimate partners than strangers. They may do this because they are less 
attuned to the possible harm that Benevolent Sexism can cause in these 
relationships. Further, women and men may be likely to think benevolent sexist 
people and statements are less sexist than hostile sexist men, because the positive 
nature of the former hides the harm that they can cause (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b; 
Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Swim et al., 2005). Thus, women and men may endorse 
Benevolent Sexism because they are not aware of the harm that these beliefs can 
promote.  
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Changing Endorsement of Sexist Beliefs 
Research on reduction of sexism is scarce. Most of the existing research on 
reduction of prejudice focuses on ethnic prejudice (see e.g., Oskamp, 2000; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Stephan & Vogt, 2004). Existing studies on changing 
gender-related concepts involve long-term projects like participation in women’s 
classes, consciousness raising groups and gender courses: Most of this research 
provides evidence that such interventions reduce traditional sexist attitudes toward 
women (Jones & Jacklin, 1988), heighten the awareness of sexism (Stake & 
Hoffmann, 2001), help develop more egalitarian attitudes (Katz, Swindell, & Farrow, 
2004; Malkin & Stake, 2004; Thomsen, Basu, & Reinitz, 1995), heighten feminist 
consciousness (Henderson-King & Stewart, 1999), and heighten feminist activism 
(Stake, Roades, Rose, Ellis, & West, 1994). Taken together, these studies provide 
evidence that gender related attitudes can be changed by continuous information 
and/or heightened sensitivity towards sexism over a period of time. Nevertheless, 
previous research did not identify what aspects of these interventions lead to 
changes in gender related concepts. Plus, these studies did not focus on reduction of 
subtle sexist beliefs. 
We argue that lack of awareness of sexist behavior in one’s personal life, 
awareness of the prevalence of sexism, and the harm caused by sexism are central 
reasons for endorsement of modern, neo-, and benevolent sexist beliefs. Hence, we 
propose that increasing awareness of sexism can reduce endorsement of these 
beliefs. If individuals are encouraged to attend to sexist behaviors, they are likely to 
become more aware of sexism. This can be seen in a study of Swim et al. (2001): 
After women were asked to report experiences with sexism on a daily basis for two 
weeks, they reported a greater awareness of sexism. We therefore predict that if 
women's and men's attention is drawn to sexism in their own lives they may become 
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less likely to endorse modern sexist beliefs, which largely accesses perceptions of 
the prevalence of discrimination. They also may be less likely to endorse neosexist 
beliefs when attending to everyday sexist behaviors because beliefs about the 
prevalence of discrimination are also part of this measure and they are related to 
other components of Modern Sexism that are represented in the Neosexism scale. 
Attention to everyday sexist behaviors could also include drawing attention to 
benevolent forms of sexism and the possibility that they could be considered sexist. 
This type of attention could result in reduction in endorsement of benevolent sexist 
beliefs as well. Thus, we hypothesize that attending to sexist behaviors in one’s 
everyday life will decrease endorsement of modern, neo-, and benevolent sexist 
beliefs. 
We propose, however, that different types of information will be more effective 
at addressing modern and neosexist beliefs on the one hand versus benevolent 
sexist beliefs on the other. Because beliefs about the prevalence of discrimination 
are more central to modern sexist beliefs, we propose that information that 
specifically targets this aspect of current manifestations of sexism will most potently 
influence endorsement of modern sexist beliefs, and potentially, by association, 
neosexist beliefs as well. In contrast, because Benevolent Sexism is hidden by its 
surface positive characterization, we propose being aware of negative consequences 
of seemingly positive behavior like paternalism, gender differentiation that favors 
women or heterosexual intimacy might result in rejection of benevolent sexist beliefs. 
This is in line with a recent assumption of Rudman and Glick (in press) that 
increasing awareness of why paternalism is problematic might help to resist its 
seductive appeal. Hence, we hypothesize that attending to the prevalence of sexism 
will decrease endorsement of modern and neosexist beliefs and attending to the 
harm of sexism will decrease endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs. 
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The Role of Gender Identification in Changing Sexist Beliefs 
Information about sexism may be more effective in changing attitudes for 
some individuals than others, because endorsement of sexist ideologies has been 
argued to be motivated by desires to legitimate and maintain the unequal gender 
status quo (Jackman, 1994, Jost & Banaji, 1994). Thus, individuals who are more 
motivated to maintain gender inequality may be less receptive to such information. 
For instance, racial apathy, and by extension gender apathy, is motivated such that 
“not-knowing” about gender inequality and gender issues is not innocent, but driven 
by the will to maintain dominance structures (Forman & Lewis, 2006). Information 
about prevalence and harm of sexism can be taken as a form of information about 
injustice which implies a need for changing unequal gender relations.  
When dealing with sexism, subjective feelings of belongingness to one's 
gender group may influence women’s and men’s reactions to drawing their attention 
to everyday sexism and their receptivity to information about sexism. From Social 
Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) we know that it is important to 
differentiate between objective group membership and a subjective sense of 
belonging to this group: Individuals differ in their identification with their gender in-
group. This identification derives from the subjective importance of the group to the 
self (e.g., Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). With higher identification, an individual’s 
thinking and acting is oriented towards in-group norms (Turner et al., 1987; see also 
Becker & Wagner, 2007; Burn, Aboud & Moyles, 2000). Therefore, for people with 
different social identities, the same information can elicit different responses (van 
Knippenberg, 1999). Applied to this study, the importance and impact of a message 
about sexism should vary as a function of gender identification. For highly identified 
men, changing hierarchies is accompanied with loss of male privilege and might 
threaten male identity. Therefore, men who are highly identified with their male in-
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group should respond with more reactance than men for whom being male is less 
important. In contrast, it is likely that higher gender identification in women is 
accompanied with stronger sensitivity for gender-related information, because highly 
identified women are motivated to evaluate their gender in-group favorably. Women 
for whom their gender is very important may be more attuned to information that 
indicates that their group status is threatened, such as that sexism is prevalent and 
harmful, in comparison to women less identified with their gender. Therefore, women 
who are more identified with their gender group may be particularly receptive to such 
information and respond with a stronger rejection of sexist beliefs.  
 
The Present Research 
The present research is designed to extend previous findings on reduction of 
prejudice by examining the impact of awareness of everyday sexist behaviors on 
endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs and the differential impact of heightened 
sensitivity towards prevalence of sexism versus harm of sexism on endorsement of 
modern, neo-, and benevolent sexist beliefs. In our first study we examine the impact 
of attending to everyday sexism on endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs. In the 
second and third study we examine the differential impact of information about 
prevalence of sexism and harm of sexism on endorsement of different types of sexist 
beliefs. In each study we also examine the role of receptivity to information, 
determined by identification with one’s gender group, as a possible moderator of the 
extent to which women and men are influenced by awareness of and information 
about sexism.  
In each of the studies, we also examine whether attention to prevalence and 
harm of sexist behaviors influences system justification beliefs as well. We consider 
endorsement of modern sexist beliefs to be a specific expression of system 
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justification (Swim et al., 2007). Thus, we expect that people who get information that 
leads one to attend to the prevalence of sexism will also decrease general system 
justification. Becoming aware of and comprehending that gender inequality exists 
provides evidence that the general system can not be just. Therefore, general system 
justification beliefs are expected to decrease as a consequence of changes in 
modern sexist beliefs. That is, Modern Sexism is predicted to mediate the relation 
between attention to the prevalence of sexism and system justification. 
 
STUDY 1 
In Study 1, we investigated whether attending to sexism in people’s everyday 
lives results in rejection of sexist beliefs. In order to test the impact of attending to 
real life experiences on sexist attitudes, we chose to have participants complete daily 
diaries asking them to focus on whether or not they experienced or observed multiple 
forms of everyday sexism (see, e.g., Swim et al. 2001; Hyers, Swim, & Mallet, 2006). 
For comparison, other participants completed diaries asking them to focus on 
everyday stressors, a task, which is less likely to lead to attention to sexist behaviors. 
We hypothesize that paying attention to everyday sexism that includes attending to 
subtle manifestations of sexism will result in decreases in endorsement of modern, 
neo-, and benevolent sexist beliefs. 
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Method 
Participants 
160 students of the Pennsylvania State University participated in group testing 
sessions and received course credit in exchange for completing the measures. Of the 
160 participants, 40 participants failed to complete the diaries correctly3. For 
example, they did not complete all seven diaries or they completed several diaries at 
one day. Analyses were conducted using the remaining 120 participants, 82 of them 
were female and 38 male students. The sample consisted of 81% White/European 
Americans, 14% Asian Americans, 3% Black/African Americans and 2% Arab and 
Latino/a Americans. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 26 years, with a mean age 
of 19 years. 
Design 
The design was a 2 (diary condition: sexism, stress) x 2 (gender of participant: 
female, male) between-subject design with identification with the gender category as 
a measured continuous variable. Participants were randomly assigned to diary 
conditions (sexism diary condition, N = 58; stress diary condition, N = 62).  
Procedure 
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to investigate how 
many and what kind of daily hassles students experience in their everyday life. The 
diary study was an online-experiment and it was divided into three parts. First, 
participants completed pre-diary measures. We told them that these were about 
                                                 
3 After half of the participants completed the study we observed that many completed several diaries 
at one time which lead us to question the validity of their responding. As a result, we altered the 
requirements for the study such that participants would not receive credit if they completed more than 
one diary on a single day. This resulted in decreasing the unusable data from 33% to 16% confirming 
our assumption that those who provided unusable data differed from those who did not because they 
were less involved in the study. As noted below, participants completed pretest measures prior to 
completing diary measures. Participants included vs. excluded from the study did not differ on these 
measures. Further, when we included whether participants were from the first vs. the second wave of 
data collection as a covariate in the analyses, all findings remained the same. 
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some demographic information, personal preferences, and interests. Then they were 
randomly assigned to either a sexism diary or a stress diary and were asked to 
complete the diary materials online for seven days. In the sexism diary condition, 
participants were asked to keep track of different types of sexism in their everyday 
lives, in the stress diary condition they were asked to keep a daily record of different 
types of stressors they experience on campus. After the week, participants answered 
postdiary measures, including questions about awareness of sexism, stress and 
racism, their feelings during the week and their endorsement of system justification 
beliefs and several other beliefs, including modern sexist, neosexist, and benevolent 
sexist beliefs. 
Prediary measures 
Prediary measures assessed demographic variables and student’s 
identification with several groups (e.g., age identity, gender identity, ethnic identity) 
and distracter questions asking about general preferences (e.g., “I don’t buy 
Christmas chocolate until it is December”) and their gender role preference. The 
latter did not form a reliable scale, so we did not include them in our analyses. 
Identification with one's gender group was measured with four items developed by 
Cameron (2004; e.g., “I feel strong ties to other women/men”; “Overall, being a 
woman/man is an important part of my self-image”). We excluded the recoded item 
because of a low corrected item total correlation. Internal consistency was 
satisfactory for a three item scale (α = .75 for women; α = .76 for men). 
Diaries 
Participants either completed sexism or stress diaries for one week. For the 
structured sexism diary, participants were asked to indicate whether they observed 
24 incidents which represented various types of sexism. We stressed that they 
should focus on interpersonal relationships and ignore incidents found in the media. 
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Diaries were adapted and modified from diary forms used by Swim et al. (2001). An 
examination of the types of incidents typically reported in diary studies assessing 
everyday sexism revealed that participants do not frequently report subtle forms of 
sexism, especially Benevolent Sexism (e.g., paternalistic behavior), when asked to 
report their observations of sexism in an open ended format (e.g., Swim et al., 2001; 
Hyers, 2007). However, a purpose of the present study was to heighten the 
awareness of multiple forms of sexism. For this reason, our structured diaries 
included incidents representing a broad range of incidents, for instance traditional, 
hostile and paternalistic stereotypes, traditional, hostile and paternalistic treatment 
based on gender, situations in which women’s complaints of sexism were not taken 
seriously, feminists were devalued, unwanted sexual attention, use of sexist 
language or sexist jokes. These diaries did not specifically focus on incidents 
directed at women. However, previous diary studies indicated that the target of most 
of the incidents women and men reported were women (Swim et al., 2001). Thus, we 
assume that the target of most of the incidents in the present diary were women.  
For the structured stress diary, we specified 19 stress incidents which 
represented typical stress situations among students (e.g., too much homework, 
failing exams, unfair grades, problems with group work, roommate problems). This 
represents a modification of previous diary studies that asked participants to attend 
to non-discriminatory stressors (e.g., Swim et al., 2001; Swim, Eysell, Quinlivan, & 
Ferguson, 2007). We altered the diaries such that we included more incidents to 
make it more comparable in work load to the sexism diaries.  
Participants of both diary conditions were asked to indicate if they personally 
experienced or witnessed each of the specified incidents in their interpersonal 
relationships and to enter how often the corresponding incidents occurred during the 
day. After indicating an incident, students in the sexism diary condition were asked to 
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estimate how sexist they perceived the reported incident to be on a rating scale 
ranging from “definitely not sexist”, “might be sexist”, “probably sexist” to “definitely 
sexist” (“sexism rating”). Comparably, students in the stress diary condition were 
asked to rate how stressful they perceived the reported incident on a rating scale 
ranging from “definitely not stressful”, “might be stressful”, “probably stressful” to 
“definitely stressful”. 
Manipulation checks 
The first question in the post measure was to indicate a general number of 
stressful and sexist incidents participants had experienced during the week. 
Afterwards, they were asked to rate the degree to which the study made them more 
aware of stress and sexism in their life on a six-point scale ranging from “disagree 
strongly” to “agree strongly”. 
Dependent measures 
All dependent variables were measured on six-point rating scales (1 = 
“disagree strongly” to 6 = “agree strongly”). After completing the manipulation checks, 
participants completed measures in the order presented below.4 
System justification. Participants completed Jost and Banaji’s (1994) eight 
item measure to assess system justification beliefs (α = .84; e.g., “Everyone has a 
fair shot at wealth and happiness”). 
Modern Sexism and Neosexism.5 Modern Sexism (MS) and Neosexism (NS) 
were assessed using the eight items of the MS scale (e.g., “Discrimination against 
                                                 
4 We also asked participants about the number of racist incidents, whether the study made them more 
aware of racism in their lives and to complete the Modern Racism scale (McConahay, 1986). We 
included these ratings to make it less obvious that we were particularly interested in sexism.  
5 To ensure that Benevolent, Modern and Neosexism represent different constructs, as was found in 
previous research (Swim, Becker, & DeCoster, 2007), we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis 
with data of all three studies (N = 548). Results indicated that a correlated factors model representing 
each scale (χ2 (24) = 35.92, p = .06; comparative fit index (CFI) = .99; root-mean-square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) = .03, standardized-root-mean-square-residual (SRMR) = .03) represented 
the data significantly better than the one factor model (χ2 (27) = 567.96, p < .001; CFI = .52; RMSEA = 
.19, SRMR = .17, ∆χ2corrected (3) = 258.27, p < .001, Satorra & Bentler, 2001). 
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women is no longer a problem in the United States”) and the 11 items of the NS 
scale (e.g., “Due to social pressures, firms frequently have to hire under qualified 
women”). Researchers have argued that MS and NS do not measure the same 
construct, but two separate factors (Campbell, Schellenberg, & Senn, 1997; Parks & 
Roberton, 2004). Previous factor analyses indicated that one factor measured denial 
of discrimination (mostly MS items) and the second factor measured negative 
attitudes toward policies designed to promote gender equality (only items of the NS 
scale; Swim, Becker, & DeCoster, 2007). Our exploratory factor analysis supported 
previous findings (Campbell et al., 1997). Two NS items and five MS items 
constituted the MS factor (which measured only denial of discrimination, α = .82) and 
the remaining nine NS items loaded on the NS factor (α =.84). Although results were 
the same if we did not create scales based upon the factor analysis, we created 
scales based upon this factor analysis rather than the original scales, because the 
reliabilities were improved, they represent a more pure conceptualization of the 
constructs assessed in the two scales, and they provide a greater distinction between 
the two scales.  
Benevolent Sexism (BS) was measured using 11 items of the ambivalent 
sexism inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1999, α = .90; e.g., “Women should be cherished 
and protected by men”).  
 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
We expected that participants who completed the sexism diary would report in 
the post-measure that they had experienced more sexist incidents during the week 
and report a heightened awareness of sexism than those who completed the stress 
diary. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with number of sexist incidents as dependent 
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variable and condition and gender as between subject-factors revealed a main effect 
of diary condition, F(1,109) = 36.87, p < .001, η² = .25. Estimated number of sexist 
incidents was higher in the sexism diary condition (M = 6.30, SD = 6.34) than in the 
stress diary condition (M = 0.41, SD = 0.89). Women and men did not differ in the 
estimated number of sexist incidents. The same ANOVA with awareness of sexism 
as dependent variable indicated that the study made participants in the sexism diary 
condition more aware of sexism in their lives (M = 4.26, SD = 1.19) than participants 
in the stress diary condition (M = 2.16, SD = 1.09), F(1,116) = 78.00, p < .001, η² = 
.40. A main effect of gender, F(1,116) = 4.35, p < .001, η² = .04, was qualified by a 
significant diary condition by gender interaction, F(1,116) = 11.08, p < .01, η² = .09, 
indicating that differences between sexism and stress diary condition were stronger 
for women (sexism diary: M = 4.68, SD = .85; stress diary: M = 2.09, SD = .97) than 
for men (sexism diary: M = 3.52, SD = 1.36; stress diary: M = 2.35, SD = 1.37). 
Importantly, however, the difference for men was still significant, F(1,36) = 6.91, p < 
.05, η² = .16.6  
Endorsement of sexist beliefs 
We predicted that the sexism diary experience would result in lower 
endorsement of sexist beliefs than the stress diary experience. To test this prediction, 
we conducted a 2 (diary condition: sexism diary, stress diary) x 2 (gender of 
participant: female, male) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with MS, NS, 
                                                 
6 We also tested whether diary condition affected perceptions of how stressful the previous 
week had been. In a further ANOVA for number of estimated stressful incidents, a marginal significant 
main effect occurred, F(1, 113) = 2.82, p < .10, η² = .02. Means indicate that perceived number of 
stressful incidents was higher for participants in the stress diary condition (M = 11.67, SD = 14.63) 
than in the sexism diary condition (M = 7.21, SD = 9.49). An ANOVA with awareness of stress as 
dependent variable revealed a significant condition by gender interaction, F(1, 116) = 8.43, p < .01, η² 
= .07. There was no difference between sexism (M = 3.68, SD = 1.03) and stress diary condition (M = 
4.04, SD = 1.13) in awareness of stress for women, F(1,80) = 2.35, p < .10, η² = .03, suggesting that 
women perceived the sexist incidents and stressful incidents as similar stressful. Paying attention to 
stress (M = 4.24, SD = 1.25) made men more aware of stress in their lives than paying attention to 
sexism (M = 2.57, SD = 1.21), F(1,36) = 17.28, p < .01, η² = .32. 
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and BS as dependent variables. A significant two-way interaction of diary condition 
by gender, F(3,113) = 5.25, p < .01, η² = .12, revealed different effects of the sexism 
diary for women and men. Therefore, we computed separate analyses for women 
and men. 
For women, a MANOVA revealed a main effect of diary condition, F(3,77) = 
8.44, p < .01, η² = .25. At the univariate level, the main effect of diary condition was 
significant for all sexism scales, F(1,79) = 14.66, p < .01, η² = .16 for MS; F(1,79) = 
7.53, p < .01, η² = .09 for NS and F(1,79) = 16.14, p < .01, η² = .17 for BS. As 
expected, participants in the sexism diary condition had lower scores on MS (M = 
2.67, SD = .57), NS (M = 2.05, SD = .52) and BS (M = 2.77, SD = .82) than 
participants in the stress diary condition (M = 3.19, SD = .65 for MS; M = 2.45, SD = 
.75 for NS and M = 3.50, SD = .80 for BS). 
A MANOVA indicated that type of diary was not significant for men, F(3,34) = 
0.69, p = .56, η² = .06. Participants in the sexism diary and stress diary condition had 
similar scores on MS (M = 3.69, SD = .90 vs. M = 3.31, SD = .79), NS (M = 2.90, SD 
= .61 vs. M = 2.85, SD = .60), and BS (M = 3.55, SD = .73 vs. M = 3.43, SD = 1.1). 
Hence, contrary to our expectations, sexism diary did not have prejudice-reducing 
effects for male participants.  
We tested two possible reasons for the lack of effect of condition for men. 
First, we tested whether men reported fewer sexist incidents in their diaries than 
women. We added all reported incidents of the seven dairies completed during one 
week to a sum score of “amount of incidents” for each participant. A t-test on amount 
of incidents reported overall during the week did not reveal significant variation 
between female and male participants, t(56) = 0.85, p = .40. Thus, women (M = 
62.49, SD = 41.17) and men (M = 52.81, SD = 42.59) reported the same amount of 
experiences during the week. Second, we tested whether men evaluated observed 
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incidents as less sexist than women did. We averaged the “sexism ratings” 
participants gave for each incident they reported in their diary ratings. A t-test 
revealed that women (M = 2.48, SD = .48) perceived their observed experiences as 
more sexist than men did (M = 1.93, SD = .55), t(56) = 4.03, p < .01.  
Next we tested whether differences in sexism ratings could account for the 
different effects of diary condition on women and men. We did not have sexism 
ratings in the stress diary condition, so we could not test this directly. Instead, we 
tested whether sexism ratings accounted for an effect of gender on endorsement of 
sexist beliefs within the sexism diary condition. ANOVAs revealed that women and 
men differ significantly on sexism measures with men having higher scores on MS, 
F(1,56) = 33.32, p < .01, η² = .37, NS, F(1,56) = 32.35, p < .01, η² = .37, and BS, 
F(1,56) = 13.04, p < .01, η² = .19. We tested whether sexism ratings mediated the 
relation between gender and endorsement of sexist beliefs using procedures 
established by Baron and Kenny (1986). The independent variable (gender) 
significantly predicted both the proposed mediator sexism rating, (B = -.55, SE = .14, 
p < .01) and the dependent variables MS (B = 1.02, SE = .18, p < .01), NS (B = .85, 
SE = .15, p < .01) and BS (B = .78, SE = .22, p < .01). Women perceived more 
sexism than men and had lower scores on MS, NS and BS. Furthermore, the 
proposed mediator (sexism rating) significantly predicted the dependent variables MS 
(B = -.38, SE = .17, p < .05) and BS (B = -.46, SE = .20, p < .05) but not NS (B = .11, 
SE = .15, ns), controlling for gender. That is, those who perceived incidents as more 
sexist tended to reject modern sexist and benevolent sexist beliefs stronger than 
those who perceived incidents as less sexist.7 When including the mediator, the 
relation between gender and MS (B = .81, SE = .19, p < .01) and between gender 
and BS dropped (B = .52, SE = .24, p < .01). A Sobel test confirmed the significance 
                                                 
7 Perceptions of stressful incidents as stressful were not correlated with MS (r = -.16, ns), NS (r = -.08, 
ns) and BS (r = .11, ns). 
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of both mediations (z = 2.07, p < .05 for MS and z = 2.00, p < .05 for BS). That is, the 
gender difference in MS and BS scores was partially mediated by sexism ratings 
suggesting that diaries had less impact on men compared to women because men 
perceived the daily sexist incidents differently.  
Endorsement of system justification 
An ANOVA revealed a significant diary condition by gender effect. Follow up 
analyses with female participants revealed a main effect of diary condition, F(1,80) = 
5.5, p < .05, η² = .06, indicating that women in the sexism diary condition were more 
likely to reject system justification beliefs (M = 3.30, SD = .76) than women in the 
stress diary condition (M = 3.67, SD = .69). In contrast, for men, diary condition had 
no effect on system justification beliefs, F(1,36) = .035, p = .85, η² = .00. Using a 
mediation analysis we further tested whether lower scores in system justification for 
women in the sexism diary condition were due to their reduced scores in MS. We 
already know that diary condition is significantly related to the dependent variable 
(system justification: B = .38, SE = .25, p < .05) and to the mediator (MS: B = .52, SE 
= .14, p < .001). Additionally MS is related to system justification controlling for 
condition (B = .50, SE = .12, p < .001).8 After inclusion of the mediator, the effect 
between diary condition and system justification decreased to non significance (B = 
.12, SE = .16, ns). A Sobel (1982) test was significant (z = -2.82, p < .01). Hence, the 
relation between condition and system justification was fully mediated by modern 
sexist beliefs. We tested the reverse mediation that information about the prevalence 
of sexism leads to changes in system justification that in turn lead to changes in MS. 
System justification decreased the relation between condition and MS significantly (z 
                                                 
8 Modern Sexism and system justification are highly correlated. We used confirmatory factor analyses, 
with data of all three studies, to test whether the scales represent two different constructs. We found 
that the two correlated factor model (χ2 (8) = 25.38, p < .001; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .063, SRMR = .03) 
represented the data significantly better than the one factor model (χ2 (9) = 290.04, p < .001; CFI = 
.77; RMSEA = .24, SRMR = .11, ∆χ2corrected (1) = 145.49, p < .001). 
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= -2.04, p < .05). However, the relation between condition and MS remained 
significant (B = .39, SE = .13, p < .01). We did not find support for BS and NS as 
mediators. 
Gender identification 
We tested whether gender identification moderated any of the above effects. 
We used regression in order to be able to keep gender identification as a continuous 
measure (c.f. Aiken & West, 1991). We did not find any significant interactions with 
gender identification suggesting that identification did not moderate the findings.  
 
Discussion 
As expected, results of Study 1 show that keeping track of sexist incidents in 
everyday life decreased endorsement of sexist beliefs. However, the expected 
impact of the sexism diary on sexist attitudes was only validated for female 
participants: Women who completed the sexism diary had significantly lower scores 
on Modern, Neo-, and Benevolent Sexism scales than women who completed the 
stress diary. Furthermore, results for women show that keeping track of sexist 
incidents did not only decrease endorsement of sexist beliefs, but also system 
justification beliefs. A Mediation analysis revealed that reduced scores on system 
justification in the sexism diary condition were fully mediated by Modern Sexism and 
not by other types of sexist beliefs. This suggests that the tendency to downplay 
sexism (as assessed by the items included in the version of the Modern Sexism 
scale in this research), more so than endorsement of other types of sexist beliefs, is 
the reason why individuals endorse system justification beliefs. 
In contrast, attending to sexism, relative to attending to other stressors, did not 
influence men’s endorsement of sexist beliefs. We found that men's perceptions of 
the degree to which incidents were sexist partially explained gender differences in 
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endorsement of modern and benevolent sexist beliefs within the sexism diary 
condition. We also found that, although men reported the same number of observed 
sexist incidents as women, the sexism diary had no effects on men’s sexist attitudes. 
This indicates that attending to sexism alone is not sufficient to reduce men's 
endorsement of sexist beliefs. The gender difference in rating of incidents as sexist 
suggests that it is important to change men’s perception of everyday discrimination 
as sexist and not just change their attention to the occurrence of sexism.  
There are a couple of limitations to Study 1 that could be addressed by a more 
controlled study. In the diary study, experiences of prevalence and harm of sexism 
are conflated together. Hence, we could not test our hypotheses that attending to 
prevalence of sexism reduces endorsement of modern sexist beliefs and attending to 
harm of sexism reduces acceptance of benevolent sexist beliefs. In the next study we 
provided participants with information about the prevalence of sexism rather than 
asking them to keep track of the prevalence of sexism in their daily lives. Other 
participants were given information about the harm caused by sexism. The remaining 
participants were given information about college stressors. We reasoned that 
directly providing information about prevalence and harm might be a more effective 
manipulation for male participants because this kind of information is less ambiguous 
and might reduce their tendency, for instance, to attribute sexist incidents to other 
causes. In addition, separately manipulating information about prevalence and harm 
allowed us to test whether different types of information triggered changes in different 
types of sexism.  
Finally, contrary to expectations, we did not find that gender identification 
moderated our effects. Given that experiences with discrimination have been 
associated with increases in gender identification (Schmitt et al., 2002), perhaps 
women’s gender identity was primed by attending to their experiences with sexism in 
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their lives thereby decreasing differences between more and less gender identified 
women. Moreover, given the lack of effect of attending to discrimination in men, it is 
possible that men’s gender identity was situationally increased by attending to 
sexism. Perhaps some of the incidents men reported were directed at men rather 
than women or, even if most of the sexist incidents were directed at women as we 
have found in other studies (Swim et al., 2001), thinking about and attending to 
gender related events may have increased men’s gender identification. We retested 
the role of gender identification in Study 2. 
 
STUDY 2 
Study 1 provided support for the hypothesis that attending to sexism leads to a 
stronger rejection of sexist attitudes in women. In Study 2 we examined the 
mechanisms of how participants were affected by attending to sexism. We 
disentangled differential effects of awareness that sexism is prevalent and 
awareness that sexism is harmful on different types of sexist beliefs: We 
hypothesized that knowledge about the prevalence of sexism works as a mechanism 
to decrease endorsement of modern and neosexist beliefs, but not of benevolent 
sexist beliefs. In contrast, information about negative consequences and harm for 
targets of ostensibly positive discrimination, such as paternalism, would work as a 
mechanism to decrease endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs in particular and 
affects modern and neosexist beliefs less or not at all. We also included gender 
identification again in Study 2 to test whether more identified women and less 
identified men were particularly receptive to information about prevalence and harm. 
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Method 
Participants 
A sample of 240 Pennsylvania State University undergraduate students (168 
women, 72 men) participated in group testing sessions with up to 50 persons per 
session. They received course credit in exchange for completing the measures. Their 
ages ranged from 18 to 44 with a mean age of 19 years. 89% identified as European-
American, 4% as Asian American, 3% as Black or African American and 4% as 
Hispanic or Latino/a. 
Design 
The design was a 3 (information condition: prevalence, harm, stress) x 2 
(gender of participant: female, male) between-subject design with identification with 
the gender category as a measured continuous moderator. Participants were 
randomly assigned to three experimental information conditions (prevalence 
condition, N = 86; harm condition, N = 77; stress condition, N = 77). The last group 
served as control group.  
Procedure 
Participants arrived at the laboratory room and were told that the study was 
about text evaluation. The first author served as the experimenter in the study and 
she spoke with a German accent. They were told that she was a PhD-student from 
Germany and wrote an English newspaper article to be published in an American 
student magazine. Participants were told that the author desired comments to 
improve the article for an U.S. audience. In addition, participants were told that 
researchers were interested in how their personal interests and attitudes would 
influence their evaluation of the article and they would therefore complete measures 
before and after they read and evaluated the text. To be consistent with the cover 
story, after reading the text, participants were asked to evaluate the text on several 
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
 131
dimensions (e.g., about the comprehensibility of the text and how interesting and new 
the topic was for the reader). Afterwards, participants completed a questionnaire 
assessing system justification, Neosexism, Modern, and Benevolent Sexism, in that 
order.9 
Manipulation. The newspaper article about the prevalence of sexism explained 
that discrimination has become more subtle but is still prevalent. Information included 
percentages of women in decision making positions, government and traditional male 
dominated fields. It was explained how often women experienced different kinds of 
sexist behaviors in their everyday lives. The newspaper article about the harm of 
sexism explained that subtle discrimination is less visible but still harmful. The harm 
and negative consequences of ostensibly polite behaviors like paternalism and 
chivalry, and characterizations of women with positive stereotypes were described. 
The newspaper article about stress in student’s lives described different sources of 
stress, such as too much homework, failing exams, unfair grades, problems with 
group work, roommate problems, and lack of time for friends. Negative 
consequences of stress for students were presented. To make the information more 
concrete and vivid, we included graphic stories in each of the three information texts. 
All three texts were of equivalent length. Pretesting both articles with 16 students 
indicated that the information about prevalence made participants focus more on the 
prevalence of sexism (M = 4.56, SD = .63) than on the harm of sexism (M = 3.75, SD 
= .93, t(15) = -3.75, p < .01) and the information about harm made participants focus 
more on harm (M = 4.56, SD = .51) than on prevalence of sexism (M = 4.13, SD = 
.50, t(15) = 2.78, p < .05). 
                                                 
9 As was done in Study 1, participants also completed the Modern Racism scale at the end of the 
measures, again to make it less obvious that we were particularly interested in their endorsement of 
sexist beliefs.  
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Gender Identification. Identification with the gender in-group was again 
measured with items from Cameron’s (2004) gender identification scale. Internal 
consistency was satisfactory (α = .80 for women; α = .70 for men). 
Manipulation Check. Two items were used as a manipulation check to 
determine whether the newspaper article about harm focused more on harm than on 
prevalence of sexism and whether the article about prevalence stressed the 
prevalence more than harm of sexism. Participants in the harm and prevalence 
condition were asked: “Overall, how strong is the argument that sexism is prevalent 
in society?” and “Overall, how strong is the argument that sexism is harmful for 
women?” 
Dependent variables. As dependent variables, we used the same measures 
as in Study 1. All items could be answered on six-point rating scales ranging from 1 = 
“disagree strongly” to 6 = “agree strongly”. An exploratory factor analysis of MS and 
NS items validated the distinction between denial of discrimination (five items of the 
MS scale and two of the NS scale) and NS (nine items of the NS scale, but without 
the two NS-items which measured denial of discrimination). Internal consistencies of 
system justification scale (α = .78), the newly constructed MS scale (denial of 
discrimination, α = .77), the newly constructed NS scale (α = .80), and BS scale (α = 
.78) were satisfactory.  
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Results 
Manipulation check 
A 2 (information condition: prevalence, harm) x 2 (gender of participant: 
female, male) MANOVA was conducted with both manipulation check items as 
dependent variables. The condition by gender interaction was significant, F(2,158) = 
3.07, p < .05, η² = .04, indicating that women and men differed in ratings of 
manipulation check. Therefore, we did MANOVAs separately for women and men. 
The MANOVA for women revealed a significant main effect for condition, 
F(2,109) = 7.55, p < .01, η² = .12. Univariate analyses indicated that women in the 
prevalence condition rated that the text more strongly stressed the argument that 
sexism was prevalent  than women in the harm condition (M = 4.55, SD = 1.08; M = 
4.07, SD = .60, respectively), F(1,110) = 8.15, p < .01, η² = .07. In contrast, women in 
the harm condition perceived that the text more strongly stressed that sexism was 
harmful than women in the prevalence condition (M = 4.19, SD = .85; M = 3.76, SD = 
1.1, respectively), F(1,110) = 5.31, p < .05, η² = .05. Hence, results suggest that 
manipulations were effective for women. 
For men, a MANOVA revealed a main effect for condition, F(2,48) = 5.90, p < 
.01, η² = .20. Univariate analyses showed that men in the prevalence condition rated 
that the text more strongly stressed the argument that sexism is prevalent (M = 4.29, 
SD = .78) than men in the harm condition (M = 3.30, SD = 1.26, F(1,49) = 12.02, p < 
.01, η² = .20). However, there was no significant difference between conditions for 
the harm rating, F(1,49) = 1.07, p = .31, η² = .02 (harm condition: M = 3.65, SD = 
1.39; prevalence condition: M = 4.00, SD = 1.03). Therefore, this suggests that the 
prevalence manipulation was effective for men whereas the harm manipulation was 
not. However, as noted below we found the predicted effects for the harm condition 
for men suggesting that the manipulation might have had the intended effects. 
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Endorsement of sexist beliefs 
A 3 (condition: prevalence, harm, stress) x 2 (gender of participant: female, 
male) MANOVA on MS, NS, and BS revealed a significant main effect for condition, 
F(6,464) = 7.49, p < .01, η² = .08, and gender, F(3,232) = 28.91, p < .01, η² = .27. 
The interaction was not significant, F(6,466) = 0.37, p = .90, η² = .01. The gender 
effect indicated that men scored higher on the MS, NS and BS scales (M = 3.12, SD 
= .71; M = 2.77, SD = .67; and M = 3.81, SD = .81, respectively) than women (M = 
2.66, SD = .69; M = 2.01, SD = .61; and M = 3.49, SD = .86, respectively). Univariate 
analyses revealed significant effects of condition for MS, F(2,234) = 11.22, p < .01, η² 
= .09, and BS, F(2,234) = 8.81, p < .01, η² = .07, but not for NS, F(2,234) = 1.61, ns, 
η² = .01.  
Planned comparisons (p < .05) between the prevalence condition versus the 
harm and stress condition and between the harm condition versus the prevalence 
and stress condition support the predictions. Participants in the prevalence condition 
had lower MS scores than participants in the stress and in the harm condition (M = 
2.57, SD = .65; M = 3.04, SD = .75; M = 2.81, SD = .71 respectively, F(1,237) = 
14.37, p < .001, η² = .06). Subsequently, a test was run for any remaining variance 
left to explain after the variance explained by the contrast had been removed 
(Niedenthal, Brauer, Robin, & Innes-Ker, 2002). This test for residual variance was 
not significant (F < 1), indicating that no additional significant contrasts are possible 
and the hypothesized contrast is a parsimonious and accurate description of the 
data.  
As predicted, participants in harm condition had lower BS scores than those in 
the prevalence condition and stress condition (M = 3.24, SD = .85; M = 3.80, SD = 
.82; M = 3.69, SD = .79 respectively, F(1,237) = 20.11, p < .001, η² = .08). Again, the 
test for residual variance was not significant (F < 1), indicating that there was no 
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additional significant contrast. Hence, consistent with the manipulation, participants in 
the prevalence condition had significantly lower scores on MS than participants in the 
harm and stress condition, whereas participants in the harm condition had 
significantly lower scores on BS than participants in the prevalence and in the stress 
condition. These effects were true for women and men and were found across all 
subcomponents of the BS scale. 
Endorsement of system justification 
A 3 (condition: prevalence, harm, stress) by 2 (gender of participant: female, 
male) ANOVA performed on system justification also revealed main effects for 
condition, F(2,234) = 4.02, p < .05, η² = .03, and gender, F(2,234) = 8.24, p < .01, η² 
= .03, and no interaction of condition by gender, F(2,234) = .09, p = .91, η² = .00. 
Planned comparisons indicated a significant difference between prevalence and 
stress condition, indicating greater rejection of system justification in the prevalence 
condition (women: M = 3.24, SD = .78; men: M = 3.58, SD = .71) than in the stress 
condition (women: M = 3.59, SD = .78; men: M = 3.93, SD = .75) but no differences 
between harm condition (women: M = 3.49, SD = .78; men: M = 3.73, SD = .71) and 
stress condition.  
As in Study 1, we conducted a mediation analysis to test whether MS 
mediated the relation between prevalence vs. stress condition and system 
justification. We already know that prevalence vs. stress condition is significantly 
related to system justification (B = -.30, SE = .12, p < .05), and to the mediator MS (B 
= -.44, SE = .11, p < .001). Additionally MS is related to system justification 
controlling for prevalence versus control condition (B = .57, SE = .07, p < .001). After 
inclusion of the mediator, the effect between prevalence vs. stress condition and 
system justification decreased to non significance (B = -.05, SE = .11, ns). A Sobel 
(1982) test indicated that this mediation was statistically significant (z = -3.78, p < 
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.001). Again, we tested the reverse mediation that information about the prevalence 
of sexism leads to changes in system justification which in turn lead to changes in 
MS. System justification decreased the relation between condition and MS 
significantly (z = -2.39, p < .05). As in Study 1, the relation between condition and MS 
remained significant (B = -.29, SE = .10, p < .01). Additional analyses also reveal that 
the other sexism scales were not significant mediators. 
Gender identification 
 As in Study 1, we used regressions to test whether gender identification 
moderated any of the above effects. None of the interactions with gender 
identification were significant.  
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 provided important insights into the mechanisms that 
are responsible for endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs by investigating differential 
effects of selected information. As expected, information that sexism is still prevalent 
decreased endorsement of modern sexist, but not of benevolent sexist beliefs. That 
is, participants who were confronted with statistical information, which clearly attest to 
women’s under-representation in decision making positions and prevalence of 
everyday sexism, changed their perceptions of gender discrimination in society. In 
contrast, information that subtle sexism is harmful led to a stronger rejection of 
benevolent sexist beliefs than of modern sexist beliefs. Hence, a heightened 
knowledge that ostensibly positive stereotypes and behaviors can have negative 
consequences reduced acceptance of benevolent sexist beliefs in particular. 
Importantly, these effects were not moderated by participants’ gender indicating that 
when the information is less ambiguous, information about the prevalence of sexism 
and its harm can influence both women and men. 
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In addition, we replicated our ability to reduce system justification beliefs. We 
illustrated that changes in system justification are specifically a function of 
information about the prevalence of sexism. Thus, it is not just a heightened 
awareness of sexism (as found in Study 1) but knowledge about the prevalence of 
sexism that leads to decreases in endorsement of system justification beliefs. Plus, 
this effect of information about prevalence of sexism on system justification was 
mediated by endorsement of modern sexist beliefs. As in Study 1, a reverse analysis 
showed that system justification partially accounts for the relation between the 
prevalence versus the stress condition and Modern Sexism. Again, the reverse 
mediation was weaker than the first one. 
Our manipulations, however, were not successful at reducing neosexist 
beliefs. A possible explanation for this is that the texts may not have directly 
addressed information relevant for this type of sexist beliefs. The text about 
prevalence stressed the prevalence of sexism in society, but did not focus on the 
other two subcomponents of Modern Sexism that are more strongly represented in 
the Neosexism scale, namely antagonism towards women’s demands and 
resentment against special favors for women. The Neosexism scale includes fewer 
items that address prevalence of sexism and, based upon a factor analysis, we 
included these items from the Neosexism scale with the Modern Sexism scale. Thus, 
different information might need to be added to information about the prevalence of 
sexism to address these aspects of Neosexism. In addition, the Neosexism scale 
tends to measure hostility towards women more so than the Modern Sexism scale 
(see Swim, Becker & DeCoster, 2007), therefore it is understandable that the text 
about prevalence of sexism did not affect neosexist beliefs.  
Also contrary to explications, we again did not find that gender identification 
moderates the effects. Perhaps the presence of a German experimenter and the 
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emphasis made about her ethnicity in the cover story made participant’s identification 
as U.S. Americans more salient and decreased the role that gender identification 
played in this context. As a consequence, we decided that experimenters’ and 
participant’s nationality should be the same in the third study. 
 
STUDY 3 
We added a third study, conceptually similar to Study 2, but with some 
improvements: First, we improved the newspaper articles. We hypothesized that 
additional information that indicated that the advantages of policies designed to help 
women in work which would address the subtlety of everyday discrimination would 
lead to a stronger rejection of neosexist beliefs. Second, we ran the study in 
Germany with participants older than college students and did not mention ethnic 
identity in the cover story. In this case, experimenters’ and participant’s nationality 
were identical (German). 
Third, we added Hostile Sexism (HS) as an additional dependent variable. We 
did this for two reasons. It is possible that the lack of effect on NS in the previous 
study occurred because of its association with hostile beliefs about women. For 
instance, an examination of the NS scale items revealed some items to measure a 
relatively blatant form of sexist beliefs (e.g., “It is difficult to work for a female boss”). 
Also, Swim, Becker, and DeCoster (2007) found indicators that NS is measuring a 
similar construct as HS. Thus, including the HS scale, we can test whether the 
effects or lack of effects for NS and HS are similar. The second reason, however, is 
to see whether information that affects endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs also 
decreases endorsement of hostile sexist beliefs. HS is defined as the flip side to 
Benevolent Sexism with individuals who are more likely to endorse benevolent sexist 
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beliefs also being more likely to endorse hostile sexist beliefs. Thus, because the two 
beliefs are linked, if we are able to decrease endorsement of benevolent sexist 
beliefs, we may also be able to decrease endorsement of hostile sexist beliefs. 
Moreover, because information about harm is particularly potent for reducing 
benevolent sexist beliefs, information about harm may be potent for reducing hostile 
sexist beliefs as well.  
 
Method 
Participants 
131 women and 58 men participated in an online-experiment and received the 
link of the study from friends and acquaintances and were asked to forward the link. 
Participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 60 years, with a mean age of 28 years. 98% of 
the participants classified themselves as Germans, 2% as Austrians and Swiss. In 
exchange for completing the measure, they participated in a lottery. One third of 
participants were students. They were debriefed one month after their participation.  
Design 
The design was a 3 (information condition: prevalence, harm, stress) x 2 
(gender of participant: female, male) between-subject design with identification with 
the gender category as a measured continuous moderator. Participants were 
randomly assigned to information condition (prevalence condition, N = 66; harm 
condition, N = 58; stress condition, N = 65). The stress condition served as a control 
group. 
Procedure 
The experiment was again described as a study about “evaluation of texts”. 
Participants were told that an article was written about sexism or stressors, 
depending on condition, to be published in a local newspaper but it still needed to be 
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improved. Besides paying attention to mistakes, we asked participants to think about 
whether the text was too difficult because the local newspaper was read by people of 
different educational backgrounds. In addition, participants were told that researchers 
were interested in how their attitudes might influence text evaluation. Therefore, they 
were asked to complete some additional measures before and after they read and 
evaluated the text. Gender identification was measured before the manipulation. 
After reading the texts, participants were asked to evaluate the text on dimensions 
described in Study 2. In addition, an opportunity to comment on the article was given. 
Finally participants completed manipulation checks and dependent measures. 
Manipulation 
Each of the three newspaper articles used in Study 2 were translated into 
German language and adapted to German context. We added the following to the 
articles: To the prevalence article, we added a statement that indicated the 
advantages of policies designed to change the current gender status quo. Thus, 
nearly the entire article addressed prevalence but we did make an additional 
connection between prevalence and policies. Most of the text about harm of sexism 
that was used in Study 2 addressed paternalism. We therefore bolstered comments 
about the other two subcomponents of Benevolent Sexism, namely gender 
differentiation and heterosexuality. Again to make the information more vivid, we 
included graphic stories for each of the three subcomponents. To make each of the 
articles the same length, we also extended the stress text. Finally, to have a similar 
amount of personal stories in each of the articles, we added personal stories for the 
prevalence and stress articles. Results of a pretest (N = 21) confirmed that the 
information about prevalence focused participants on prevalence (M = 4.40, SD = 
.52) more than harm of sexism (M = 3.73, SD = .79; t(19) = -2.29, p < .05) and the 
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information about harm focused participants more on harm (M = 4.55, SD = .69) than 
on prevalence of sexism (M = 3.10, SD = .1.10; t(19) = 3.75, p < .05). 
Gender Identification 
Identification with the gender in-group was again measured with translated 
items of Cameron’s (2004) scale. Internal consistency was satisfactory (α = .78 for 
women; α = .86 for men).  
Manipulation Check 
We used the same manipulation check as in Study 2.  
Dependent variables 
Items could be answered on six-point rating scales ranging from 1 = “disagree 
strongly” to 6 = “agree strongly”. We used German translations of the scales applied 
in Study 1 and Study 2: German Modern Sexism scale (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1998) 
primarily measures denial of discrimination. For the sake of consistency, we used 
unpublished translations of the NS scale (T. Eckes, personal communication, 
February 13, 2007) to have a full measure for NS. A factor analysis of MS and NS 
items again confirmed the distinction between denial of discrimination (five items of 
the MS scale and two of the NS scale, α = .82) and NS (nine items of the NS scale, 
without the two items which loaded on the denial of discrimination-factor, α = .85). BS 
was measured with a German translation (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1999, α = .87). We 
added a measure of Hostile Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) using the 11 items of a 
translation of HS scale (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1999; α = .81; e.g., “When women lose 
to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated 
against”). We translated the measure of system justification (α = .90) and put this 
measure at the end of the survey.10  
 
                                                 
10 Instead of modern racism, our filler items this time were a reduced and slightly adapted measure of 
subtle and blatant prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). 
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Results 
Manipulation check 
A MANOVA with both manipulation check items was significant (F(4,364) = 
105.48, p < .001, η² = 54). Participants in the prevalence condition perceived that 
their text provided a stronger argument for the prevalence of sexism than did 
participants in the harm and stress conditions F(2,186) = 214.07, p < .001, η² = .70 
(planned comparisons: both ps < .01; harm condition: M = 3.28, SD = 1.17; 
prevalence condition: M = 4.45, SD = .64; stress condition: M = 1.34, SD = .76). In 
contrast, participants in the harm condition perceived that their text provided a 
stronger argument for the harm of sexism than did participants in the prevalence and 
stress conditions, F(2,186) = 123.34, p < .001, η² = .57 (planned comparisons: both 
ps < .01; harm condition: M = 4.16, SD = 1.17; prevalence condition: M = 3.15, SD = 
.92; stress condition: M = 1.42, SD = .86). No gender difference revealed, F(2,182) = 
.23, p = .79, η² = .00) or interaction with gender, F(4,366) = .91, p = .91, η² = .01.11 
Endorsement of sexist beliefs 
We found significant effects for gender identification in our analyses. 
Therefore, we conducted separate hierarchical moderated regression analyses 
(Aiken & West, 1991) using each of the four sexism scales as dependent variables. 
The experimental factors were recoded into two dummy variables. For the first 
variable (prevalence contrast), participants in the prevalence condition were assigned 
a one, participants in the other two conditions were assigned a zero. In the second 
variable (harm contrast), participants in the harm condition were assigned a one, 
whereas all other participants were assigned a zero. In regression analyses, in the 
                                                 
11 Gender identity did not interact with the manipulation check. Thus, women and men who were more 
and less identified were similarly made aware of the content of the articles and, therefore, the 
manipulation was equally effective across groups. Because we found predicted moderating effects for 
identity on our dependent variables, this suggested that, while they both comprehended the 
information, they reacted differently to this information. 
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first step, the two dummy variables were entered. When both variables are 
simultaneously included in the analyses, the prevalence contrast compares only the 
prevalence versus the control (stress) group and the harm contrast compares only 
the harm versus control (stress) condition.12 In the second step, identification with the 
gender in-group and two interaction terms (prevalence contrast by identification; 
harm contrast by identification) were entered.  
First, regression analyses for each of the four dependent variables with the 
two contrasts testing the effects of prevalence and harm conditions relative to the 
stress condition, identification, gender, and two- and three-way interactions as 
predictors, revealed three-way-interactions for the contrasts by identification by 
gender. As expected, these interactions indicated different effects of the information 
texts on endorsement of sexist beliefs depending on gender and gender 
identification. Therefore, we computed separate regression analyses for female and 
male participants. 
Female participants. MS, NS and HS were predicted to be lower in the 
prevalence condition in comparison to the stress condition. BS and HS were 
predicted to be lower in the harm condition than in the stress condition. Both effects 
should be especially true for women highly identified with their gender.  
Consistent with hypotheses, the prevalence condition decreased endorsement 
of MS and NS (B = -.80, SE = .15, p < .001; B = -.46, SE = .17, p < .01, respectively), 
but not of BS. Similar to the effect for NS, information about prevalence of sexism 
also decreased endorsement of HS (B = -.39, SE = .16, p < .05). Also, consistent 
with our hypotheses, the harm condition decreased endorsement of BS and HS (B = 
                                                 
12 To get a comparison between prevalence and harm condition, we calculated further regressions 
with either harm condition or prevalence condition as the comparison group. When prevalence had an 
effect on modern and Neosexism, the effect was the same using the stress condition or harm 
condition as comparison group. When harm had an effect on Benevolent Sexism, the effect was the 
same using stress condition or prevalence condition as comparison group. 
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-1.26, SE = .16, p < .001; B = .67, SE = .16, p < .001, respectively), but not MS and 
NS. As expected, the interaction term for the prevalence contrast by identification 
was negative and significant for MS, NS, and HS (B = -.47, SE = .19, p < .05; B = -
.54, SE = .21; p < .05; B = -.76, SE = .20, p < .001, respectively) whereas the 
interaction between the harm contrast and identification was negative and significant 
for BS and HS (B = -.78, SE = .19, p < .001; B = -.69, SE = .19, p < .01, respectively). 
Hence, the impact of both types of information depended on women's identification 
with their gender in-group.  
Figure 1 (a-d) shows simple slopes of the regressions of each of the four 
sexism scales on information condition for more identified (one SD above the mean) 
and less identified respondents (one SD below the mean). In accordance with our 
predictions, simple slope analyses for MS and NS yielded significant negative slopes 
for more identified women in the prevalence condition (B = -1.27, SE = .23, p < .001; 
B = -1.0, SE = .25, p < .001, respectively), whereas slopes for less identified women 
were not significant (B = -.34, SE = .23, ns; B = .09, SE = .25, ns, respectively). 
There was also a negative trend for high identifiers in the harm condition with greater 
rejection of NS when provided information about harm (B = -.50, SE = .28, p < .10). 
Thus, information about the prevalence of sexism leads to greater rejection of MS 
and NS, particularly for women who are highly identified with their gender in-group. 
Moreover, there was a trend suggesting that high identifiers who read that sexism is 
harmful also rejected neosexist beliefs. Also supporting our prediction, simple slopes 
for BS revealed a significant slope for more identified women in the harm condition (B 
= -2.04, SE = .27, p < .001). For less identified women a marginal significant slope 
was found (B = -.48, SE = .27, p < .10), but not nearly as strong as for high 
identifiers. Hence, the impact of information about harm depended also on gender 
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identification: For women who read that sexism is harmful, higher gender 
identification lead to greater rejection of benevolent sexist beliefs. 
Consistent with the main effects, for those high in identification, simple slopes 
for both dummy variables were significant in case of HS for the harm contrast and for 
the prevalence contrast (B = -1.35, SE = .27, p < .001; B = -1.15, SE = .24, p < .001, 
respectively). Simple slopes for those low in identification were not significant. Thus, 
information that sexism is harmful as well as that sexism is prevalent leads to a 
stronger rejection of hostile sexist views only when women are highly identified with 
their gender in-group.  
Male participants. We predicted the same effects of information on 
endorsement of sexist beliefs for men as for women, except for men we predicted 
that the effects would be strongest for those who were less identified with their 
gender in-group. 
Consistent with hypotheses, the prevalence condition decreased endorsement 
of MS, NS, and HS (B = -.69, SE = .22, p < .01; B = -.43, SE = .26, p = .107; B = -.44, 
SE = .25, p < .10, respectively) but not BS. Also, consistent with hypotheses, the 
harm condition decreased endorsement of BS (B = -.83, SE = .27, p < .01), but not 
MS and NS. However, in contrast to predictions, the harm condition also did not 
decrease endorsement of HS (B = -.34, SE = .26, ns). Similar to results for women, 
men in the prevalence condition had significantly lower scores on MS, NS and HS, 
whereas men in the harm condition had significantly lower scores on BS. 
Also as expected, the interaction between prevalence and identification was 
negative and significant for MS, NS, and HS (B = .41, SE = .17, p < .05; B = .72, SE 
= .21, p < .01; B = .63, SE = .20, p < .01, respectively) whereas the interaction 
between the harm contrast and identification was positive and significant for BS (B = 
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.98, SE = .23, p < .001). Hence, in line with our hypothesis, the impact of information 
on men’s endorsement of sexist beliefs also depended upon gender identification.  
We plotted the simple slopes for the regressions of each of the four sexism 
scales on information condition for more identified men (one SD above the mean) 
and for less identified men (one SD below the mean; see Figure 1e-h). As predicted, 
simple slope analyses for those less identified testing the prevalence contrast 
revealed significant slopes for MS, NS, and HS (B = -1.09, SE = .27, p < .001; B = -
1.15, SE = .33, p < .01, and B = -1.07, SE = .31, p < .01, respectively), whereas 
simple slopes for those more identified were not significant (B = -.28, SE = .27, ns; B 
= .28, SE = .33, ns, and B = .19, SE = .31, ns, respectively). Simple slope analyses 
for BS revealed a significant slope for those low in identification with the harm 
contrast (B = -1.82, SE = .34, p < .01), but not for those high in identification (B = .15, 
SE = .34, ns). Surprisingly, there was a negative trend for the less identified in the 
harm condition toward greater rejection of neosexist beliefs (B = -.74, SE = .34, p < 
.05). Thus, information that sexism is still prevalent leads to greater rejection of 
modern sexist, neosexist and hostile sexist beliefs only for less identified men. 
Equally, information about harm leads to greater rejection of benevolent sexist beliefs 
only when men are less identified with their gender in-group. 
Endorsement of system justification 
Regression analyses with system justification as dependent variable revealed 
that the prevalence condition decreased endorsement of system justification in 
women (B = -.47, SE = .19, p < .05), but not the harm condition (B = -.27, SE = .19, 
ns). No interaction effect with gender identification occurred. 
For men, the prevalence condition also decreased endorsement of system 
justification (B = -.64, SE = .27, p < .05) but not the harm condition (B = -.08, SE = 
.28, ns). In addition, the prevalence contrast by identification interaction was 
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significant (B = .75, SE = .22, p < .01), suggesting that less identified men in the 
prevalence condition had lowest scores on system justification. 
Again, we conducted a mediation analysis, with prevalence versus stress 
condition as the predictor variable, system justification as dependent variable and MS 
as mediator together for women and men. Prevalence vs. stress condition was 
significantly related to system justification (B = -.53, SE = .16, p < .01), and to the 
mediator (MS: B = -.85, SE = .14, p < .001). Additionally MS was related to system 
justification controlling for the prevalence contrast (B = .60, SE = .09, p < .001). After 
inclusion of the mediator, the effect between condition and system justification 
decreased to non significance (B = -.02, SE = .16, ns). Sobel (1982) test indicated 
that this mediation was statistically significant (z = -4.54, p < .001). Thus, for the third 
time, the relation between condition and system justification was fully mediated by 
effects of modern sexist beliefs. We tested again the reverse mediation. The relation 
between prevalence vs. stress condition and MS was partially mediated by system 
justification (z = -2.92, p < .01) but remained significant (B = -.62, SE = .13, p < .001). 
Support was also not found for the other sexist beliefs as mediators. 
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Discussion 
The results of Study 3 replicated and extended findings of the two US studies 
in a European context. We not only replicated the effect of information about 
prevalence of sexism on endorsement of modern sexist beliefs and information about 
harm of sexism on endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs, but found new effects 
as well. Consistent with predictions, information about prevalence of sexism affected 
endorsement of neosexist beliefs. The pattern of findings for Hostile Sexism was very 
similar to those for Neosexism and is consistent with the argument that Hostile 
Sexism and Neosexism both tap into more negative beliefs about women. Moreover, 
we had predicted that information about harm would affect endorsement of hostile 
sexist beliefs and we found this to be the case for women but not for men.  
Another significant finding of Study 3 concerns the moderating role of gender 
identification. Effects of both types of information on endorsement of sexist beliefs 
depended on gender identification. Consistent for all measures of sexism, the above 
effects were strongest for women who were more identified and men who were less 
identified with their gender and weaker or not significant for women who were less 
and men who were more identified.  
 
General Discussion 
The present research investigated whether women and men endorse sexist 
beliefs because they do not attend to its prevalence and harm. We investigated this 
by testing types of information that would reduce endorsement of these beliefs. 
Specifically, we analyzed the impact of attention to sexism in one’s everyday live and 
heightened awareness that sexism is prevalent and harmful for women on reduction 
of subtle sexist attitudes. So far, research has mostly studied ways to reduce ethnic 
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prejudice (e.g., Oskamp, 2000; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and a few studies 
successfully tested that participating in gender classes change feminist 
consciousness (e.g., Henderson-King & Stewart, 1999). The unique contribution of 
the current research was to investigate the role of awareness of sexism in one's own 
life on endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs and the differential role that information 
about prevalence and harm has on endorsement of different types of subtle sexist 
beliefs. We hypothesized that heightened awareness about the prevalence of sexism 
would result in greater rejection of modern sexist and neosexist beliefs whereas 
heightened awareness that sexism is harmful would lead to greater rejection of 
benevolent sexist beliefs. Overall, we found strong support for our hypotheses.  
In Study 1, we found that attending to sexism in everyday life resulted in 
stronger rejection of modern, neo- and benevolent sexist beliefs in women but not in 
men. A mediation analysis indicated that men scored higher on every sexism 
measure, not because they attended to fewer everyday sexist incidents but because 
they evaluated these incidents as less sexist than women did. Thus, in essence they 
observed a similar amount of incidents but, in their view, they observed fewer sexist 
incidents because they were less likely to label them as sexist. As a result, attending 
to specific behaviors in their lives that researchers have identified as sexist were not 
as effective at reducing endorsement of sexist beliefs in men as in women. 
Our two controlled information studies, in which we carefully manipulated 
information that provided evidence for the prevalence of sexism versus for the harm 
of sexism, indicated that this kind of information decreased endorsement of sexist 
beliefs by women and men. This suggests that information about sexism can impact 
men's beliefs when the information is less ambiguous. It may have been easier for 
men to provide alternative explanations for the sexist incidents in their everyday lives 
than when provided with information about sexism. We also found that different types 
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of information can affect different types of sexism. The findings suggest that women 
and men endorse modern sexist, neosexist, and hostile sexist beliefs because they 
do not perceive sexism to be prevalent, whereas women and men endorse 
benevolent sexist beliefs because they do not perceive them to be harmful. 
Across all three studies, we found that attending to everyday sexism and 
information about the prevalence of sexism decreased endorsement of system 
justification beliefs. Moreover, this effect can be accounted for by the effect of such 
information on endorsement of modern sexist beliefs. Across all studies, the reverse 
mediation with system justification as mediator and Modern Sexism as dependent 
variable revealed that system justification partially mediated the relation between 
experimental condition and Modern Sexism. Therefore, we conclude that Modern 
Sexism and system justification affect each other, but here we found stronger 
evidence that specific beliefs (Modern Sexism) influence diffuse beliefs (system 
justification) more so than the other way around.  
In Study 3 we were able to find support for the predicted moderating role of 
gender identification. We found that attending to the prevalence of sexism and its 
harm lead to prejudice reducing effects for women more identified and men less 
identified with their gender. These results are a step further toward a better 
understanding of the impact of gender identification on women and men’s reactions 
toward sexism. Because information was less effective at changing more identified 
men and less identified women’s beliefs, they may endorse sexist beliefs for different 
reasons than less identified men and more identified women. Perhaps more identified 
men’s motivation is maintenance of dominance hierarchies and less identified 
women’s motivation is a general desire to perceive the world as just (Lerner, 1980). 
These motivations may result in resistance to accepting information about the 
prevalence and harm of sexism. Yet it is interesting to note from the pattern of 
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means, that the resistance did not result in reactance in the form of greater 
endorsement of sexist beliefs. That is, even though they may have reacted against 
the information, the information did not increase endorsement of sexist beliefs 
relative to the control condition. 
This finding contrasts with results from the first two studies. We argued that 
the procedures in the first two studies may have affected the salience of gender 
identity. In the first study, attending to sexism for a whole week may have increased 
gender identification in both women and men, thereby explaining the effect on the 
diaries on women and not men. In the second study the German experimenter's 
emphasis on her nationality may have overpowered participant's thoughts about their 
gender identity. This might have made the U.S American identity more salient and 
thus overshadowed the role of gender identity in that context. A second possibility 
may have to do with characteristics of the samples used in the studies. A difference 
between the first two and the third study was participant's age. Participants in the first 
two studies were on average 19 years old (with a range of 18 to 44 and 1% being 
older than 22 years) whereas participants in the third study were on average 28 
years old (with an age range from 19 to 60 and 84 % being older than 22 years). It is 
possible that young students are less adept at questioning the content of the article 
than older participants (e.g., Sears, 1986). Being less critical and more likely to 
accept information might have overshadowed the effects of gender identity. 
Our results have important implications for interventions to reduce sexism. We 
demonstrated that sexist attitudes can be changed through selective information 
about the prevalence and harm of sexism. Therefore, we recommend programs to 
inform individuals about the prevalence and negative consequences of subtle sexism 
especially about the negativity of behaviors, such as paternalism, which seem to be 
positive and benevolent yet represent stereotypic characterizations and treatment of 
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women. This information may be more effective for less identified men and more 
identified women. For prejudice reduction programs, it would be interesting to 
determine whether situationally decreasing men’s gender identification and 
increasing women’s gender identification increases the effectiveness of the 
information for more individuals. Practically, increasing one group’s gender 
identification while simultaneously decreasing another group’s gender identification 
could be difficult. If motivational reasons do underpin more identified men and less 
identified women’s resistance to information, prejudice reduction programs might 
want to target both motivational reasons for endorsing sexist beliefs and 
informational reasons to most effectively reduce endorsement of sexist beliefs. 
There are some limitations to the present research. First, we did not find that 
gender identification moderated the prejudice-reducing effects in the first two studies 
but it did in the last study. Future research should further examine the role of gender 
identification in this context to determine, for instance, whether it was a function of 
differences in age or cultural understandings of gender or a consequence of 
methodological differences across the studies that affected the salience of gender.  
Second, since we do not know how long lasting the effects are, it would be 
useful for future research to address long term effects. Plus, we were able to reduce 
sexist attitudes in a neutral situation where sexism did not have a function. However, 
sexism is often motivated and strategically used in situations where individuals seek 
to get advantages of being sexist or are rewarded for accepting sexism, whereby the 
use of Benevolent Sexism can be effective in situations where Modern Sexism would 
not be and the other way around. Hence, future research should focus on the 
functional relevance of Benevolent and Modern Sexism in different contexts, for 
example, to investigate when people use Modern or Benevolent Sexism to their 
advantage or when they think it is best to appear non-sexist, so that interventions can 
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be specifically developed for situations where sexism is most likely used to one’s 
advantage.  
Third, we do not know if the findings translate into changes in behaviors. 
Broadening this research of heightened awareness of sexism and its harm on 
changing intentions and actual behavior to confront sexism would be a promising 
extension. For instance, important first steps to publicly noting sexism is to notice and 
label it as sexist (Stangor et al., 2003). 
Fourth, one could argue that demand characteristics might account for our 
findings. However, demand characteristics are not likely to fully account for our 
findings, otherwise we would not have found differential effects of information about 
harm and prevalence on different types of sexism. Plus, we also may not have found 
that the effects were stronger for women than men in the first study and for certain 
groups of women and men based on gender identification in the third study.  
To conclude, the present findings point to core reasons why individuals 
endorse subtle sexist beliefs based upon the type of information that reduces 
endorsement of such beliefs. Moreover, the research points to ways to reduce 
endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs. First, awareness of sexism in one’s everyday 
live can reduce endorsement of sexist beliefs in women. Second, in order to reduce 
endorsement of modern sexist, neosexist, and hostile sexist beliefs it is specifically 
necessary to heighten awareness of the prevalence of sexism. In order to reduce 
endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs it is specifically necessary to attend to the 
harm experienced by targets of discrimination. In addition, although this type of 
information will effectively reduce endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs in certain 
individuals, other individuals will be resistant to this information and it may be 
important to address gender identification when using this type of information to 
reduce endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs. 
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
154 
References 
Abrams, D., Viki, G.T., Masser, B., & Bohner, G. (2003). Perceptions of stranger and 
acquaintance rape: The role of Benevolent and Hostile Sexism in victim blame 
and rape proclivity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 111-125. 
Aiken, L.S., & West, S.G. (1991). Multiple regressions: Testing and interpreting 
interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Barreto, M., & Ellemers, N. (2005a). The perils of political correctness: men’s and 
women’s responses to old-fashioned and modern sexist views. Social 
Psychology Quarterly, 68, 75-88. 
Barreto, M., & Ellemers, N. (2005b). The burden of Benevolent Sexism: How it 
contributes to the maintenance of gender inequalities. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 35, 633-642. 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182. 
Becker, J.C., & Wagner, U. (2007). Doing gender differently – The interplay of 
strength and content of gender identity in predicting women’s endorsement of 
sexist beliefs. Paper submitted for publication. 
Benokraitis, N.V., & Feagin, J.R. (1995). Modern Sexism: Blatant, subtle, and covert 
discrimination (2nd ed.). Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Berg, S. H. (2006). Everyday sexism and posttraumatic stress disorder in women: A 
correlational study. Violence Against Women, 12, 970-988. 
Burn, S.M., Aboud, R., & Moyles, C. (2000). The relationship between gender social 
identity and support for feminism. Sex Roles, 42, 1081-1089. 
Cameron, J. E. (2004). A three factor model of social identity. Self and Identity, 3, 
239-262. 
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
 155
Campbell, B., Schellenberg, E.G., & Senn, C.Y. (1997). Evaluating measures of 
contemporary sexism. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 21, 89-102. 
Eagly A.H., & Mladinic, A. (1994). Are people prejudiced against women? Some 
answers from research on attitudes, gender, stereotypes, and judgments of 
competence. European Review of Social Psychology, 5, 1-32. 
Eckes, T., & Six-Materna, I. (1998). Leugnung von Diskriminierung: Eine Skala zur 
Erfassung des Modernen Sexismus [Denial of discrimination: A scale 
measuring Modern Sexism]. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 29, 224-238. 
Eckes, T., & Six-Materna, I. (1999). Hostilität und Benevolenz: Skala zur Erfassung 
des Ambivalenten Sexismus [Hostility and benevolence: A scale measuring 
ambivalent sexism]. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 30, 211-228. 
Ellemers, N. (2001). Individual upward mobility and the perceived legitimacy of 
intergroup relations. In J.T. Jost & B. Major (Eds.), The psychology of 
legitimacy (pp. 205-222). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Fischer, A.R. (2006). Women’s Benevolent Sexism as reaction to hostility. 
Psychology of Women Quarterly, 30, 410-416. 
Fitzgerald, L. F., Shullman, S., Bailey, N., Richards, M., Swecker, J., Gold, Y. et al. 
(1988). The incidence and dimensions of sexual harassment in academia and 
the work-place. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 32, 152-175.  
Forman, T.A. (2004). Color-blind racism and racial indifference: The role of racial 
apathy in facilitating enduring inequalities. In M. Krysan & A. E. Lewis (Eds.), 
Changing terrain of race & ethnicity (pp. 43–66). New York: Russell Sage. 
Forman, T.A., & Lewis, A.E. (2006). Racial apathy and hurricane Katrina. The social 
anatomy of prejudice in the post-civil rights era. Du Bois Review, 3, 175-202. 
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
156 
Glick, P., Diebold, J., Bailey-Werner, B., & Zhu, L. (1997). The two faces of Adam: 
Ambivalent Sexism and polarized attitudes toward women. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 1323-1334.  
Glick, P., & Fiske S.T. (1996). The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating 
Hostile and Benevolent Sexism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
70, 491-512. 
Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1999). The Ambivalence toward Men Inventory: 
Differentiating hostile and benevolent beliefs about men. Psychology of 
Women Quarterly, 23, 519-536. 
Glick, P., Fiske, S. T., Mladinic, A., Saiz, J. L., Abrams, D., Masser, B. et al. (2000). 
Beyond prejudice as simple antipathy: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism across 
cultures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 763-775. 
Glick, P., Sakalli-Ugurl, N., Ferreira, M.C., & de Souza, M.A. (2002). Ambivalent 
Sexism and attitudes toward wife abuse in Turkey and Brazil. Psychology of 
Women Quarterly, 26, 292-297. 
Henderson-King, D., & Steward, A.J. (1999). Educational experiences and shifts in 
group consciousness: Studying women. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 25, 390-399. 
Hyers, L.L. (2007). Resisting prejudice every day: Exploring women's assertive 
responses to anti-black racism, anti-semitism, heterosexism, and sexism. Sex 
Roles, 56, 1-12. 
Hyers, L.L., Swim, J.K., & Mallet, R.K. (2006). The personal is political: Using daily 
diaries to examine everyday gender-related experiences. In S.N. Hesse-Biber 
& P. Leavy (Eds.), Emergent methods in social research (pp. 313-336). Sage 
Publication. 
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
 157
Jackman, M.R. (1994). The velvet glove: Paternalism and conflict in gender, class, 
and race relations. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Jackman, M. (2005). Rejection or inclusion of outgroups?. In J. Dovidio, P. Glick, & L. 
Rudman (Eds.), On the nature of prejudice. 50 years after Allport (pp. 89-105). 
Malden: Blackwell. 
Johannesen-Schmidt, M.C., & Eagly, A.H. (2002). Another look at sex differences in 
preferred mate characteristics: The effects of endorsing the traditional female 
gender role. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 26, 322-328. 
Jones, G. P., & Jacklin, C. N. (1988). Changes in sexist attitudes towards women 
during introductory women's and men's studies courses. Sex Roles, 18, 611-
622.  
Jost, J.T., & Banaji, M.R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system justification and 
the production of false-consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 
33, 1-27. 
Jost, J.T., & Kay, A.C. (2005). Exposure to Benevolent Sexism and complementary 
gender stereotypes: Consequences for specific and diffuse forms of system 
justification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 498-509. 
Kaiser, C. R., Major, B., & McCoy, S. K. (2004). Expectations about the future and 
the emotional consequences of perceiving prejudice. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 30, 173-184. 
Katz, J., Swindell, S., & Farrow, S. (2004). Effects of participation in a first women's 
studies course on collective self-esteem, gender-related attitudes, and 
emotional well-being. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34, 2179-2199. 
Kilianski, S.E., & Rudman, L.A. (1998). Wanting it both ways: Do women approve of 
Benevolent Sexism? Sex Roles, 39, 333-352. 
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
158 
Klonoff, E. A., & Landrine, H. (1995). The schedule of sexist events: A measure of 
lifetime and recent sexist discrimination in women's lives. Psychology of 
Women Quarterly, 19, 439-472.  
Landrine, H., Klonoff, E. A., Gibbs, J., & Manning, V. (1995). Physical and psychiatric 
correlates of gender discrimination: An application of the schedule of sexist 
events. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 19, 473-492. 
Lerner, M.J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: 
Plenum. 
Luhtanen, R., & Crocker, J. (1992). A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of 
one's social identity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 302-318. 
Major, B., Gramzow, R.H., McCoy, S.K., Levin, S., Schmader, T., & Sidanius, J. 
(2002). Perceiving personal discrimination: The role of group status and 
legitimizing ideology, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 269-
282. 
Malkin, C., & Stake, J.E. (2004). Changes in attitudes and self-confidence in the 
women's and gender studies classroom: The role of teacher alliance and 
student cohesion. Sex Roles, 50, 455-468. 
Mason, K. O., Czajka, J. L., & Arber, S. (1976). Change in U.S. women's sex-role 
attitudes, 1964-1974. American Sociological Review, 41, 573-596.  
McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the modern racism 
scale. In J.D. Dovidio & S.L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and 
racism (pp. 91-125). San Diego: Academic Press. 
McCoy, S. K., & Major, B. (2003). Group identification moderates emotional 
responses to perceived prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
29, 1005-1017.  
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
 159
Moradi, B., & Risco, C. (2006). Perceived discrimination experiences and mental 
health of Latina/o American persons. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 53, 
411-421.  
Moradi, B., & Subich, L. M. (2004). Examining the moderating role of self-esteem in 
the link between experiences of perceived sexist events and psychological 
distress. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 51, 50-56. 
Moya, M., Glick, P., Expósito, F., De Lemus, S., & Hart, J. (in press). It’s for your own 
good: Benevolent Sexism and women’s tolerance of paternalistic 
discrimination by intimate partners. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin. 
Niedenthal, P. M., Brauer, M., Robin, L., & Innes-Ker, A. H. (2002). Adult attachment 
and the perception of facial expression of emotion. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 82, 419-433. 
Oskamp, S. (Ed.). (2000). Reducing prejudice and discrimination. Mahwah, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Parks, J. B., & Robertson, M. A. (2004). Attitudes toward women mediate the gender 
effect on attitudes toward sexist language. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 
28, 233-239. 
Pettigrew, T.F., & Meertens, R.W. (1995). Subtle and blatant prejudice in Western 
Europe. European Journal of Social Psychology, 25, 57-75. 
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact 
theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 751-783.  
Rudman, L. A. (1998). Self-promotion as a risk factor for women: The costs and 
benefits of counterstereotypical impression management. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 629-45.  
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
160 
Rudman, L. A., & Fairchild, K. (2004). Reactions to counterstereotypic behavior: The 
role of backlash in cultural stereotype maintenance. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 87, 157-176.  
Rudman, L. A., & Glick, P. (2001). Prescriptive gender stereotypes and backlash 
toward agentic women. Journal of Social Issues, 57, 743-62.  
Rudman, L. A. & Glick, P. (in press). Progress, pitfalls and remedies. To appear in E. 
Borgida & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Beyond common sense: Psychological science in 
the courtroom. 
Rudman, L. A., & Heppen, J. (2003). Implicit romantic fantasies and women’s interest 
in personal power: A glass slipper effect? Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 29, 1357-1370. 
Sandy, L., & Cortina, L.M. (2005). Interpersonal mistreatment in the workplace: The 
interface and impact of general incivility and sexual harassment. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 90, 483-496.  
Satorra, A., & Bentler, P.M. (2001). A scaled difference chi-square test statistic for 
moment structure analysis. Psychometrika, 66, 507-514. 
Sears, D. O. (1986). College sophomores in the laboratory: Influences of a narrow 
data base on social psychology’s view of human nature. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 51, 515-530. 
Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., Kobrynowicz, D., & Owen, S. (2002). Perceived 
discrimination against one's gender group has different implications for well-
being in women and men. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 197-
210.  
Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural 
equations models. In S. Leinhart (Ed.), Sociological methodology 1982 (pp. 
290–312). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
 161
Spence, J. T., & Hahn, E. D. (1997). The attitudes toward women scale and attitude 
change in college students. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 21, 17-34.  
Stangor, C., Swim, J.K., Sechrist, G.B., DeCoster, J., van Allen, K.L., & Ottenbreit, A. 
(2003). Ask, answer and announce: Three stages in perceiving and 
responding to discrimination. European Review of Social Psychology, 14, 277-
311. 
Stake, J. E., & Hoffmann, F. (2001). Changes in student social attitudes, activism, 
and personal confidence in higher education: The role of women's studies. 
American Educational Research Journal, 38, 411-436. 
Stake, J. E., Roades, L., Rose, S., Ellis, L., & West, C. (1994). The women’s studies 
experience: Impetus for feminist action. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 18, 
17–24. 
Stephan, W. G., & Vogt, W. P. (Eds.). (2004). Education programs for improving 
intergroup relations: Theory, research and practice. New York: Teachers 
College Press. 
Swim, J.K., Aikin, K.J., Hall, W.S., & Hunter, B.A. (1995). Sexism and racism: Old-
fashioned and modern prejudices. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68, 199-214. 
Swim, J.K., Becker, J.C., & DeCoster, J. (2007). Higher order structures for 
contemporary measures of sexist beliefs. Manuscript in preparation, 
Pennsylvania State University. 
Swim, J.K., Becker, J., Pruitt, E. R., & Lee, E. (in press). Sexism reloaded: Worldwide 
evidence for its endorsement, expression, and emergence in multiple contexts. 
To appear in H. Landrine & N. Russo (Eds.), Bringing diversity to feminist 
psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
162 
Swim, J.K., & Cohen, L.L. (1997). Overt, covert and subtle sexism. A comparison 
between the attitudes toward women and Modern Sexism scales. Psychology 
of Women Quarterly, 21, 103-118. 
Swim, J.K., Eysell, K., Quinlivan, E., & Ferguson, M.J. (2007). Self-silencing to 
sexism. Manuscript in preparation, Pennsylvania State University. 
Swim, J.K., Hyers, L.L., Cohen, L.L., & Ferguson, M.J. (2001). Everyday sexism: 
evidence for its incidence, nature and psychological impact from three daily 
diary studies. Journal of Social Issues, 57, 31-53. 
Swim, J. K., Mallett, R., & Stangor, C. (2004). Understanding subtle sexism: 
Detection and use of sexist language. Sex Roles, 51, 117-128. 
Swim, J.K., Mallett, R., Russo-Devosa, Y., & Stangor, C. (2005). Judgments of 
sexism. A comparison of the subtlety of sexism measures and sources of 
variability in judgments of sexism. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 29, 406-
411.  
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J.C. (1979). An integrated theory of intergroup conflict. In W.G. 
Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (2nd 
ed., pp. 33-47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J.C. (1986). The Social Identity Theory of intergroup behavior. In 
S. Worchel & W.G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (2nd ed., 
pp. 7-24). Chicago, MI: Nelson-Hall. 
Thomsen, C. J., Basu, A. M., & Reinitz, M. T. (1995). Effects of women's studies 
courses on gender-related attitudes of women and men. Psychology of 
Women Quarterly, 19, 419-426.  
Thornton, A., Alwin, D. F., & Camburn, D. (1983). Causes and consequences of sex-
role attitude change. American Sociological Review, 48, 211-227.  
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
 163
Tougas, F., Brown, R., Beaton, A.M., & Joly, S. (1995). Neosexism: Plus ca change, 
plus c’est pareil. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 842-849. 
Tougas, F., Brown, R., Beaton, A. M., & St.-Pierre, L. (1999). Neosexism among 
women: The role of personally experienced mobility attempts. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1487-1497.  
Twenge, J.M. (1997). Attitudes toward women, 1970-1995. Psychology of Women 
Quarterly, 21, 35-51. 
Van Knippenberg, D. (1999). Social identity and persuasion: Reconsidering the role 
of group membership. In A.D. Abrams & M.A. Hogg (Eds.), Social identity and 
social cognition (pp. 315-331). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.  
Vescio, T. K., Gervais, S., Snyder, M., & Hoover, A. (2005). Power and the creation 
of patronizing environments: The stereotype-based behaviors of the powerful 
and their effects on female performance in masculine domains. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 658-672.  
Wright, S.C. (2001). Restricted intergroup boundaries: Tokenism, ambiguity and the 
tolerance of injustice. In J.T. Jost & B. Major (Eds.), The psychology of 
legitimacy (pp. 223-256). Cambridge: University Press. 
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
164 
Authors’ note:  
This research was supported by a PhD fellowship awarded to the first author by the 
DFG Research Training Group „Group focused enmity“(GRK 884/1-04) located at the 
Universities of Marburg and Bielefeld, Germany. Correspondence concerning this 
article should be addressed to Julia C. Becker, Philipps-University Marburg, 
Department of Psychology, Social Psychology, Gutenbergstraße 18, 35032 Marburg, 
Germany, e-mail: beckerj2@staff.uni-marburg.de 
We are grateful to Ulrich Wagner for his comments on a previous version of this 
paper. 
LEGI INTELLEXI CONDEMNAVI 
 165
 
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
harm control prevalence
high identification low identification
 
1,5
2
2,5
3
harm control prevalence
high identification low identification
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
harm control prevalence
high identification low identification
 
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
harm control prevalence
high identification low identification
Figure 1a-d: Simple slopes of Modern Sexism (MS), Neosexism (NS), Benevolent Sexism (BS) and 
Hostile Sexism (HS) as a function of condition and identification, women, Study 3.  
Note: We have two dummy variables, therefore the slopes for high and low identifiers are composed of 
two different slopes. One compares the first dummy with the control (stress) condition, the second one 
compares the second dummy with the control (stress) condition. 
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Figure 1e-h: Simple slopes of Modern Sexism (MS), Neosexism (NS), Benevolent Sexism (BS) and 
Hostile Sexism (HS) as a function of condition and identification, men, Study 3.  
Note: We have two dummy variables, therefore the slopes for high and low identifiers are composed of 
two different slopes. One compares the first dummy with the control (stress) condition, the second one 
compares the second dummy with the control (stress) condition. 
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Final discussion and outlook 
As outlined in the introduction, sexism is still prevalent but has changed its 
appearance in the way that formerly blatant expressions of sexism have now become 
more subtle (Glick et al., 2000; Swim, Becker, Pruitt, & Lee, in press). The most 
important psychological concepts of subtle sexism are Modern Sexism (Swim, Aikin, 
Hall, & Hunter, 1995), Neosexism (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995) and 
Ambivalent Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Subtle expressions of sexism are typically 
less visible and obvious than blatant sexism, as they are internalized as customary 
behavior (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995) and hence often remain unnoticed (Barreto & 
Ellemers, 2005a, 2005b). Not only men, but also many women take an active part in 
maintaining the current gender system by “doing gender” (West & Zimmerman, 1987) 
and by endorsing sexist beliefs (e.g., Heitmeyer, 2007; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; 
Swim, Mallett, Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). Recent research has identified 
several psychological factors as predictors of women’s acceptance of sexist attitudes 
(e.g., Christopher & Mull, 2006; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; 
Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson 2006), but a coherent parsimonious theoretical model 
was still missing. Accordingly, the first purpose of the present research (Manuscript 
#1) was to shed light on the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon that, even though 
women belong to the target group of gender discrimination, many of them support the 
gender hegemony. Based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and 
Social Role Theory (Eagly & Wood, 1999), the Gender Identity Model (GIM) was 
introduced to explain this phenomenon. Three studies provided preliminary, but clear 
evidence for the usefulness of the GIM to explain differences in women’s 
endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs and engagement in collective action. 
As a direct consequence of advancing knowledge about predictors to explain 
endorsement of sexist beliefs, the second part of the present research focused on 
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ways to reduce endorsement of these beliefs (Manuscript #2). So far, no research 
work has yet investigated a method to reduce subtle sexist beliefs, and only little 
research has so far analyzed changes in other gender-related concepts which were 
caused by long-term teaching projects (e.g., Jones & Jacklin, 1988; Henderson-King 
& Steward, 1999). The second part of the present dissertation (Manuscript #2) 
therefore aimed at identifying factors which help to reduce subtle sexist beliefs. It was 
posited that many individuals lack awareness of the prevalence of sexism and the 
harm experienced by the targets of gender discrimination (Benokraitis & Feagin, 
1995; Swim, Mallet, & Stangor, 2004). A heightened knowledge about the prevalence 
of sexism was predicted to reduce endorsement of modern sexist beliefs, whereas a 
heightened sensitivity for the harm of sexism was predicted to result in decreased 
endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs. These effects were predicted to be 
moderated by gender identification. Results of three experimental studies provided 
strong support for the reduction of prejudice through heightened knowledge about the 
prevalence and harm of sexism and partial evidence for the moderating role of 
gender identification.  
1. Predictors of women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs: 
The GIM 
Previous research catalogued many relatively stable personality factors as 
predictors of sexism (e.g., Christopher & Mull, 2006; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007; 
Whitley, 1999), but ignored the fact that many women endorse sexist beliefs although 
they belong to the target group of gender discrimination. Thus, group membership, 
i.e., strength of gender identification should play an important role in explaining the 
acceptance of sexist beliefs. However, only little research has so far considered the 
strength of gender identification as an important predictor for endorsement of sexist 
beliefs and engagement in collective action (for exceptions see Cameron & Lalonde, 
FINAL DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK 
 169
2001; Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000; Harquail, 2007). A further important, but almost 
neglected distinction, which needs to be made, is between the strength of gender 
identification and the identity content (see for example, Downing & Roush, 1985; 
Foster, 1999). To the best of our knowledge, only Condor (1984) combined strength 
of gender identification, and identity content. However, Condor did not analyze the 
strength of gender identification and content of identity in explaining women’s 
endorsement of sexist beliefs. In the first Manuscript of the present dissertation 
(Manuscript #1), we therefore developed the GIM incorporating strength of 
identification and identity content as two orthogonal dimensions of gender identity. 
The GIM combines theoretical insights from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979) and Social Role Theory (Eagly & Wood, 1999) and is thus based on a strong 
theoretical background. According to the GIM, different gender identities can be 
separated which in turn are expected to be differently related to endorsement of 
sexist beliefs. Highly identified women who connect traditional contents with the 
gender category (i.e., have internalized a traditional gender role) were expected to 
endorse sexist beliefs and to reject collective action more strongly than highly 
identified women who associate progressive contents with their gender in-group (i.e., 
have internalized a progressive gender role). We did not predict this difference for 
low identified women. Three studies, one correlational survey and two experiments, 
confirmed our assumptions: Women indeed show a stronger endorsement of 
benevolent, hostile and modern sexist beliefs and a stronger rejection of collective 
action when they are highly identified with their gender in-group and connect 
traditional contents with the female gender category as compared to those women 
who associate progressive contents with women as a group. In contrast, the content 
of identity had almost no effect on the endorsement of sexist beliefs when women are 
low identified with their gender in-group. Hence, our research highlights the 
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importance of separating strength of gender identification and content of gender 
identity in explaining women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs.  
Overall, the GIM closes an important gap in previous research by offering an 
explanation for why some women support the gender status quo, although they are 
members of the target group of gender discrimination, whereas others not only reject 
sexist beliefs but also engage in collective action in order to change the unequal 
gender system. Moreover, we demonstrated that identification motivates to think and 
act on behalf of the in-group and that identity content directs thinking and behavior. 
2. Antidotes 
Although subtle sexist beliefs are still prevalent, there is a dearth of studies 
which have explicitly investigated psychological factors to reduce them (an exception 
are studies about the influence of long-term teaching projects on changing gender-
related concepts, e.g., Jones & Jacklin, 1988; Henderson-King & Steward, 1999). 
Therefore, in Manuscript #2 this dissertation is based on, we proposed that a 
heightened awareness of the prevalence of sexism reduces modern and neosexist 
beliefs, whereas a heightened awareness of the harm experienced by the targets of 
gender discrimination reduces the endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs in 
particular. In three independent experimental studies we found strong support for 
these assumptions. Women who kept track of sexism in every day life for one week 
by completing a sexism diary showed reduced endorsement of benevolent, modern 
and neosexist beliefs. Moreover, information about the prevalence of sexism reduced 
endorsement of modern (and neosexist) beliefs whereas information about the harm 
of sexism reduced endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs in women and men. 
Hence, the second part of the dissertation extends findings from long-term teaching 
projects on changing gender-related concepts (e.g., Jones & Jacklin, 1988; 
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Henderson-King & Steward, 1999) by indicating that short-term interventions which 
heighten knowledge and awareness of the prevalence of sexism and its harm can 
change subtle sexist beliefs effectively. 
Additionally, we demonstrated that the prejudice reducing effects of 
information about the prevalence of sexism as well as about the harm of sexism were 
consistently stronger for women highly identified and men highly unidentified with 
their gender in-group as compared to highly unidentified women and highly identified 
men (Study 3 in Manuscript #2). Therefore, the present research stresses the 
important role of gender identification in both explaining (cf. Manuscript #1) and 
reducing (cf. Manuscript #2) sexist beliefs. 
In Manuscript #2, we also aimed at testing the impact of the interplay of the 
strength of gender identification and gender role preference on changing subtle 
sexist beliefs. Unfortunately, the gender role preference scale did not work in the 
North American context. Possible reasons are a) a lack of correspondence in the 
meaning of the items after translation from German into English language, b) that the 
participants in the US sample were considerably younger (on average 18/19 years) 
than the participants who were used to construct and validate the gender role 
preference scale (on average 40 years) and c) that the scale expressed behaviors 
which are an important issue in Germany but perhaps taken for granted in the US 
(e.g., being a working mother).  
Therefore, future research investigating the reduction of subtle sexist beliefs 
should consider the role of the strength of gender identification as well as identity 
content. It is likely that interventions to reduce endorsement of sexist beliefs are 
irrelevant for highly identified women who associate progressive values with the 
gender category, because they are less prejudiced anyway. By contrast based on the 
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results of Manuscript #1, interventions might be especially important for those women 
who connect traditional values with the gender category. 
3. General Discussion 
In sum, the present research addressed aspects of sexism which has until 
now received only little empirical attention, for instance the separation of the strength 
of gender identification and identity content in order to predict sexist beliefs and the 
role of awareness of the prevalence of sexism versus the role of knowledge about 
the harm of sexism in regard to reducing sexist beliefs. This research has important 
implications in a number of ways, particularly for the domain of understanding and 
changing power relations between women and men.  
First, the present dissertation clarifies mechanisms of how endorsement of 
sexist beliefs can be predicted in women as well as of how these beliefs can be 
changed, at least in a European and American context. It would be of benefit if future 
research investigates whether a lack of awareness and knowledge about sexism and 
its harm is also one of the reasons for endorsing subtle sexist beliefs in “non-
Western”-countries. As demonstrated by Glick et al. (2000) stronger objective gender 
inequality in a country (as measured with United Nations indices of gender equality) 
is accompanied with more obvious forms of prejudice such as Hostile Sexism. 
Hence, it might be unnecessary to heighten the awareness of the prevalence of 
sexism in countries where gender discrimination is not subtle, but obvious. It is 
therefore likely that the concept of denial of discrimination is only of psychological 
relevance (or meaning) in societies in which gender equity is, at least on the surface, 
culturally valued. Likewise, resentment toward feminists emerges only in those 
countries where a substantial number of women have made efforts to obtain gender 
equality (Swim et al., in press). In addition, concepts developed in the United States, 
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for instance the concept of denial of the discrimination, can, but does not have to be 
the same in other cultures (Gibbons, Hamby & Dennis, 1997; Chia, Allred & Jerzak, 
1997). Hence, although the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory has been successfully 
translated and administered in a variety of cultures (Glick et al., 2000), the suitability 
of the concepts of denial of discrimination, anti-feminism and gender identity need to 
be validated in cultures beyond North America and Europe. 
A second important point of the present research concerns the three reasons 
for women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs outlined before, which are a) legitimizing 
ideologies, b) individual advantages of sexism, and c) lack of awareness of the 
prevalence of sexism and its harm. As argued in the introduction of the dissertation it 
seems to be difficult to change legitimizing ideologies and to withdraw women’s 
individual advantages of sexism, since both serve particular motivational functions 
(e.g., Lerner, 1980; Jost & Banaji, 1994). For this reason, in Manuscript #2, we 
focused on cognitive processes (lack of awareness and knowledge) in order to 
change sexist beliefs. However, we also included system justification (Jost & Banaji, 
1994) as a general measure of legitimizing ideologies in the questionnaire in order to 
be able to control whether these beliefs were also affected by information about 
sexism. Indeed, we obtained evidence that a heightened sensitivity for the 
prevalence of sexism changed more than only subtle sexist beliefs: A higher attention 
to sexism in one’s everyday life and information about the prevalence of sexism also 
reduced the endorsement of system justification beliefs and therefore general 
legitimizing ideologies. Given the motivational functions of the endorsement of 
system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994), this finding is worth remarking. 
Additionally, regarding benevolent sexism on the surface as expression of 
individual advantages for women, it can be argued that attitudes toward individual 
advantages of sexism were changed as well: The stronger rejection of benevolent 
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sexist beliefs in women who have read information about negative consequences of 
sexism might imply a changed attitude toward personal advantages of subtle sexism. 
In other words, realizing the harm of seemingly positive attitudes and behavior for 
women on a macro level might lead to rejections of promised personal benefits on a 
micro level. Realizing that Benevolent and Modern Sexism is harmful to women on a 
macro level, even though the individual woman does not perceive personal 
discrimination in her everyday life, is of particular importance, because that can be a 
first step to stop denial of discrimination and to stop reinforcement of gender 
stereotypes. 
Altogether, our results show that at least in neutral situations, it seems to be 
possible to change subtle sexist beliefs, attitudes toward personal benefits of sexism 
and general legitimizing ideologies through heightening people’s awareness of 
sexism and its harm. 
A third contribution of the present research concerns possible implications for 
interventions to reduce sexist prejudice. Based on the findings of both manuscripts, 
programs that heighten people’s awareness of and knowledge about the prevalence 
and harm of sexism are strongly recommended, especially for women who are highly 
identified with their gender and who connect traditional contents with this category. 
The present research is limited to reducing sexist beliefs in situations were sexism 
did not serve a particular function. Hence, interventions should take place in people’s 
everyday life, where sexist behavior is strategically used and rewarded. Such 
interventions could already start in schools in order to establish an awareness of 
sexism in society and an anti-prejudice norm. 
We argued that keeping track of sexism using a diary-method did not change 
men’s sexist beliefs because the observed incidents might be too ambiguous. 
Accordingly, we found that unambiguous information either about the prevalence or 
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about the harm of sexism could actually reduce endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs 
in men. Hence, less ambiguous information may be better for men at the beginning of 
anti-sexism-interventions, because it might reduce their tendency to attribute sexism 
to other causes. 
Additionally, as demonstrated in this research, the moderating role of gender 
identification should be considered in programs to reduce sexist prejudice by all 
means. Especially regarding interventions for men, it should be taken into account 
that information about the prevalence and harm of sexism implicates the necessity of 
changing the unequal gender system. For highly identified men, such information can 
present a threat to male privilege and elicit resistance. We provided preliminary 
evidence that indeed highly identified men did not decrease their sexist beliefs which 
might indicate that they perceived this information as a greater threat as compared to 
men for whom being male is not as important. However, information about sexism did 
not increase men’s endorsement of sexist beliefs. Future research should therefore 
explore this process more carefully. 
Finally, the present research is closely linked to research on confronting 
sexism (Hyers, 2007; Stangor et al., 2003). It is likely that individuals, who change 
their sexist beliefs, also change their related behavior. Hence, a further interesting 
avenue for future research would be to explore, by means of behavioral indices, 
whether a heightened awareness of sexism and its harm leads not only to a change 
in attitudes but also to more confronting behavior both in women and in men. 
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4. Outlook 
Coming back to a more general level, expropriate and oppressive relationships 
work effectively without the use of force but with consensually shared legitimizing 
ideologies (Jackman, 1994). The use of ideologies conceals and justifies inequality 
and can result, for instance, in non-detection or even denial of subtle sexism 
(Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Swim et al., 2005). As demonstrated in the first part of 
the present research (Manuscript #1), women to whom their gender in-group is 
important and who connect progressive contents with this group reject subtle sexist 
beliefs more strongly and show more approval of collective action in order to change 
the current gender status quo as compared to traditional women. It is likely that this 
goes back to the understanding that women have a lower status in society than men 
(cf. Condor, 1984). Hence, women who are aware of gender discrimination are more 
likely to reject sexist beliefs. This hypothesis was proofed in the second part of the 
present research (Manuscript #2): Paying attention toward sexism as well as 
increasing knowledge that sexism is prevalent and harmful can change endorsement 
of subtle sexist beliefs. 
According to Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony, consent is not 
automatic, yet is produced and transmitted by the civil society, e.g., political 
organizations, church, schools, the media, or family. To change society involves a 
period of negotiation carried out in all institutions of society and culture. Hence, from 
an idealistic point of view, the findings of the present dissertation indicate that a 
promising way to change gender hegemony in society would be to heighten the 
awareness of sexism and its harm in the civil society, to establish anti-discrimination 
norms and to engage in actions to change inequality (Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 
1990). 
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However, besides the discussed psychological mechanism of heighten 
sensitivity and attitude change, political equality can only be achieved by subtracting 
power from the advantaged group (cf. Jackman, 1994). It is self-evident that 
dominants will not give up their advantages voluntarily. This can be seen, for 
instance, in negative reactions toward feminism, such as the so called “backlash 
decade” (Faludi, 1991) of the 1980s that produced a new wave of sexism. Therefore, 
besides changes in individuals on a micro level, societal changes on macro level are 
necessary to reach actual gender equality. 
The necessity of changes on the micro and macro level are not only confined 
to gender discrimination, but should certainly be applied to all kinds of expropriate 
and unequal relationships between groups, such as those caused by socioeconomic 
status and ethnicity. 
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Internalisierung von Sexismus bei Frauen: Prädiktoren und 
Interventionsmöglichkeiten 
Sexistische Inhalte werden nicht nur von Männern unterstützt, sondern auch 
von vielen Frauen befürwortet (Jackman, 1994; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Rudman 
& Glick in press). In der vorliegenden Dissertation wurde dieses Phänomen 
aufgegriffen und zunächst der Frage nachgegangen, wie sowohl die unterschiedliche 
Zustimmung zu Sexismus als auch unterschiedliches Engagement gegen Sexismus 
von Frauen erklärt werden kann. Daran anschließend wurde untersucht, welche 
Möglichkeiten es gibt, die Zustimmung zu subtilem Sexismus bei Frauen und 
Männern zu reduzieren.  
In der psychologischen Forschung wurden bislang Prädiktoren zur Vorhersage 
von Sexismus bei Menschen generell untersucht, ohne zu beachten, dass viele 
Frauen sexistischen Inhalten zustimmen, obwohl sie der Gruppe angehören, gegen 
die Sexismus gerichtet ist. An dieser Forschungslücke ansetzend wurde im ersten 
Teil der vorliegenden Dissertation berücksichtigt, dass zwar alle Frauen der 
Kategorie Frau angehören, sich aber darin unterscheiden, wie wichtig bzw. unwichtig 
ihnen diese Gruppenmitgliedschaft ist, d.h. wie stark sie sich mit der 
Geschlechtskategorie identifizieren (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Zusätzlich wurde 
beachtet, dass Frauen unterschiedliche Inhalte mit der Geschlechtskategorie 
verknüpfen können (progressive versus traditionelle Inhalte). Durch die Kombination 
der Dimensionen Stärke und Inhalt der Identifikation wurde das „Gender Identity 
Model“ entwickelt. Auf der Basis des „Gender Identity Model“ wurden folgende 
Hypothesen formuliert: Frauen, die sich stark mit der Kategorie Frau identifizieren 
und gleichzeitig traditionelle Inhalte mit dieser Kategorie verknüpfen, sollten im 
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Vergleich zu denjenigen, die ebenfalls stark identifiziert sind, aber progressive Inhalte 
mit der Kategorie verbinden, allen Formen von Sexismus eher zustimmen und sich 
nicht für eine Veränderung des Status quo einsetzen. Im Gegensatz dazu sollte sich 
bei niedrig identifizierten Frauen kein Unterschied zwischen denjenigen, die 
progressive und denjenigen, die traditionelle Inhalte mit der Kategorie Frau 
verknüpfen, in der Zustimmung zu Sexismus zeigen. Operationalisiert wurde der 
Inhalt der Identifikation mit der individuellen Geschlechtsrollenpräferenz einer Frau. 
In einem Pretest wurde eine Skala zur Messung der Geschlechtsrollenpräferenz 
entwickelt und in drei anschließenden Studien wurden die Vorhersagen des „Gender 
Identity Model“ überprüft. In einer ersten korrelativen Studie konnten die Hypothesen 
bestätigt werden. Zwei zusätzliche Experimente untersuchten die kausale Richtung 
des Zusammenhanges zwischen den Formen der Identifikation und der Zustimmung 
zu sexistischen Überzeugungen. Der Inhalt der Identifikation wurde durch ein Priming 
einer traditionellen oder einer progressiven Geschlechtsrolle experimentell 
manipuliert. Dagegen  wurde die Stärke der Identifikation gemessen und als 
quasiexperimenteller Faktor behandelt. Es wurde getestet, ob eine saliente 
traditionelle Geschlechtsrolle bei starker Identifikation mit der Geschlechtskategorie 
die Zustimmung zu Sexismus erhöht (Hypothese 1) und ob eine saliente progressive 
Geschlechtsrolle bei starker Identifikation mit der Geschlechtskategorie die 
Zustimmung zu Sexismus reduziert (Hypothese 2). Während sich im ersten 
Experiment nur für collective action beide Hypothesen bestätigen ließen, sich für 
benevolenten und hostilen Sexismus jedoch nur Hypothese 2 empirisch bewährte, 
fanden im zweiten Experiment beide Hypothesen für benevolenten, modernen und 
hostilen Sexismus Bestätigung: Moderierte Regressionen ergaben, dass hoch mit 
der Geschlechtskategorie identifizierte Frauen, bei denen ein Priming einer 
progressiven Geschlechtsrolle erfolgt war, benevolenten, modernen und hostilen 
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Sexismus signifikant stärker ablehnten als hochidentifizierte Frauen in der 
Kontrollgruppe. Im Gegensatz dazu akzeptierten Frauen, die sich hoch mit der 
Geschlechtskategorie identifizierten und mit einer traditionellen Geschlechtsrolle 
geprimt wurden, benevolenten, modernen und hostilen Sexismus signifikant stärker, 
als Personen, die nicht geprimt wurden. Für Frauen, die sich wenig mit der 
Geschlechtskategorie identifizierten, zeigte sich kein Effekt des Priming auf die 
Zustimmung zu sexistischen Inhalten. 
Im zweiten Teil der Dissertation wurden Möglichkeiten der Reduktion von 
Sexismus untersucht. In drei Experimenten wurden die beiden Hypothesen getestet, 
dass a) die Akzeptanz von modernem Sexismus durch ein erhöhtes Bewusstsein für 
die Prävalenz von Sexismus verringert werden kann und b) die Akzeptanz von 
benevolentem Sexismus durch erhöhtes Wissen über die negativen Konsequenzen 
des scheinbar „positiven“ Sexismus reduziert werden kann. In einem ersten 
Experiment wurde zunächst untersucht, ob eine erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit für 
Sexismus im Alltag zu veränderten Einstellungen führt. Um die Aufmerksamkeit für 
Sexismus im Alltag zu erhöhen, wurde US-amerikanische Studierende gebeten, eine 
Woche lang entweder ein strukturiertes Sexismustagebuch oder ein strukturiertes 
Stresstagebuch (Kontrollgruppe) auszufüllen. Es zeigte sich, dass eine erhöhte 
Aufmerksamkeit für Sexismus die Zustimmung zu benevolentem, modernem und 
Neosexismus bei Frauen abschwächen kann. In einem zweiten Experiment waren 
US-amerikanische Studierende aufgefordert einen von drei Informationstexten, a) 
über die Prävalenz von Sexismus oder b) über die negativen Konsequenzen des 
scheinbar „positiven“ Sexismus oder c) über Stress im Leben von Studierenden, zu 
bewerten. Gemessen wurde, ob die Texte die Zustimmung zu verschiedenen 
Formen von Sexismus unterschiedlich beeinflussten. Es zeigte sich, dass Information 
über die Prävalenz von Sexismus zu einer stärkeren Ablehnung von modernem 
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Sexismus führte, während sich Informationen über negative Konsequenzen des 
scheinbar „positiven“ Sexismus in einer stärkeren Ablehnung von benevolentem 
Sexismus niederschlugen. Ergebnisse eines dritten Experiments replizierten und 
erweiterten die Befunde der vorangegangen Studie in einem europäischen Kontext. 
Es zeigte sich, dass die vorurteilsreduzierenden Effekte bei stark mit der 
Geschlechtskategorie identifizierten Frauen und wenig identifizierten Männern 
besonders groß waren. In allen drei Studien zeigte sich außerdem, dass eine erhöhte 
Aufmerksamkeit für die Prävalenz von Sexismus nicht nur sexistische Einstellungen 
veränderte, sondern ebenfalls die Tendenz zur Systemrechtfertigung (Jost & Banaji, 
1994) verringerte. 
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